Takeaway
In short, Cohens confirmed that the Supreme Court may review state-court judgments on federal questions, preserving the supremacy and uniform interpretation of federal law, while holding that the particular federal lottery statute did not preempt Virginia's ban on ticket sales.
Virginia prosecuted P. J. Cohens and M. J. Cohens in the Norfolk Court of Hustings for selling lottery tickets in violation of a Virginia statute. The Cohens asserted that Congress had authorized the City of Washington to conduct lotteries for approved city improvements and that tickets from such a lottery could therefore be sold in Virginia.
The parties submitted an agreed case. The Virginia court rejected the federal defense, found the Cohens guilty, and imposed a $100 penalty plus costs. Because that court was the highest Virginia court able to hear the case, the Cohens sought Supreme Court review by writ of error. Virginia moved to dismiss, challenging the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. After rejecting the jurisdictional objections, the Court reached the merits and affirmed the Virginia judgment.
Issue #1
Whether Article III federal-question jurisdiction is defeated because Virginia was a party prosecuting its own citizens.
Holding
No. A case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States falls within the federal judicial power regardless of the parties' identities.
Reasoning
Article III separately grants federal judicial power over all cases arising under the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties, and over specified controversies defined by the parties. In a federal-question case, jurisdiction rests on the nature of the case, not on the status of the litigants. A case arises under federal law whenever its correct decision depends on construing the Constitution or a federal statute, including when a defendant raises federal law as a defense to a state prosecution.
The Court rejected the claim that state sovereignty created an unstated exception whenever a State was a party. The Constitution makes federal law supreme and binds state judges to it. Permitting each State's courts to render final, unreviewable interpretations of federal law would allow state enforcement proceedings to defeat valid federal measures and would produce conflicting constructions of national law.
The fact that Virginia was prosecuting its own citizens did not change the result. Although Article III's party-based jurisdiction did not generally authorize an original federal suit by a citizen against his own State, the federal-question grant was designed to protect the Constitution and federal laws even when a State initiated the proceeding against one of its residents. სახელმწიფյալ reasoning thus turned on the federal issue embedded in the prosecution, rather than on ordinary concerns about impartiality between a State and its own citizen.
Issue #2
Whether the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in cases in which a State is a party prevents appellate review of a state-court federal-question judgment.
Holding
No. The original-jurisdiction clause applies to cases in which jurisdiction rests on the identity of the parties; it does not eliminate appellate jurisdiction over a federal-question case merely because a State is a party.
Reasoning
Article III gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in specified cases, including cases in which a State is a party, and appellate jurisdiction in the other cases within the federal judicial power. The Court read these provisions together: original jurisdiction covers cases brought within federal jurisdiction because of the parties, while appellate jurisdiction covers cases brought within federal jurisdiction because they arise under federal law.
A contrary reading would make federal review impossible in important cases that cannot originate in the Supreme Court, including a state prosecution in which the defendant asserts a federal constitutional defense. The Court declined to infer a negative limitation from affirmative constitutional language where doing so would defeat the Constitution's purpose of making federal judicial power effective.
Marshall limited broad language from Marbury v. Madison. Marbury held that Congress could not expand the Court's original jurisdiction beyond the Constitution's grant. It did not require treating every grant of original jurisdiction as an absolute bar to appellate review in a distinct class of cases that arise under federal law.
Issue #3
Whether the Eleventh Amendment barred the Cohens' writ of error seeking review of Virginia's criminal judgment.
Holding
No. The writ of error was not a suit commenced or prosecuted against Virginia within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment; in any event, the Cohens were Virginia citizens, not citizens of another State or foreign citizens or subjects.
Reasoning
The Eleventh Amendment responded to concern that private creditors could bring affirmative claims against States in federal court. Its text bars suits in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against a State by citizens of another State or foreign citizens or subjects; it does not withdraw federal authority to review a State-initiated prosecution for conformity with federal law.
The Court characterized the writ of error as defensive. Virginia began the case and sought to impose a penalty. The Cohens did not demand money, property, or other relief from Virginia; they sought only review of whether the state court had rejected their federal defense unlawfully. A writ of error acts on the lower-court record and allows affirmance or reversal of the judgment; it does not convert the original defendant into a plaintiff asserting a claim against the State.
The amendment also did not apply by its express terms because the Cohens were citizens of Virginia. Thus, even if the writ were deemed a suit against the State, it was not a suit by a citizen of another State or by a foreign citizen or subject.
Issue #4
Whether the Supreme Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction over judgments of state courts in cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Holding
Yes. Article III and Section 25 of the Judiciary Act authorize Supreme Court review of state-court judgments that decide federal questions adversely to a claimed federal right or defense.
Reasoning
The Constitution grants the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, subject to congressional regulation. Nothing in that language confines review to judgments of lower federal courts. Its focus is the federal character of the case, not the tribunal that rendered the initial decision.
Final federal review was essential to national supremacy and uniformity. If state courts could conclusively decide federal questions, the Constitution and federal laws could receive different meanings in different States, and a State could effectively nullify federal authority by enforcing its own contrary law against individuals.
Historical practice reinforced the textual conclusion. Under the Articles of Confederation, national prize courts heard appeals from state courts. The Federalist expressly anticipated Supreme Court review of state-court decisions in federal cases, and Congress promptly enacted Section 25 of the Judiciary Act. The Court also noted the longstanding acceptance of this review by Congress, the Supreme Court, and nearly every state judiciary.
Issue #5
Whether the congressional statute authorizing Washington City lotteries was a law of the United States capable of supporting Supreme Court review under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act.
Holding
Yes. Congress acted as the legislature of the United States when it legislated for the District of Columbia, so the statute was a federal law within the Supremacy Clause and Section 25.
Reasoning
Congress's authority to exercise exclusive legislation over the federal district is granted by the Constitution to Congress in its national legislative capacity. A statute enacted pursuant to that power is therefore a law of the United States, even if its immediate subject is local to the District of Columbia.
Whether that law displaced Virginia's prohibition was a question of statutory and constitutional construction. Because the Virginia court had rejected the Cohens' claimed protection under the federal statute, Section 25 expressly permitted Supreme Court review of that federal question.
Issue #6
Whether Congress's authorization for the City of Washington to conduct lotteries authorized the sale of Washington lottery tickets in Virginia despite Virginia's criminal prohibition.
Holding
No. The statute authorized the City of Washington to permit lotteries for local improvements, but it did not authorize ticket sales in States whose laws prohibited those sales.
Reasoning
The statutory language gave the Washington corporation power to authorize lottery drawings for important improvements within the City, subject to monetary limits and presidential approval. Nothing in the statute expressly extended the corporation's authority beyond the District or purported to override another State's criminal laws.
The Court treated the corporation as a local body created to manage the City's internal affairs. Its lottery authority, like its other corporate powers and revenues, was naturally local. An intention to allow this local corporation to displace the penal laws of every State would have been consequential and would need to be stated clearly, not inferred from general language authorizing lotteries.
The authorization could operate fully without permitting out-of-state sales. Congress could allow tickets to be sold in Washington to purchasers from throughout the Union without interfering with Virginia's internal police laws. Because the statute did not authorize sales in Virginia, the Court had no need to decide whether Congress constitutionally could have granted such authority.