Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1793

Chisholm v. Georgia

2 U.S. 419 | 1 L. Ed. 440 | 2 Dall. 419 | 1793 U.S. LEXIS 249

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Takeaway

In short, Chisholm held that Article III allowed a citizen to sue a nonconsenting State in federal court, but the decision was soon displaced by the Eleventh Amendment, which sharply limited such suits.

Background

Alexander Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina and executor of Robert Farquhar’s estate, brought an original action in assumpsit against the State of Georgia. He alleged that Georgia owed a debt arising from supplies furnished during the Revolutionary War.

Georgia did not enter an appearance. The Attorney General of the United States moved for a conditional order requiring Georgia to appear at the next Term or face a default judgment and an inquiry into damages. Because the case was filed originally in the Supreme Court, there was no lower-court decision. The Court first had to decide whether it had jurisdiction to entertain a citizen’s suit against a nonconsenting State.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Article III permits a citizen of one State to sue another State in the Supreme Court.

Holding

Yes. By a 4–1 vote, the Court held that Article III extends federal judicial power to a controversy between a State and a citizen of another State, including a case in which the State is the defendant.

Reasoning

The Constitution extends judicial power to “controversies between a State and citizens of another State.” Chief Justice Jay, Justice Blair, Justice Wilson, and Justice Cushing read that language according to its ordinary meaning. A dispute between a State and an out-of-state citizen remains such a controversy regardless of which side filed the suit.

The surrounding provisions confirmed that reading. Article III also covers controversies between States and provides original jurisdiction whenever a State is a party. Those provisions necessarily contemplate that a State can sometimes stand as a defendant; the Constitution did not limit the word “party” to plaintiffs.

The majority rejected the claim that state sovereignty created an implied exception. In the American constitutional system, sovereignty ultimately resided in the people, who adopted the Constitution and delegated specified powers to the national government. For matters assigned to federal judicial power, a State had accepted the limits imposed by the constitutional compact.

A central purpose of the national judiciary was to provide neutral resolution of interstate disputes and to ensure justice for citizens of different States. Allowing a State to sue citizens of other States while barring those citizens from suing the State would be inconsistent with equal justice and could generate interstate friction.

Issue #2

Whether the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized this original action in assumpsit against Georgia.

Holding

Yes. The Court concluded that the Judiciary Act gave the Supreme Court original, though nonexclusive, jurisdiction over this civil controversy between Georgia and a citizen of another State, and that assumpsit could proceed if the State was capable of contracting.

Reasoning

Section 13 of the Judiciary Act granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over civil controversies between a State and citizens of other States. The statutory grant tracked Article III and supplied jurisdiction for Chisholm’s suit.

Justice Cushing explained that, once the Constitution permits a State to be sued, an action of assumpsit may lie on an alleged contract debt. A State is a body politic capable of making contracts, and a contract claim is an ordinary civil controversy capable of judicial resolution.

The Court did not decide the merits of Chisholm’s alleged debt. Its ruling established only that Georgia could be called before the Court to answer the claim and that the suit could proceed under the ordinary form of a contract action.

Issue #3

Whether service on Georgia’s Governor and Attorney General, followed by a conditional default order, was an appropriate procedure.

Holding

Yes. The Court approved service on the Governor and Attorney General and ordered Georgia to appear or show cause before a default judgment would be entered.

Reasoning

The Governor was Georgia’s chief executive officer, and the Attorney General was its principal legal officer. Serving both officials was a practical and adequate means of notifying the State of the action.

The Court declined to enter an immediate default judgment. Respect for the State and basic procedural fairness required additional notice and an opportunity to appear and defend before judgment and an inquiry into damages could occur.

Accordingly, the Court ordered Chisholm to file his declaration, directed service of certified copies on Georgia’s Governor and Attorney General, and provided that default would follow only if Georgia still failed to appear or show cause at the next Term.

Concurrences

Justice Blair

Reasoning

Justice Blair relied principally on the Constitution’s text. In his view, a controversy between a State and a citizen of another State necessarily includes either procedural posture: a dispute between A and B is equally a dispute between B and A.

He also emphasized that Article III plainly allows suits between States, where one State must be a defendant. The Constitution’s separate grant of original jurisdiction in cases in which a State is a party likewise contained no limitation to State-plaintiff cases.

Blair rejected the argument that the absence of a fully specified means of coercing a State defeated jurisdiction. The Court should exercise the jurisdiction clearly conferred and leave any later problem of enforcement to the political branches if it actually arose. He nevertheless favored a conditional rather than immediate default order.

Justice Wilson

Reasoning

Justice Wilson offered the broadest account of popular sovereignty. He argued that States are artificial political persons created by people, not masters standing above the people. A State that makes a contract and refuses to honor it should not escape justice merely by announcing that it is sovereign.

Wilson distinguished the American system from feudal monarchy. In England, immunity rested on the notion that the King was the sovereign and could not be sued in his own courts. In the United States, the people were sovereign, public officers were their agents, and States had surrendered defined aspects of their authority through the federal Constitution.

From that premise, Wilson concluded that the people could authorize federal courts to adjudicate claims against States. Article III’s text, the Constitution’s design to establish justice and domestic tranquility, and the need for a complete national government all supported Georgia’s amenability to suit.

Justice Cushing

Reasoning

Justice Cushing focused on the reciprocal wording of Article III. A citizen’s demand against a State is as much a controversy between a State and a citizen of another State as a State’s demand against that citizen.

He reasoned that concerns about residual state sovereignty could not override express constitutional grants. The Constitution already restricted States in important ways, including through the national powers over war, taxation, treaties, and interstate obligations. Judicial authority over the specified controversies was another such limitation.

Cushing also concluded that a State could be sued in assumpsit if it had contractual capacity, and that service on Georgia’s Governor and Attorney General adequately notified the State.

Dissents

Justice Iredell

Reasoning

Justice Iredell agreed that the Constitution gave Congress authority to create federal courts and to define their jurisdiction, but he maintained that courts could act only through procedures and remedies supplied by Congress. Article III alone did not, in his view, authorize the Court to invent a new compulsory action against a State.

He read the Judiciary Act as directing federal courts to use writs consistent with established “principles and usages of law.” Under the common law inherited by the States, a sovereign could not be compelled to answer an ordinary debt action. The limited English petition of right depended on the sovereign’s consent and did not establish a coercive judicial remedy against a government.

Because Congress had enacted no statute clearly authorizing an ordinary assumpsit action to compel a State to pay money, Iredell concluded that the suit could not be maintained. He also stated, though he considered the point unnecessary to decide, that Article III should not be read to permit compulsory money suits against States without unmistakably clear language.