Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 2013

Missouri v. McNeely

133 S. Ct. 1552 | 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 | 2013 U.S. LEXIS 3160 | 569 U.S. 141 | 81 U.S.L.W. 4250 | 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 150

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Takeaway

In short, this case rejects a blanket rule that alcohol dissipation always excuses a warrant: warrantless DUI blood draws are constitutional only when the total circumstances show that obtaining a warrant is impracticable.

Background

At about 2:08 a.m., a Missouri officer stopped Tyler McNeely after seeing him speed and repeatedly cross the centerline. McNeely showed signs of intoxication, performed poorly on field-sobriety tests, and refused a portable breath test. After arresting him, the officer took him to a hospital when McNeely indicated that he would refuse a breath test at the station.

At the hospital, McNeely refused to consent to a blood test even after the officer explained Missouri's implied-consent consequences. The officer directed a lab technician to draw McNeely's blood without seeking a warrant. The sample, taken about 25 minutes after the stop, showed a BAC of 0.154 percent. McNeely was charged with driving while intoxicated.

The trial court suppressed the blood-test result. It found no exigency beyond the ordinary dissipation of alcohol because the officer had not tried to obtain a warrant and faced no unusual emergency. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Schmerber requires a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry and that alcohol dissipation alone does not justify every nonconsensual warrantless blood draw. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review to resolve a conflict over whether dissipation creates a per se exigency.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the natural dissipation of alcohol in a suspected drunk driver's bloodstream creates a per se exigency that always permits a nonconsensual blood draw without a warrant.

Holding

No. The natural metabolization of alcohol does not categorically establish exigent circumstances; the validity of a warrantless blood draw must be decided case by case under the totality of the circumstances.

Reasoning

A compelled blood draw is a Fourth Amendment search because it invades bodily integrity and implicates especially substantial personal privacy interests. Absent a recognized exception, police ordinarily need a warrant before intruding beneath a person's skin to obtain evidence.

The exigent-circumstances exception applies only when a compelling law-enforcement need leaves no time to secure a warrant. The Court's Fourth Amendment cases generally evaluate claimed exigencies from the particular facts, rather than through broad presumptions that eliminate the warrant requirement.

Schmerber v. California did not announce a categorical rule for drunk-driving investigations. In Schmerber, the suspect had been injured in an accident, taken to a hospital, and delayed by the accident investigation and medical transport. Those combined circumstances, along with the continuing loss of BAC evidence, supported the officer's reasonable belief that there was no time to obtain a warrant.

Alcohol does dissipate naturally and progressively, so delay can reduce the evidentiary value of a blood sample. But unlike evidence a suspect can immediately flush, conceal, or destroy, BAC evidence disappears gradually and predictably. Moreover, some delay in obtaining a blood sample is ordinarily unavoidable because officers commonly must transport the suspect and obtain medically trained assistance.

In many cases, officers can begin the warrant process while other officers transport the suspect or while medical personnel prepare for testing. Modern procedures, including electronic and telephonic warrant practices in many jurisdictions and standardized DWI warrant forms, can reduce the time needed to obtain judicial authorization. Those practical developments make a blanket exception overbroad and preserve the warrant's role as a neutral check on police discretion.

The State's important interest in combating drunk driving does not itself displace the Fourth Amendment's warrant preference. States retain substantial enforcement tools, including implied-consent laws, license consequences for refusal, the admissibility of refusal evidence, and warrants for compelled testing. The seriousness of drunk driving therefore does not justify presuming exigency in every case.

Issue #2

Whether the circumstances of McNeely's blood draw established exigency apart from a categorical rule based on alcohol dissipation.

Holding

No. On this record, the Missouri courts properly found no exigency, and the judgment suppressing the blood-test evidence was affirmed.

Reasoning

Missouri defended the search on the broad claim that alcohol dissipation always creates exigency, rather than arguing that this officer could not have obtained a warrant in time. The officer made no effort to seek a warrant because he believed one was unnecessary, despite knowing that a prosecutor was on call and having obtained blood-draw warrants in prior cases.

The trial court found that a prosecutor and judge were readily available, and no unusual circumstances—such as an accident scene, injured persons, or other investigative demands—interfered with a warrant application. Because Missouri did not separately challenge those factual conclusions, the Court affirmed without attempting to supply an exhaustive list of circumstances that may establish exigency in future DWI cases.

The Court stressed that a routine traffic stop does not automatically mean a warrant is required. Practical facts such as the expected delay in the local warrant process, the availability of a magistrate, transport needs, and the likely effect of delay on reliable BAC evidence can still establish exigency in an appropriate individual case.

Concurrences

Justice Kennedy

Reasoning

Justice Kennedy joined the Court's judgment and the portions of its opinion rejecting Missouri's across-the-board rule. He agreed that the case, as framed and litigated, supported only the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment does not always permit a warrantless blood draw after a DUI arrest.

He cautioned that the Court's repeated emphasis on a case-specific inquiry should not be read to mean that workable rules and protocols are impossible. States may develop procedures that comply with the Fourth Amendment while giving officers practical guidance, and a future case with a fuller record may allow the Court to provide more specific direction.

Dissents

Chief Justice Roberts

Reasoning

Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Alito, agreed that Missouri's proposed rule was too broad. In his view, however, the Court should have provided a clearer rule for the recurring circumstances of a drunk-driving arrest rather than simply directing officers to evaluate the totality of the circumstances.

He reasoned that alcohol in the bloodstream is indisputably and continuously disappearing, and BAC evidence can determine both guilt and the severity of punishment. That ongoing loss creates a compelling need to preserve important evidence, but exigency exists only if there is no time to obtain a warrant before blood can be drawn.

Under his proposed rule, an officer must seek a warrant if one can reasonably be obtained before the suspect reaches a medical facility and a qualified person can draw blood. If the officer reasonably concludes there is insufficient time, or seeks a warrant but receives no timely response before the blood draw can occur, the officer may proceed without a warrant.

The Chief Justice believed this framework both protects the warrant preference when judicial review is practical and gives police concrete guidance in a common setting. He would have vacated and remanded for Missouri courts to apply that rule, rather than affirming outright.

Justice Thomas

Reasoning

Justice Thomas would have adopted the categorical rule Missouri requested. Once police have probable cause to believe a person drove while intoxicated, the body's natural metabolization of alcohol inevitably destroys evidence of the offense with every passing minute, which he viewed as an exigent circumstance in every such case.

In his view, Schmerber recognized that alcohol dissipation itself creates the relevant emergency. The fact that alcohol disappears gradually, rather than instantaneously, does not make the destruction of evidence less real. He compared the situation to officers watching drugs burn: police need not wait for a warrant while evidence is steadily being destroyed merely because some may remain later.

Justice Thomas also argued that the majority's totality test is unworkable in the field. Officers cannot know a suspect's original BAC, metabolic rate, time of last drink, hospital delays, magistrate availability, or how long a warrant will take. Requiring officers to predict those variables forces them to gamble with the loss of highly probative evidence.

Because a medically conducted blood draw is a limited intrusion and BAC evidence is central to enforcing drunk-driving laws, Justice Thomas concluded that probable cause plus the inevitable dissipation of alcohol should permit a warrantless blood draw.