Whether Congress could permit a jury to infer interstate transportation from the failure to release a kidnap victim within the statutory period.
Holding
Yes. The statutory inference was constitutional because it was rebuttable and rested on a rational connection between prolonged detention and interstate transportation.
Reasoning
The Court distinguished a permissible evidentiary inference from a rule that conclusively establishes guilt. The kidnapping statute did not make the defendant guilty merely because the victim remained detained beyond the stated period. Instead, it allowed the jury to infer interstate transportation while leaving the defendant free to offer evidence that no interstate movement occurred.
Congress could reasonably conclude that a kidnapping victim who is held for an extended period is likely to have been moved across state lines. That practical connection was sufficient to support an inference in a statute directed at a crime that often involves concealment, mobility, and difficulty of direct proof.
Because the inference was not arbitrary and did not prevent Rathbun from contesting the interstate-transportation element, it did not violate due process or improperly enlarge federal criminal jurisdiction.