Caseflicks

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit • 2012

Debbra Hill v. Michael Astrue

698 F.3d 1153 | 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22245

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Takeaway

In short, this case requires an ALJ to evaluate material medical opinions and panic-related limitations before treating a claimant as capable of regular, full-time work and relying on vocational testimony built on that assumption.

Background

Debbra Jo Hill sought disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, alleging disability since April 2004. She had poorly controlled diabetes, lasting limits from a shoulder injury and two surgeries, bipolar disorder, anxiety and panic attacks, depression, and borderline intellectual functioning. Although she worked part-time at a Dollar Tree store, her earnings did not amount to substantial gainful activity. Her panic attacks sometimes disrupted her work; one attack in March 2008 reportedly left her in bed for five days and away from work for roughly two weeks.

After a hearing, an administrative law judge found several severe impairments but concluded that Hill could perform a restricted range of light work. The ALJ's residual-functional-capacity finding assumed, among other things, that Hill could maintain regular attendance and complete a normal workday and workweek without psychologically based interruptions. Relying on a vocational expert's response to a hypothetical incorporating those assumptions, the ALJ found Hill not disabled at step five.

The Appeals Council denied review. The district court adopted a magistrate judge's recommendation, granted summary judgment to the Commissioner, and affirmed the denial of benefits. Hill appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the ALJ permissibly disregarded examining psychologist Dr. Lynn Johnson's opinion that Hill was unlikely to sustain full-time competitive employment.

Holding

No. The ALJ's failure to consider Dr. Johnson's opinion was legal error and was not harmless.

Reasoning

An examining physician's opinion may be rejected only for clear and convincing reasons if uncontradicted, or for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence if contradicted. The ALJ did not discuss Dr. Johnson's assessment at all and therefore supplied no reason—much less the required reason—for disregarding it.

The Commissioner argued that Dr. Johnson merely opined on the ultimate disability question, which is reserved to the agency. The court rejected that characterization. Dr. Johnson did not simply state that Hill was disabled or unable to work; she offered an evidence-based medical assessment of Hill's ability to sustain full-time employment in light of her combined mental and physical impairments and her inability to afford treatment.

Because agency regulations require consideration of every medical opinion, the omission could not be treated as harmless. Dr. Johnson's assessment bore directly on whether Hill could maintain full-time work, a central premise of the ALJ's residual-functional-capacity finding.

Issue #2

Whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's residual-functional-capacity assessment of Hill's panic-related limitations.

Holding

No. The assessment was incomplete and unsupported because it minimized evidence of Hill's panic disorder and recurrent, work-disrupting panic attacks.

Reasoning

Although the ALJ recognized several severe mental impairments, he did not include Hill's diagnosed panic disorder among them and effectively treated her condition as anxiety alone. Once an ALJ finds a severe medically determinable impairment, the ALJ must consider all medically determinable impairments in the remaining steps of the disability analysis.

The record documented anxiety and panic attacks, including attacks observed by medical providers, counselors, and Hill's job coach. Hill's symptoms were consistent with panic disorder, and the ALJ improperly confined the idea of a panic attack to only an episode severe enough to cause collapse.

The ALJ relied in part on nonexamining consultant Dr. Kuka's view that Hill's severe panic or manic episodes occurred about twice yearly and lasted two or three days. But Hill's March 2008 workplace attack reportedly kept her in bed for five days and away from work for about two weeks, directly undermining that estimate. The record also contained reports of more frequent attacks, and the fact that every attack was not witnessed did not erase the substantial corroborating evidence.

Issue #3

Whether the vocational expert's testimony supplied substantial evidence for the step-five finding that Hill could perform other work.

Holding

No. The ALJ relied on an incomplete hypothetical that omitted limitations supported by the record.

Reasoning

At step five, the Commissioner may rely on vocational-expert testimony only if the hypothetical accurately reflects all of the claimant's physical and mental limitations that are supported by substantial evidence. A vocational expert's answer has no evidentiary value when the question leaves out material limitations.

Because the residual-functional-capacity assessment did not adequately account for Hill's panic disorder and attacks, the hypothetical inherited the same defects. In particular, the assumptions that Hill could maintain regular attendance and complete normal workdays and workweeks without psychological interruptions were not supported by the record.

On cross-examination, the vocational expert acknowledged that a person who experienced weekly panic attacks and missed two to four days of work per month could not engage in substantial gainful activity. That testimony underscored the materiality of the omitted panic-related limitations.

Issue #4

Whether the court should direct an immediate award of benefits rather than remand for further administrative proceedings.

Holding

No. The appropriate remedy was remand for further proceedings.

Reasoning

Ordinarily, when an ALJ's decision lacks record support, the case should return to the agency for additional investigation or explanation. An immediate award is appropriate only when the record is fully developed, no useful purpose would be served by further proceedings, and proper evaluation would require a disability finding.

Here, the ALJ needed to reevaluate the medical evidence, Hill's residual functional capacity, and the vocational consequences of her properly assessed limitations. Because unresolved issues remained and the record did not clearly compel a disability finding, the court reversed and remanded rather than ordering benefits.