Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1804

Little v. Barreme

6 U.S. 170 | 2 L. Ed. 243 | 2 Cranch 170 | 1804 U.S. LEXIS 255

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Takeaway

In short, this case establishes that executive and military officers remain liable for acts that exceed Congress's authorization: superior orders cannot legalize an otherwise unlawful seizure.

Background

During the undeclared naval hostilities between the United States and France, Captain George Little commanded the U.S. frigate Boston. Acting under instructions transmitted by the Secretary of the Navy, Little captured the Flying-Fish, a Danish vessel carrying Danish and neutral property. The vessel was traveling from Jérémie, a French port, to St. Thomas when it was seized on the high seas and brought to Boston.

Congress's nonintercourse statute authorized the President to direct naval commanders to stop, examine, and, if appropriate, seize American vessels that were bound or sailing to French ports. The Navy Department's instructions went further: they directed commanders to stop American vessels, including those disguised under foreign papers, that were bound to or from French ports. Little believed the Flying-Fish might really be American, although it sailed under Danish papers.

The district judge ordered the vessel and cargo restored as neutral property but denied damages because there was probable cause to suspect that the vessel was American. The circuit court reversed that denial and awarded damages. It reasoned that, even if the Flying-Fish had been American, the statute did not authorize a high-seas seizure of a vessel sailing from, rather than to, a French port. Captain Little appealed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the nonintercourse statute authorized Captain Little to seize on the high seas a vessel sailing from a French port.

Holding

No. The statute authorized high-seas seizures only of covered American vessels bound or sailing to a French port, not vessels sailing from one.

Reasoning

The statute broadly declared that American-owned, hired, or employed vessels engaged in prohibited commerce with France could be forfeited. But its general seizure language contemplated seizures within the United States, while section 5 supplied a distinct and narrower authority for seizures on the high seas.

Section 5 permitted naval commanders to stop and examine suspected American vessels on the high seas and to seize them only if examination showed that they were bound or sailing to a French port or dependency. By specifying that condition, Congress excluded high-seas seizures of vessels not headed to French territory.

The Flying-Fish was sailing from Jérémie to St. Thomas. Therefore, even if Captain Little's suspicion had been correct and the vessel had actually been American, the statute would not have authorized its detention on the high seas. The seizure was unlawful.

Issue #2

Whether executive instructions directing the seizure of vessels bound to or from French ports excused Captain Little from damages when those instructions exceeded the statute.

Holding

No. Executive instructions cannot legalize or excuse a seizure that Congress did not authorize; Captain Little was liable in damages.

Reasoning

The Secretary of the Navy instructed commanders to prevent commerce with French ports and to be vigilant against vessels really American but sailing under Danish or other foreign papers, whether they were bound to or from French ports. Those instructions reflected an executive construction broader than the statutory text.

Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that military discipline and the need for obedience to superior orders initially suggested that a naval officer acting in good faith might be excused, with the injured party left to seek relief from the government that gave the order. The Court ultimately rejected that view.

An executive instruction cannot change the legal character of an act or make lawful what would otherwise be a trespass. Because the statute did not permit this seizure, the Navy Department's contrary order did not protect Captain Little from civil liability.

Once the seizure was unlawful even on the assumption that the Flying-Fish was American, the Court did not need to decide whether probable cause to suspect American ownership would have excused damages for taking a vessel that was in fact neutral. The circuit court's damages award stood.