The claimed losses were consequential rather than direct damages. Hyman-Michaels did not lose the $27,000 itself, interest on the funds, or a transfer fee. Instead, it sought losses caused by the business disruption that followed the missed payment: arbitration costs and profits lost when the shipowner canceled the favorable charter.
The court assumed that Uniform Commercial Code Article 4 did not govern electronic fund transfers, following the Second Circuit’s approach in Delbrueck. It therefore applied common-law principles, especially Hadley v. Baxendale, rather than deciding whether Article 4’s bad-faith limitation on consequential damages applied.
Under Hadley, consequential damages are recoverable only when the defendant had notice of the special circumstances making those losses a probable result of breach or negligence. Illinois cases applied that rule even where a transmission company negligently mishandled a money order. General awareness that delayed payments can cause harm is not enough.
Swiss Bank knew that the transfer concerned payment for the hire of a vessel named Pandora, but it did not know the payment deadline, the favorable terms of the charter, the shipowner’s desire to escape the deal, or Hyman-Michaels’s particular vulnerability to another late payment. It therefore had no basis to infer that losing a $27,000 payment instruction could expose it to more than $2 million in losses.
The notice rule also serves an economic function: it places extraordinary losses on the party best positioned to prevent or insure against them unless that party specifically shifts the risk by contract. Swiss Bank could not sensibly calibrate its staffing, safeguards, or insurance to risks it could not measure and that arose from a business relationship to which it was not a party.
Hyman-Michaels, by contrast, knew exactly how valuable and fragile its charter was. It had already experienced one threatened cancellation, waited until arguably the last possible day to initiate an international transfer, and, once it learned the payment had failed, did not immediately send a duplicate wire or use a banker’s check, courier, or other rapid method to get funds to Geneva.
The court treated Hyman-Michaels’s conduct as analogous to the avoidable-consequences doctrine. Its earlier decision to operate with no margin for error resembled failing to take a precaution before an accident, while its failure to make a duplicate payment after learning of the problem resembled unreasonably allowing an injury to worsen. Its own imprudence thus independently reinforced the conclusion that Swiss Bank should not bear the extraordinary losses.
The Illinois telegraph cases relied on by Hyman-Michaels did not compel a different result. In those cases, the transmission companies knew the precise type of loss their errors would cause, and the senders had not failed to protect themselves. Here, Swiss Bank had much less information, while Hyman-Michaels failed to take readily available steps to prevent the cancellation.