Jose Reyna-Tapia became a lawful permanent resident in 1990, but his 1998 conviction for sexual abuse of a minor—an aggravated felony—led to removal proceedings. An immigration judge ordered him removed in October 1999. Authorities found him in Arizona in 2000, and the government charged him with unlawful reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, as enhanced by § 1326(b)(2), as well as a violation of supervised release.
Reyna-Tapia agreed in writing to plead guilty to unlawful reentry. He, his counsel, and the prosecutor consented to a magistrate judge conducting the Rule 11 plea proceeding. After a careful colloquy, the magistrate judge found that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis, and recommended acceptance. Neither party objected. The district judge then accepted the plea.
After reviewing the presentence report, Reyna-Tapia moved to withdraw his plea. He argued that his deportation had not ended his lawful-permanent-resident status, or alternatively that the loss of that status violated due process because he had not been told it would result from removal. The district court denied the motion for lack of a fair and just reason. A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed but held that a district judge must conduct de novo review when a magistrate judge conducts a felony plea colloquy. The court reheard the case en banc to resolve the magistrate-judge and review questions.
Issue #1
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Reyna-Tapia’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he remained a lawful permanent resident after deportation.
Holding
No. Reyna-Tapia did not show a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea because his lawful-permanent-resident status ended no later than his final deportation order and actual deportation.
Reasoning
A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing must establish a fair and just reason, and the denial of such a motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Reyna-Tapia’s asserted reason depended on the premise that he remained a lawful permanent resident despite having been ordered removed and deported.
The governing immigration regulation provided that lawful-permanent-resident status terminates upon entry of a final administrative deportation order. Ninth Circuit precedent also established that the status ends when the alien is deported. Thus, Reyna-Tapia’s 1999 removal ended his status under either rule.
The court also emphasized the common-sense point that a reasonable person understands deportation to mean that he may no longer reside in the United States. Because Reyna-Tapia had no valid basis for believing he retained permanent-resident status, the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to allow withdrawal of the plea.
Issue #2
Whether Reyna-Tapia’s underlying deportation violated due process because he was not specifically advised that removal would terminate his lawful-permanent-resident status.
Holding
No. The record did not show a prejudicial due-process violation in the removal proceeding.
Reasoning
An alien charged with unlawful reentry may collaterally attack the underlying deportation only by showing that the deportation was ordered in a prejudicial violation of due process. Although aliens are entitled to due process, the burden remained on Reyna-Tapia to identify a defect in his removal proceeding and resulting prejudice.
The record showed that Reyna-Tapia received notice that the government sought his deportation based on his sexual-abuse conviction and that he was deportable. The district court reviewed the removal record and found that he understood his rights and voluntarily and intelligently consented to removal.
Reyna-Tapia identified no record evidence undermining those findings. His assertion that he was not separately warned about the consequence for his permanent-resident status did not establish that his removal was procedurally unfair or that his due-process rights were violated.
Issue #3
Whether a district court may delegate a felony Rule 11 plea colloquy to a magistrate judge when the defendant consents.
Holding
Yes. A consensual felony plea colloquy is an authorized “additional duty” for a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).
Reasoning
The Federal Magistrates Act permits magistrate judges to perform additional duties that are not inconsistent with the Constitution or federal law. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Gomez and Peretz teach that consent is critical: a magistrate may not conduct certain important felony proceedings over a defendant’s objection, but a defendant may consent to a magistrate’s participation in such proceedings.
A Rule 11 plea colloquy bears a sufficient relationship to duties expressly assigned to magistrate judges. Determining whether a plea is voluntary resembles the voluntariness inquiry magistrate judges undertake when they hold evidentiary hearings and recommend rulings on suppression motions involving alleged coerced statements.
Determining whether there is a factual basis for a plea likewise resembles a magistrate judge’s authorized role at a preliminary hearing, where the question is whether the facts support a belief that the defendant committed the charged crime. Rule 11 proceedings are also highly structured, governed by a familiar rule-based script, and generally less complex than many evidentiary matters magistrate judges may already handle.
Because Reyna-Tapia affirmatively consented, and because the plea colloquy is related to specified magistrate functions, the delegation created neither a constitutional nor statutory problem. The magistrate judge could conduct the colloquy and submit findings and a recommendation for the district judge’s ultimate acceptance of the plea.
Issue #4
Whether the district judge must conduct de novo review of a magistrate judge’s Rule 11 findings and recommendation when neither party objects.
Holding
No. De novo review is required only for the portions of the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations to which a party timely objects.
Reasoning
Section 636(b)(1)(C) expressly requires a district judge to make a de novo determination of the portions of a magistrate judge’s report or proposed findings to which objections are made. By its terms, the statute does not require automatic de novo review when the parties file no objection.
Peretz also confirms that any de novo review needed to protect Article III values need not occur unless a party requests it. A district judge need not independently revisit findings that both parties have accepted as correct.
The court identified several safeguards protecting a defendant who consents to a magistrate-led plea proceeding. The defendant may refuse consent in the first place; may object to the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and thereby obtain de novo review; and may withdraw the plea as of right before the district judge accepts it. Before sentencing, the defendant may also seek withdrawal for a fair and just reason.
Requiring automatic de novo review despite the absence of objections would consume judicial resources and undermine the Magistrates Act’s aim of improving the efficient administration of justice. Because Reyna-Tapia consented and filed no timely objection, no de novo review was required.