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Supreme Court of the United States • 1898

United States v. Wong Kim Ark

169 U.S. 649 | 18 S. Ct. 456 | 42 L. Ed. 890 | 1898 U.S. LEXIS 1515

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Takeaway

In short, this case constitutionalized birthright citizenship: with narrow historical exceptions, anyone born on United States soil and subject to its laws is a United States citizen, regardless of the citizenship or race of the parents.

Background

Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco in 1873. His parents were Chinese subjects who had established a permanent residence and business in San Francisco, but had never been diplomats or other officials of the Chinese government. Wong lived in California, made two temporary trips to China, and each time intended to return to the United States.

When Wong returned from his second trip in 1895, the customs collector refused to let him land solely because the government did not regard him as a United States citizen. The Chinese Exclusion Acts would not apply if he was a citizen. Wong sought habeas corpus relief in federal district court, which held that he was a citizen by birth and ordered his release. The United States appealed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a person born in the United States to Chinese parents who are foreign subjects but permanently resident, non-diplomatic aliens is a United States citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding

Yes. A child born in the United States to resident alien parents is a citizen at birth when the parents are subject to United States law and are not diplomats, hostile occupying forces, or members of an Indian tribe owing direct allegiance to that tribe.

Reasoning

The Fourteenth Amendment declares that all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction are citizens. The Court read that language against the established common-law rule of jus soli: birth within a sovereign's territory and allegiance ordinarily creates citizenship, regardless of a child's parentage.

Under English common law, which the Court found had been adopted in the American colonies and continued in the United States, a child born in the country to alien parents was a natural-born subject. The traditional exceptions were narrow: children of foreign diplomats, children born to enemy forces occupying domestic territory, and analogous circumstances in which the territorial sovereign lacked full authority over the child or parent.

The phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” did not require parents to owe exclusive or permanent allegiance to the United States. Resident aliens are subject to American laws, owe local and temporary allegiance while present, and receive the nation's protection. That relationship places both the parents and their American-born children within the jurisdiction required by the Amendment.

The Court distinguished Elk v. Wilkins, which involved a member of a recognized Indian tribe. Tribal members were understood at the time to owe direct allegiance to their tribes rather than to the United States, an exceptional political relationship not shared by ordinary resident aliens.

The Court also relied on the Amendment's text, purpose, and contemporaneous history. Although the Amendment was centrally intended to secure citizenship for formerly enslaved people, its language applies to all persons without racial limitation. Congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment specifically considered children of Chinese immigrants and did not exclude them from birthright citizenship.

Issue #2

Whether Chinese exclusion laws, treaties denying naturalization to Chinese subjects, or Congress's refusal to authorize naturalization for Chinese immigrants could limit citizenship acquired by birth under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding

No. A statute or treaty concerning the admission, exclusion, or naturalization of aliens cannot override citizenship conferred directly by the Fourteenth Amendment at birth.

Reasoning

The Court separated citizenship by birth from citizenship by naturalization. The Constitution recognizes birth and naturalization as distinct sources of citizenship: a person born under the Amendment's stated conditions becomes a citizen immediately and needs no act of Congress to obtain that status.

Congress's authority to establish a uniform rule of naturalization is a power to confer citizenship on people born outside the United States; it is not a power to take away or narrow the constitutional citizenship of persons born here. Thus, Congress's exclusion of Chinese immigrants from ordinary naturalization could not imply that their United States-born children lacked citizenship.

The Chinese Exclusion Acts governed Chinese aliens born abroad who remained subjects of China. The Court had upheld Congress's broad authority to exclude or expel aliens, but that power did not extend to a person who was already a United States citizen by birth, whatever his race or ancestry.

Treaties and statutes must yield to the Constitution. The treaty provision stating that it did not confer naturalization on Chinese subjects addressed naturalization, not the constitutional consequence of birth in the United States.

Issue #3

Whether Wong Kim Ark lost any citizenship by making temporary visits to China.

Holding

No. On the agreed facts, Wong neither renounced his United States citizenship nor performed any act that forfeited it.

Reasoning

The parties agreed that Wong's residence remained in California, that his trips to China were temporary and made with the intention to return, and that neither he nor his parents had renounced his allegiance to the United States. Those stipulations left no factual basis to find a loss of citizenship.

The Court recognized that an adult citizen may be able to expatriate, but found no need to decide the effect of any act by a minor or by parents acting for a minor. The case presented only the narrower question whether Wong acquired citizenship at birth, and the Court concluded that he did.

Dissents

Chief Justice Fuller

Reasoning

Chief Justice Fuller, joined by Justice Harlan, rejected the majority's view that the English common-law rule of birthplace controlled American national citizenship. In his view, nationality is fundamentally a question of public and international law, under which citizenship ordinarily follows parentage and political allegiance rather than the mere geographic location of birth.

The dissent maintained that the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that a person be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States means completely subject to its political jurisdiction and owing it direct, immediate, and exclusive allegiance. Children of foreign nationals who retained permanent allegiance to another sovereign, Fuller argued, did not meet that condition merely because they were born on American soil.

Fuller read the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment together. The Act's phrase, “not subject to any foreign power,” in his view, showed that the Amendment was not intended to make citizens of children whose parents remained foreign subjects. He regarded the Amendment's main purpose as securing citizenship for formerly enslaved people, who were born in the United States and owed no foreign allegiance.

The dissent further stressed that Chinese subjects could not then be naturalized under United States law and that the relevant treaties with China expressly withheld naturalization. In Fuller's view, those legal arrangements reflected the governments' shared understanding that Chinese residents remained aliens; their children therefore should not gain citizenship simply by birth in the United States.

Finally, Fuller warned that the majority's rule would restrict the political branches' authority over immigration, naturalization, and treaty relations. He would have held that Wong Kim Ark remained a Chinese subject and reversed the district court's order.