Caseflicks

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit • 2003

United States v. Donald Lawrence Ritchie, Heather Horner, Claimant-Appellant

342 F.3d 903 | 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7757 | 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 577 | 2003 Daily Journal DAR 9689 | 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17752

Full access

Unlock the video and quiz

The written brief is free to read below. Subscribe to watch the video explainer and take the quiz.

Create an account Log in

Takeaway

In short, this case requires courts to treat post-criminal Rule 41(e) property-return motions as civil actions and requires the government to pursue reasonable follow-up notice when a forfeiture letter is returned undelivered.

Background

During a 1999 investigation of Donald Ritchie, Heather Horner’s boyfriend, the DEA searched Horner’s apartment and seized $3,000 in cash, a revolver, and other property. Ritchie was later convicted of federal drug offenses, but Horner was neither charged nor arrested. The DEA nonetheless administratively forfeited the cash and revolver.

After Ritchie’s criminal case ended, Horner, proceeding without counsel, moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) for return of the property. She alleged that the DEA had not given her constitutionally adequate notice of the forfeiture and asked the court to vacate it. The government opposed the motion and attached an unsigned-for-the-declarant DEA declaration and numerous exhibits, including published notices, mailed notices, and Ritchie’s petition for return of property. It argued that Horner had adequate, indeed actual, notice.

The district court summarily denied Horner’s motion on the grounds stated in the government’s opposition and found that she had been duly notified. Horner appealed. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Horner’s post-criminal-proceeding Rule 41(e) motion had to be treated as a civil complaint seeking equitable relief.

Holding

Yes. Because no criminal proceeding was pending against Horner and she alleged inadequate forfeiture notice, her Rule 41(e) motion had to be treated as a civil equitable complaint governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Reasoning

Horner had not waived the issue by failing to present it more fully below. She was pro se, her motion was summarily denied, and thus she had little meaningful opportunity to make the argument. The government had also acknowledged in the district court that her filing arguably could be treated as an equitable civil complaint. In any event, the classification of the motion was a pure legal question that the court could consider on appeal.

Ninth Circuit precedent establishes that a Rule 41(e) motion filed when no criminal case is pending is a civil equitable proceeding, even if the claimant styles it as a criminal-rule motion. The court rejected the government’s contention that a district court may dismiss such a free-standing motion under a more lenient standard than would apply to an ordinary civil complaint.

The cases on which the government relied did not support a different result. They held only that a claimant who received adequate notice of an administrative forfeiture ordinarily has an adequate legal remedy and cannot later obtain relief through Rule 41(e). They did not permit a court to disregard civil-procedure protections where, as here, the claimant alleges that the earlier forfeiture notice was inadequate.

Issue #2

Whether the district court could dismiss Horner’s claim by relying on the government’s declaration and exhibits without applying the procedures required for materials outside the pleadings.

Holding

No. The district court improperly relied on outside materials without converting the matter to summary judgment and giving Horner an opportunity to respond.

Reasoning

A court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal generally must convert the matter to one for summary judgment if it considers evidence outside the complaint. The principal exceptions—documents attached to or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and properly noticed facts—did not apply to the government’s declaration and exhibits.

The DEA declaration was prepared in response to Horner’s motion and plainly was not incorporated into it. Nor did Horner’s limited reference to Ritchie’s separate petition for return of property make that petition, much less the handwriting on its mailing envelope, part of her claim. A passing mention of a document does not permit the opposing party to introduce its contents as true on a motion to dismiss.

The disputed matters in the government’s submissions—what notice the DEA gave, whether Horner actually knew of the forfeiture, and whose handwriting appeared on an envelope—were not adjudicative facts beyond reasonable dispute. They therefore could not be judicially noticed. Even if judicial notice had been appropriate, Horner was entitled to an opportunity to challenge it.

The declaration also would not have supported summary judgment as submitted. It was signed by another person 'for' the asserted declarant, rather than subscribed by the declarant based on personal knowledge as the summary-judgment rules require.

Issue #3

Whether the DEA provided legally adequate notice of the administrative forfeiture, particularly after a personal-notice letter concerning the cash was returned undelivered.

Holding

The undisputed facts did not establish adequate notice. The DEA had to make reasonable additional efforts after its personal-notice letter was returned undelivered, and the record required further development concerning actual notice and the forfeiture of both items.

Reasoning

Statutory forfeiture procedures required published notice and written notice to each person who appeared to have an interest in the property. Those provisions must be read in light of due process, which requires notice reasonably calculated under the circumstances to inform interested persons and permit objections. Because forfeitures are disfavored, notice requirements are strictly construed against the government.

The known facts did not establish adequate notice as to the revolver. The DEA made no effort to send Horner personal notice about it, even though the gun was taken from her apartment. On that record, the government’s bare assertion that Horner did not appear to have an interest in the revolver was unpersuasive.

The court joined the other circuits that had considered the question and held that when the government learns that an initial personal-notice letter was returned undelivered, it must make reasonable additional efforts to provide personal notice. What efforts are reasonable depends on the circumstances, but if the DEA made no further effort after the letter to Horner was returned, its notice of the cash forfeiture was legally insufficient.

The court could not resolve the government’s alternative assertion that Horner had actual notice. The record did not establish whether she knew of the forfeiture in time, or with enough accurate and detailed information, to protect her interests in the administrative proceeding. The district court therefore had to develop the facts on remand.