Bresgal v. Brock

The court began with the 1974 amendment defining agricultural employment to include the handling, planting, drying, packing, processing, freezing, and grading of an “agricultural or horticultural commodity.” Although forestry workers are not ordinarily described as agricultural workers, the statute must be read in light of its overall purpose: protecting migrant laborers from the abusive practices of labor contractors.

The conditions Congress sought to address—misleading recruitment, unsafe transportation, poor housing, wage abuses, and exploitation by labor contractors—exist in forestry just as they do in conventional farming. It would make little sense to protect workers planting fruit trees in orchards while excluding workers planting fir trees for later harvest when both groups face the same contractor-driven harms.

The added 1974 language did more than expand the list of covered processing activities. By covering the planting and handling of agricultural commodities, including work not necessarily performed on a traditional farm, Congress shifted attention from the location of the work to the nature of the commodity and activity. Treating commercially grown trees as agricultural commodities therefore gave effect to the amendment rather than rendering parts of it redundant.

The legislative history confirmed this conclusion. The Senate Report specifically stated that the bill and its penalties were intended to apply to forestry contractors employing illegal aliens as tree planters, thinners, and other forest laborers. That direct statement of congressional intent reinforced the text and the Act’s remedial purpose.

The Secretary’s contrary interpretation received no controlling deference. The Department’s longstanding view concerned the earlier Fair Labor Standards Act definition, not the amended MSPA provision at issue. Moreover, the Department had not interpreted the amended provision until this litigation, and the question was one of statutory construction rather than specialized agency expertise.

The judgment covered recruiting, hiring, employing, furnishing, or transporting migrant or seasonal workers for predominantly manual forestry work, including tree planting, brush clearing, pre-commercial thinning, and forest-fire fighting. The Secretary argued that this definition improperly fixed the boundaries of “forestry work.”

The court concluded that the district court had used the plaintiffs’ description to identify the work at issue, not to establish an exclusive or immutable regulatory definition. The judgment expressly left room for the agency to refine the category in administering the MSPA, and it did not require the Secretary to adopt the precise language in agency regulations.

A non-class action does not invariably limit an injunction to named plaintiffs when broader relief is necessary to provide them complete relief. Because the plaintiffs were migrant workers who could work with contractors operating across state and circuit lines, enforcement could not realistically be confined to contractors who dealt with particular named plaintiffs or were based within the Ninth Circuit.

The injunction ran against the Secretary, who was a party, rather than directly against absent forestry contractors. Thus, the fact that many affected contractors were not parties did not bar an order requiring the Secretary to enforce the Act against them. The district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring enforcement on what was effectively a nationwide basis.

But the district court went beyond what was necessary when it required the Secretary to amend national regulations, revise the Coordinated Enforcement Plan, and notify other federal agencies and potential contractors. Courts may compel an agency to carry out a statutory duty, but ordinarily may not control the agency’s internal choices about how to administer that duty.

The Ninth Circuit therefore modified the injunction. It retained an order barring the Secretary and successors from refusing to enforce the MSPA as to the specified predominantly manual forestry activities, while leaving the method of enforcement to the agency’s discretion.

The Equal Access to Justice Act permits fees to a prevailing party against the United States unless the government’s position was substantially justified. The court noted uncertainty over whether the 1985 amendments required a standard more demanding than simple reasonableness.

The court did not need to resolve that doctrinal question because the government’s position met either formulation. The statutory language was ambiguous, there was no directly controlling precedent, and the Secretary had an arguable legal basis for relying on conventional definitions that excluded commercial forestry.