Whether a geographic mark can be refused registration under § 2(e)(3) without proof that its misleading suggestion of origin would materially affect consumers’ purchasing decisions.
Holding
No. Section 2(e)(3) requires a showing of material deception. Because the Board applied the older standard, the court vacated its decision as to the appealed goods and remanded.
Reasoning
Before the NAFTA amendments, a geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark could eventually be registered if it acquired distinctiveness. The Patent and Trademark Office therefore could refuse registration based on a likely association between the goods and a place where they did not originate, without showing that the association mattered to buyers.
The amendments made refusal under § 2(e)(3) permanent: acquired distinctiveness can no longer overcome it. The court reasoned that this consequence calls for the same materiality requirement used for geographically deceptive marks under § 2(a), rather than a bare inference of deception from a goods-place association.
The resulting test asks whether the mark primarily signifies a generally known location, whether consumers are likely to believe the goods come from that location when they do not, and whether that misrepresentation would materially affect their decision to buy.
The evidence connecting California to insulated bags and wraps was tenuous; much of the evidence concerned other goods. More importantly, the Board had not considered materiality. The court left the full three-part inquiry to the Board on remand. Its decision did not disturb the refusal for goods California Innovations had not included in its appeal.