Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1798

Calder v. Bull

3 U.S. 386 | 1 L. Ed. 648 | 3 Dall. 386 | 1798 U.S. LEXIS 148

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Takeaway

In short, this case established that the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clauses prohibit only retroactive criminal punishment, not retroactive civil laws affecting property or probate rights.

Background

A Connecticut probate court rejected and refused to record a will affecting disputed property. More than eighteen months passed, ending the ordinary statutory period for appeal; under existing Connecticut law, Calder and his wife would therefore prevail as heirs.

In 1795, the Connecticut legislature passed a resolution setting aside the probate decree and directing a new probate hearing, with a new opportunity to appeal. At the new hearing, the probate court approved the will. The Connecticut Superior Court affirmed, and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors found no error. Calder and his wife sought review in the Supreme Court, arguing that the legislature's retrospective intervention was an unconstitutional ex post facto law.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Connecticut's resolution ordering a new probate hearing was an ex post facto law prohibited by Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution.

Holding

No. The Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to retrospective criminal or penal laws, not to retrospective civil legislation affecting property rights or judicial proceedings.

Reasoning

Justice Chase treated the phrase "ex post facto law" as a legal term of art rather than as a literal ban on every law enacted after an event. In its constitutional sense, the prohibition protects individuals from retrospective legislative punishment for past conduct.

He identified four prohibited categories: a law making previously innocent conduct criminal; a law aggravating an existing crime; a law increasing the punishment for a past offense; and a law changing evidentiary rules to permit conviction on less or different proof than the law previously required.

The Connecticut resolution did not punish anyone for prior conduct, alter the definition of a crime, increase a punishment, or ease the proof needed for a criminal conviction. It instead reopened a civil probate dispute and ultimately affected which claimants would receive property.

The Court distinguished ex post facto laws from retrospective laws. Every ex post facto law is retrospective, but not every retrospective law is ex post facto. Retrospective civil measures may be unfair or oppressive, but they are not invalid under this particular constitutional prohibition.

Issue #2

Whether the Supreme Court could invalidate Connecticut's resolution because it allegedly violated Connecticut's own constitution or exceeded the state's general legislative authority.

Holding

No. The Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether a state statute violated the state's own constitution, and Justice Chase did not decide the broader question whether a state legislature may revise a judicial decision by statute.

Reasoning

Justice Chase stated that Connecticut's own courts were the proper tribunals to determine whether the legislature's resolution was inconsistent with Connecticut's charter, customs, or state constitution. Those courts had upheld the resolution.

Although Chase rejected the idea that a state legislature was wholly omnipotent, he expressly declined to decide whether Connecticut's legislature could constitutionally revise or correct a court decision. The case could be resolved solely by interpreting the federal Ex Post Facto Clause.

Chase nevertheless explained his view that republican legislatures are constrained by fundamental principles of justice. He gave examples of measures that would exceed legitimate legislative authority, including punishing innocent conduct, impairing lawful private contracts, making a person judge in his own cause, or taking property from one person and giving it to another. Those observations were not necessary to the judgment and did not supply the basis for invalidating Connecticut's resolution.

Concurrences

Justice Paterson

Reasoning

Justice Paterson first reasoned that Connecticut's legislature had long exercised a customary supervisory power to grant new trials. Because Connecticut's constitution consisted substantially of established usages, that practice allowed the legislature to act in a judicial capacity in this setting. If the resolution was a judicial act, rather than legislation, the federal ban on ex post facto laws did not apply.

Paterson also agreed that the result would be the same if the resolution were treated as legislation. The phrase "ex post facto" had an established meaning limited to crimes, punishments, and penalties. The Constitution's separate prohibition on laws impairing contractual obligations reinforced the conclusion that ex post facto laws did not include all retrospective civil laws.

He emphasized that he personally would have preferred a constitutional prohibition on retrospective laws generally. But he concluded that the constitutional text adopted a narrower, technical prohibition confined to penal legislation.

Justice Iredell

Reasoning

Justice Iredell likewise relied first on Connecticut's uninterrupted practice of legislative supervision over its courts through grants of new trials. In his view, the legislature exercised judicial authority when it granted the new hearing, and a judicial action was not an ex post facto law.

He agreed in the alternative that, even if the resolution were legislative, the Ex Post Facto Clause concerned criminal matters only. Its purpose was to prevent legislative punishments for acts that were innocent when committed and to prevent retrospective increases in criminal punishment.

Iredell differed from Justice Chase's broader natural-law suggestions. A court may invalidate legislation that clearly exceeds a constitutionally imposed limit, but it may not strike down an act merely because judges regard it as contrary to abstract natural justice. Judgments about natural justice lack a fixed legal standard and ordinarily belong to the legislature, acting within its constitutional authority.

Justice Cushing

Reasoning

Justice Cushing viewed the case as straightforward. If Connecticut's action was judicial, the Federal Constitution did not reach it; if it was legislative, Connecticut's ancient and uniform practice justified it under that state's constitutional system.