Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 2013

United States v. Windsor

133 S. Ct. 2675 | 186 L. Ed. 2d 808 | 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4921 | 570 U.S. 744 | 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 445 | 81 U.S.L.W. 4633

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Takeaway

In short, Windsor invalidated DOMA §3 because the Federal Government could not deny recognition and dignity to same-sex marriages that States had made lawful, while leaving the broader question of state marriage bans unresolved at that time.

Background

Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, New York residents, married in Ontario, Canada, in 2007. New York recognized their marriage. When Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor sought the federal estate-tax marital deduction, but §3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defined “marriage” and “spouse” for all federal statutes and regulations to exclude same-sex couples. The IRS therefore denied the deduction, and Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes.

Windsor sued for a refund, arguing that DOMA §3 violated the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. During the litigation, the Executive Branch concluded that §3 was unconstitutional and declined to defend it, but continued enforcing it and refused to pay Windsor’s refund. The House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) intervened to defend the statute. The District Court held §3 unconstitutional and ordered a refund; the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Article III and prudential considerations permitted the Court to decide the case after the Executive agreed that DOMA §3 was unconstitutional but continued to withhold Windsor’s refund.

Holding

Yes. The United States retained an Article III stake because the judgment required it to pay money, and BLAG’s defense of DOMA supplied sufficient adversarial presentation to overcome prudential concerns.

Reasoning

Windsor had a concrete injury when the Government denied her the estate-tax exemption and refund. That injury remained unredressed because the Executive continued to enforce DOMA §3 and refused to pay the ordered refund, even though it agreed with Windsor’s constitutional position.

The Government also had a sufficient stake on appeal. A judgment ordering the Treasury to pay Windsor $363,053 imposed a real and immediate economic injury on the United States. The Government’s agreement with the legal conclusion below did not erase the financial consequence of the judgment or the live dispute over whether it had to pay.

The Court distinguished Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement from prudential limits on the exercise of jurisdiction. Article III was satisfied because Windsor still sought money the Government had not paid; the parties’ alignment on the constitutional question instead raised a prudential concern about whether the litigation was genuinely adversarial.

BLAG’s vigorous defense of §3 gave the Court the concrete adverseness needed to evaluate a difficult constitutional question. The importance and breadth of DOMA—affecting more than 1,000 federal statutes and many people—also weighed in favor of resolving the issue rather than leaving lower courts without controlling guidance.

Because the United States could properly seek review and the prudential concerns were adequately addressed, the Court did not decide whether BLAG independently had standing to appeal.

Issue #2

Whether §3 of DOMA, which denied federal recognition to same-sex marriages valid under state law, violated the Fifth Amendment.

Holding

Yes. DOMA §3 was unconstitutional because its purpose and practical effect were to demean, disadvantage, and stigmatize same-sex couples whose marriages their States had made lawful.

Reasoning

Marriage and domestic relations have historically been regulated primarily by the States, subject to constitutional limits. Although Congress may enact discrete laws affecting marital status to advance particular federal programs, DOMA imposed a sweeping federal definition across more than 1,000 statutes and federal regulations.

New York’s recognition of Windsor and Spyer’s marriage conferred a legal status and dignity of substantial importance. DOMA used the same state-defined class for the opposite purpose: it treated marriages the State considered equal as unequal under federal law and attached disabilities to them throughout the federal code.

The Court did not hold DOMA invalid simply as an intrusion on state authority. Rather, the unusual federal departure from the traditional reliance on state marriage definitions was evidence bearing on DOMA’s purpose and effect under the Fifth Amendment’s protections for liberty and equal treatment.

DOMA’s text, legislative history, title, and operation showed that its central aim was not merely administrative efficiency. Congress enacted the statute to defend heterosexual marriage, discourage state recognition of same-sex marriage, and ensure that same-sex marriages recognized by States would receive second-class treatment under federal law.

