State v. Wilson

Section 53a-13(a), modeled on the Model Penal Code, excuses a defendant who lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to law. The legislature deliberately chose “wrongfulness,” rather than “criminality,” and its legislative history shows an intent to cover the defendant who knows an act is illegal but, because of a delusion, believes it morally justified. The statute therefore requires more than a bare inquiry into whether the defendant knew his conduct was criminal.

reasoning

The Model Penal Code’s use of “appreciate” also matters. The inquiry is not limited to detached intellectual knowledge that conduct is illegal or wrong. A defendant must be able to grasp the wrongfulness of the conduct as a meaningful reality in his life. Thus, mental illness may negate appreciation even where the defendant can state, in the abstract, that the conduct violates the law.

A purely personal moral standard would be inconsistent with the Model Penal Code’s focus on society’s moral disapproval, the prevailing approach in other jurisdictions, and the criminal law’s reliance on shared social norms. A defendant is not legally insane merely because he knowingly violates both law and societal morality in favor of a delusional personal belief system.

The state’s proposed objective societal test, however, was too narrow because it would effectively equate moral wrongfulness with criminality. A delusional defendant may understand that society presently condemns his conduct, yet sincerely believe that society would morally approve if it knew the circumstances as he honestly, though mistakenly, perceives them.

The proper instruction must therefore ask whether, because of mental disease or defect, the defendant substantially misperceived reality and lacked substantial capacity to appreciate that his conduct violated societal morality under the circumstances as he sincerely perceived them. If the defendant could appreciate that society would condemn the conduct even under those perceived circumstances, he remains responsible despite a divergent personal moral code.

A defendant asserting insanity bears the burden to prove the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, but is entitled to an instruction when the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find the defense established. Here, the dispute was not whether Wilson was entitled to an insanity instruction generally, but whether the evidence warranted an instruction specifically defining wrongfulness.

Wilson’s expert and treatment-related testimony supplied that evidentiary basis. Witnesses described his belief that he had saved others from an evil threat, that Peters and Dirk were responsible for serious harm and mind control, and that Wilson had a higher moral duty to stop them. One expert compared his thinking to a person who believes it is morally necessary to assassinate Hitler despite knowing the act would be illegal.

That Wilson had unsuccessfully tried to persuade police of the alleged danger did not defeat the requested instruction. The relevant question was whether he sincerely believed that society would have condoned his conduct if it shared his delusional understanding of the circumstances. Evidence suggesting that Wilson instead acted from personal revenge concerned the weight and credibility of his proof, which were for the jury.

Wilson’s requested instruction did not precisely state the societal-morality standard the court adopted. Ordinarily, a trial court need not give an inaccurate requested charge. But fundamental fairness favored relief because Wilson correctly identified the essential point that wrongfulness includes moral justification, while neither the statutory text nor legislative history clearly supplied the more refined standard announced by the court. He could not fairly be expected to anticipate that formulation.

The instructional error was nonconstitutional because it concerned an affirmative defense, so Wilson had to show that the omission probably affected the trial’s result. He met that burden because the instruction did not define wrongfulness in moral terms or explain that the jury could consider his appreciation of societal morality under the facts as he delusionally perceived them.

Wilson’s central theory was that he may have understood the killing was illegal but did not appreciate its moral wrongfulness because he believed he was protecting society from grave danger. The court’s general statement that wrongfulness meant intellectual and emotional understanding that conduct was wrong did not adequately present that theory to the jury.

Closing argument and evidence could not cure the deficient legal instruction. Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions, not counsel’s arguments, on the governing law. Because the omitted definition went to the heart of Wilson’s insanity defense, the conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.