Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1883

Pace v. Alabama

106 U.S. 583 | 1 S. Ct. 637 | 27 L. Ed. 207 | 1882 U.S. LEXIS 1584 | 16 Otto 583

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Takeaway

In short, Pace v. Alabama adopted a formal equality approach: because Alabama imposed the same severe penalty on both the Black and white participants in an interracial relationship, the Court found no Equal Protection violation, despite the law’s explicit racial classification.

Background

Tony Pace, a Black man, and Mary Cox, a white woman, were indicted in Alabama for living together in adultery or fornication. Alabama Code § 4189 made interracial adultery or fornication a separate offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary or hard labor for two to seven years. Pace was convicted and sentenced to two years of hard labor.

Pace argued that § 4189 violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because it imposed a much harsher punishment than Alabama Code § 4184, which generally punished adultery or fornication between persons of the same race. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, and Pace sought review in the United States Supreme Court.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Alabama’s harsher punishment for interracial adultery or fornication denied a Black defendant the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding

No. The Court held that § 4189 did not discriminate against either race because it imposed the same punishment on both participants in an interracial relationship.

Reasoning

The Court accepted the general principle that the Equal Protection Clause forbids hostile and discriminatory state legislation directed at a person or class. Equal protection, the Court explained, includes protection against greater or different criminal punishment for the same offense because of a person’s race. It cited the Civil Rights Act of 1870 as reflecting that understanding: all persons were to be subject to like punishments and penalties, and no others.

The Court rejected Pace’s premise that Alabama had punished the same offense differently depending on the race of one participant. In the Court’s view, § 4184 generally covered adultery or fornication between persons of different sexes who were of the same race, while § 4189 created a distinct offense that could occur only when the participants were of different races.

Because § 4189 applied identically to both offenders in an interracial relationship, the Court found no race-based discrimination in the statute’s punishment. A white participant and a Black participant each faced the same penalty. The Court characterized the distinction as one directed at the interracial offense itself, rather than at either participant’s race, and therefore affirmed Pace’s conviction.