In practice, DOMA deprived lawfully married same-sex couples of numerous federal rights and responsibilities involving taxes, Social Security, health benefits, bankruptcy, veterans’ benefits, immigration-related matters, ethics rules, and other areas. It forced couples to be married under state law but unmarried under federal law, undermining the stability and public dignity that state marriage recognition was meant to provide.

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes an equal-protection principle that bars the Federal Government from imposing inequality based on a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group. No legitimate federal purpose overcame DOMA’s purpose and effect of disparaging and injuring same-sex couples in lawful marriages. The holding was confined to same-sex marriages made lawful by a State.

Dissents

Chief Justice Roberts

Reasoning

Chief Justice Roberts agreed with Justice Scalia that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the United States accepted the lower courts’ judgment and sought affirmance rather than relief from that judgment. In his view, the Court therefore should not have reached DOMA’s constitutionality.

On the merits, he concluded that Congress had rational grounds to preserve a uniform federal definition of marriage at a time when every State and nation defined marriage as a union of a man and a woman. The majority, he argued, insufficiently supported its conclusion that the political branches acted from a bare desire to harm same-sex couples.

Roberts emphasized the limited character of the majority’s stated holding. Because the majority relied substantially on the Federal Government’s unusual displacement of state marriage definitions, he read the decision not to resolve whether States themselves could retain the traditional definition of marriage.

Justice Scalia

Reasoning

Justice Scalia argued that there was no Article III controversy because Windsor and the United States agreed on the merits and both sought affirmance of the judgment below. A court may decide constitutional questions only as necessary to resolve a genuine dispute between adverse parties; it cannot issue what is effectively an advisory opinion merely because amici defend the opposite position.

He rejected the majority’s view that the Government’s obligation to pay the refund created sufficient adversity. In his view, the Government could not be an aggrieved appellant when it did not seek to undo the judgment requiring payment and instead requested that the Court affirm it. BLAG’s participation could not create the constitutionally required dispute between the actual parties.

On the merits, Scalia maintained that the Constitution neither requires nor forbids social approval of same-sex marriage. He would have applied rational-basis review and found several conceivable legitimate purposes for DOMA, including providing a uniform federal definition of marriage and preserving the intended operation of federal statutes enacted when marriage was universally understood as opposite-sex.

Scalia sharply criticized the majority for attributing malice and animus to Congress and the President. In his view, defending a traditional understanding of marriage does not itself demonstrate a purpose to demean gay people, and invalidating legislation based on inferred improper motives improperly places courts above democratic debate.

He further contended that, despite the majority’s limiting language, its reasoning would inevitably be used against state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. The Court, he argued, should have left the issue to democratic processes rather than characterizing opponents of same-sex marriage as acting from hostility.

Justice Alito

Reasoning

Justice Alito agreed that the United States was not a proper petitioner because it sought no change in the judgment below. Unlike Justice Scalia, however, he concluded that BLAG had standing to defend DOMA because the House had authorized it to represent the institution’s interests and the invalidation of an Act of Congress impaired Congress’s legislative authority.

On the merits, Alito argued that the Constitution does not establish a fundamental right to same-sex marriage. Such a right was not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition, so the Court should not create it through substantive due process.

He also rejected heightened equal-protection scrutiny. In his view, the dispute reflected competing conceptions of marriage rather than an arbitrary classification: a traditional, conjugal understanding linking marriage to opposite-sex unions and procreation, and a newer, consent-based understanding focused on committed emotional and sexual relationships.

The Constitution, Alito argued, does not choose between those conceptions. Legislatures may adopt either view unless the Constitution specifically forbids it, and judges lack institutional competence to resolve the social, philosophical, and empirical debate over the long-term consequences of same-sex marriage.

Finally, Alito reasoned that DOMA §3 did not prevent States from recognizing same-sex marriages or from granting state-law rights to same-sex couples. It simply defined the class of persons entitled to federal benefits and subject to federal obligations. Assuming Congress had authority to enact the underlying federal programs, he concluded, Congress also had authority to define marriage for those programs.