Maryann Favale worked as an administrative assistant at Saint Joseph’s School for about twenty-one years. In late 2002, Sister Bernice Stobierski became interim principal and later became the school’s full-time principal. Favale alleged that, between December 2002 and June 2003, Sister Stobierski sexually harassed her through inappropriate touching, suggestive comments, lewd conduct, and requests for physical affection.
Favale notified the Roman Catholic Diocese of Bridgeport of the alleged harassment in June 2003. She then sued the Diocese for sexual harassment, retaliation, defamation, emotional-distress torts, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and related claims. Her husband, Mark Favale, asserted loss of consortium. Sister Stobierski was not a party to the action.
At Sister Stobierski’s 2005 deposition, plaintiffs’ counsel sought testimony about her alleged anger-management history and any psychological or psychiatric illnesses and treatment. Counsel for Stobierski and the Diocese objected and instructed her not to answer. The plaintiffs moved under Rule 37 to compel her testimony and to require the Diocese to produce related records. The Diocese sought a protective order, arguing that the information was irrelevant, privileged, and improperly sought from a nonparty who had not been subpoenaed.
Issue #1
Whether the court had authority to decide discovery motions concerning Sister Stobierski even though she was a nonparty witness who had not been subpoenaed.
Holding
Yes, but only for the limited purpose of resolving these motions, because Sister Stobierski voluntarily appeared and testified at her deposition.
Reasoning
The Diocese argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Sister Stobierski because she was not a party and had not been served with a subpoena. The court concluded, however, that her voluntary appearance and deposition testimony supplied sufficient authority to decide the discovery dispute then before it.
The court cautioned that this limited ruling did not excuse formal process in later discovery. If plaintiffs again needed Sister Stobierski’s testimony, they were required to subpoena her under Rule 45, despite counsel’s assertion that he had relied on defense counsel’s earlier representations in electing not to subpoena her for this deposition.
Issue #2
Whether plaintiffs could compel Sister Stobierski to testify about treatment for alleged anger-management, psychological, or psychiatric conditions.
Holding
No. The requested testimony was not relevant to any claim or defense because it did not tend to show a known propensity for sexual harassment.
Reasoning
Rule 26 permits broad discovery of nonprivileged matters relevant to the claims or defenses in the case, and Rule 37 permits an order compelling discovery when a proper request has not been answered. But discovery remains subject to relevance limits, and the court has broad discretion to weigh relevance against the burden and intrusiveness of the proposed inquiry.
Under Connecticut law, negligent hiring and negligent supervision require proof that the employer knew or reasonably should have known of the employee’s propensity for the particular type of tortious conduct that caused the plaintiff’s injury. Thus, the relevant notice inquiry is not whether the employer knew generally that an employee had problems, but whether it knew of a propensity for the conduct at issue.
Favale alleged injury from repeated sexual harassment. She did not allege that Stobierski’s anger-management problems or psychological or psychiatric conditions caused, contributed to, or manifested themselves as sexual harassment. Even if the Diocese knew of those conditions, that knowledge would not establish notice of a propensity to commit sexual harassment. The testimony therefore did not bear on the negligent-hiring or negligent-supervision claims, and the motion to compel was denied.
Issue #3
Whether plaintiffs could compel the Diocese to produce records concerning Sister Stobierski’s alleged anger-management, psychological, or psychiatric treatment, and whether a protective order should issue barring further discovery into those subjects.
Holding
No; the records were irrelevant, and the court granted a protective order barring further discovery into those highly personal matters.
Reasoning
The same notice requirement governed the request for Diocese records. To support negligent hiring or supervision, records would need to bear on whether the Diocese had notice of Stobierski’s propensity for the type of conduct that injured Favale—here, sexual harassment.
Records of anger-management treatment or psychological and psychiatric conditions would not, without more, demonstrate a propensity for sexual harassment. Because plaintiffs alleged sexual harassment rather than harm caused by anger, emotional instability, or psychiatric conditions, the requested records were outside the proper scope of discovery.
The court also emphasized the profoundly personal character of the requested medical and treatment information. Given both its lack of relevance and its sensitive nature, the court sustained the Diocese’s objection, denied the request to compel production, and entered a protective order precluding future discovery into those subjects.