Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 2013

City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n

133 S. Ct. 1863 | 185 L. Ed. 2d 941 | 2013 U.S. LEXIS 3838 | 569 U.S. 290

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that there is no freestanding “jurisdictional” exception to Chevron: when Congress gives an agency general authority to administer a statute, courts apply ordinary Chevron review to the agency’s permissible interpretation of ambiguous limits on its own power.

Background

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 limits state and local authority over the placement of wireless facilities. One limit, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), requires local governments to act on wireless-siting applications within a “reasonable period of time.” The Communications Act also gives the FCC general authority to make rules necessary to carry out the Act.

After wireless providers reported persistent local delays, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling construing a reasonable period as presumptively 90 days for collocation applications and 150 days for other siting applications. The presumptions were rebuttable. Arlington and San Antonio argued that the FCC lacked authority to interpret this provision, relying on the statute’s saving clause for local zoning authority and its provision for judicial review of local decisions.

The Fifth Circuit applied Chevron to the threshold question of the FCC’s authority, found the statute ambiguous on that point, and held that the FCC’s interpretation was permissible. It also upheld the 90- and 150-day presumptive timeframes. The Supreme Court granted review only on whether Chevron applies to an agency’s interpretation concerning the scope of its own statutory authority.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Chevron deference applies when an agency interprets an ambiguous statutory provision bearing on the scope of its own regulatory authority.

Holding

Yes. Chevron applies to an agency’s permissible interpretation of an ambiguity concerning the scope of its authority, just as it applies to other ambiguities in a statute the agency administers.

Reasoning

Chevron requires a court first to use ordinary tools of statutory interpretation to determine whether Congress directly addressed the precise question. If Congress spoke clearly, both court and agency must follow that command. If the statute remains ambiguous, the court asks whether the agency adopted a permissible construction. The doctrine rests on the presumption that Congress ordinarily intends an administering agency, rather than a court, to resolve ambiguities within the bounds of a reasonable interpretation.

The Court rejected a separate category of nondeferential “jurisdictional” questions. For agencies, an allegedly incorrect application of statutory authority and an allegedly unauthorized assertion of authority present the same basic question: whether the agency has gone beyond what Congress allowed. Unlike a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, an agency’s authority to act cannot meaningfully be separated from the statutory limits governing how it acts.

The Court illustrated the point with hypothetical statutes regulating common carriers. Whether a statute directly grants an agency “jurisdiction” to prohibit unreasonable conditions or instead prohibits those conditions and gives the agency broad rulemaking power, the substantive question is the same: whether the agency may regulate a particular actor or practice. The availability of Chevron cannot sensibly turn on which drafting form Congress chose.

Supreme Court precedent consistently applies Chevron to provisions that define or limit agency authority, including interpretations involving the FCC’s authority over pole attachments, the CFTC’s authority over state-law counterclaims, and the Army Corps’ authority over adjacent wetlands. Even in cases involving economically and politically significant agency assertions of power, the Court has used the Chevron framework rather than creating a jurisdictional exception.

The Court did not hold that an agency may define its power without constraint. Courts must rigorously enforce clear statutory boundaries at Chevron step one. But when Congress has left an ambiguous boundary and the agency gives it a permissible reading, a court need not first classify the issue as jurisdictional; the permissible agency construction controls.

Issue #2

Whether the Communications Act’s protection of traditional state and local zoning authority bars Chevron deference to the FCC’s interpretation of the wireless-siting timing requirement.

Holding

No. The case does not present a federalism-based reason to withhold Chevron deference.

Reasoning

Section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) itself imposes a federal limitation on local authority by requiring action on siting applications within a reasonable period of time. The meaning of that federal requirement is therefore a question of federal law.

The practical choice was not between federal regulation and local autonomy. Congress had already imposed the federal timing constraint; the remaining question was whether the FCC or federal courts would supply its meaning. The saving clause did not create a special federalism exception to Chevron for interpreting the express limitations in § 332(c)(7)(B).

Concurrences

Justice Breyer

Reasoning

Justice Breyer agreed that the jurisdictional/nonjurisdictional distinction is generally illusory and that the FCC was entitled to deference here. He emphasized, however, that a court must independently determine whether Congress delegated authority to the agency to make interpretations carrying the force of law before applying Chevron.

In his view, statutory ambiguity is often, but not invariably, evidence that Congress intended an agency to fill a gap. Courts may also consider context-specific factors, including the agency’s expertise, the interstitial or central nature of the question, the complexity of the regulatory program, the agency’s care and consistency, the statutory structure, and whether the subject lies within another agency’s domain.

Applying that approach, he concluded that the FCC had authority to interpret the reasonable-time requirement. The Communications Act grants the FCC broad administrative and rulemaking authority; “reasonable period of time” is open-ended; and the timing issue is an interstitial, technically informed matter. The saving clause expressly yields to § 332(c)(7)(B), while the judicial-review provision merely supplies a remedy and does not withdraw the FCC’s interpretive authority.

Dissents

Chief Justice Roberts

Reasoning

Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, maintained that a court may not defer to an agency until the court independently decides that Congress delegated interpretive authority to that agency over the particular question at issue. Chevron deference is legitimate only because Congress has authorized the agency to make a binding choice within a statutory gap; an agency cannot receive deference in deciding whether that delegation exists.

The dissent distinguished the relevant inquiry from a line between important “jurisdictional” issues and routine applications of authority. The question is instead antecedent to Chevron: whether Congress gave the agency power to issue an interpretation with the force of law concerning the specific statutory provision and ambiguity before the court. Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Marbury, courts must independently decide that legal question.

The dissent read Chevron, Adams Fruit, Mead, and Gonzales as requiring a provision-specific inquiry into delegated authority. A general grant to administer a statute may often support deference, but it does not automatically establish that the agency may authoritatively interpret every provision, particularly where Congress may have allocated authority elsewhere or carved out an exception.

The dissent viewed the majority’s approach as insufficiently protective against agency self-expansion. Because agencies combine substantial rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative powers, courts must police the boundary between Congress’s legislative authority and executive agencies’ delegated authority. The Fifth Circuit should therefore have decided de novo whether the FCC had authority over § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), rather than deferring to the FCC’s answer to that threshold question.