Takeaway
In short, this case confirms that vocational-expert testimony may constitute substantial evidence at step five without a Daubert-style foundation hearing, provided the claimant has a meaningful opportunity to challenge it and the administrative record supports the ALJ's conclusion.
George Brault sought Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging that nerve damage in his left arm and a cervical-spine injury from a 2006 automobile accident rendered him disabled. The administrative law judge found that Brault met his burden through the first four steps of the Social Security disability framework. At step five, however, the burden shifted to the Commissioner to show that other jobs existed in significant numbers that Brault could perform.
Relying on a vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ found that Brault could adjust to eight identified occupations. The expert used the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to identify jobs compatible with Brault's limitations and the privately published Occupational Employment Quarterly to estimate job numbers. Brault stipulated to the expert's qualifications but challenged the reliability of the expert's method for connecting the DOT's detailed job codes with broader Standard Occupational Classification data. The ALJ allowed cross-examination and post-hearing briefing, then denied benefits without expressly discussing Brault's objection.
The District of Vermont affirmed, concluding that the vocational expert's testimony could properly support the Commissioner's decision. Brault appealed to the Second Circuit.
Issue #1
Whether the ALJ was required to expressly explain in the written decision why he rejected Brault's challenge to the vocational expert's testimony.
Holding
No. The ALJ was not required to specifically discuss or provide a written analysis of Brault's objection to the vocational expert's methodology.
Reasoning
Judicial review of a Social Security denial focuses on the agency's decision, not on deciding disability anew. The court asks whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and whether substantial evidence—relevant evidence a reasonable mind could accept as adequate—supports the result. That standard is highly deferential: factual findings may be rejected only when a reasonable factfinder would have to reach the opposite conclusion.
Brault relied on Seventh Circuit authority to argue that an ALJ must explain how a challenged expert opinion was resolved. But the court concluded that this authority did not establish the rule he asserted. In particular, Brault mischaracterized language in Donahue v. Barnhart that discussed a Social Security ruling by analogy rather than imposed a general written-explanation requirement.
An ALJ must develop the record fairly, but need not discuss every item of evidence or every objection submitted by a claimant. By accepting the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ necessarily rejected Brault's challenge. The record showed that the ALJ had the objection before him, and the law did not require him to set out his particular analysis of it in the written decision.
Issue #2
Whether the ALJ was required to conduct a Daubert-like reliability inquiry or require supporting vocational data after Brault challenged the vocational expert's DOT-to-SOC job-number methodology.
Holding
No categorical Daubert-like duty applied, and in any event Brault received a full and fair opportunity to challenge the vocational expert's testimony.
Reasoning
The court declined to adopt the Seventh Circuit's approach requiring an ALJ to inquire into the reliability of a vocational expert's conclusions when their foundation is challenged, or to require the expert to make supporting data available on demand. That approach drew on Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, but Congress expressly provides that formal rules of evidence do not govern Social Security hearings. Those proceedings are intended to be accessible and flexible, so long as they remain fundamentally fair.
The substantial-evidence standard itself supplies an adequate, case-specific means to assess vocational testimony. Although expert evidence could not support an agency decision if it were simply invented or "conjured out of whole cloth," the court saw no regulation or binding Second Circuit authority requiring a vocational expert to identify every source or provide the detailed documentation Brault demanded. Prior Second Circuit guidance likewise allowed reliance on a vocational expert who identified the sources generally used to develop job figures.
The court did not decide that an ALJ may never need to examine the reliability of vocational-expert testimony more closely. It held only that this case did not require resolution of that broader question, because the ALJ considered the challenge sufficiently even under Brault's proposed premise. The ALJ confirmed the expert's impartiality, addressed possible conflicts with the DOT, obtained counsel's stipulation to the expert's qualifications, permitted extensive cross-examination on the SOC-to-DOT mapping method and specific job figures, and accepted additional post-hearing briefing. These procedures gave Brault a full opportunity to present his objections.
Given that opportunity and the expert's testimony concerning both his expertise and the sources he used, the ALJ could treat the testimony as substantial evidence that suitable jobs existed in significant numbers. The court therefore affirmed the step-five finding and the denial of benefits.
Issue #3
Whether the ALJ could rely on vocational-expert job numbers that might include part-time positions without separately identifying the number of full-time jobs.
Holding
Yes. The ALJ did not need to segregate part-time jobs or make a separate finding of the precise number of available jobs.
Reasoning
Brault offered no proof that the expert's estimates actually included part-time work. More importantly, the governing step-five inquiry was whether jobs existed in significant numbers, not whether the expert provided a precise count of exclusively full-time positions.
The court declined to create a per se rule excluding part-time positions from consideration. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that work existed in significant numbers, and the court read the authority Brault invoked as not establishing the contrary rule.