United States v. Autumn Jackson, Boris Sabas, Also Known as Boris Shmulevich, and Jose Medina, Also Known as Yosi Medina

Although § 875(d) does not expressly define “extort” or use the word “wrongful,” the ordinary legal meaning of extortion includes wrongfulness. Other federal extortion statutes either expressly include that element or concern conduct, such as threatened kidnapping or physical injury, that is inherently wrongful. Congress’s silence in § 875(d) therefore did not show an intention to give extortion a wholly different meaning.

The legislative history reinforced that conclusion. Congress considered the predecessor to § 875(d) at the same time it enacted the predecessor to the Hobbs Act, whose definition of extortion expressly required the wrongful use of force or fear. Those enactments reflected the traditional understanding that extortion involves wrongful conduct, and the court inferred that Congress used “extort” in § 875(d) in that traditional sense.

A threat to disclose information that may damage reputation is not inherently wrongful in every setting. A consumer may threaten to complain publicly or sue over a defective product, and a private club may threaten to identify members who have not paid dues. Reading § 875(d) to cover all such threats for payment would criminalize ordinary efforts to enforce plausible claims.

The key inquiry is whether the threatened disclosure bears a nexus to a plausible claim of right to the money or property demanded. A reputational threat is inherently wrongful when the defendant has no claim of right, and cannot reasonably believe she has one, or when the threat is unrelated to any plausible claim. In those circumstances, the threat itself is the sole leverage for payment, actual disclosure would defeat that leverage, and payment would not prevent renewed demands.

The district court told the jury that extortion meant obtaining money or something of value through threats to reputation. It further told the jury that it made no difference whether defendants were actually owed money or thought they were. That instruction allowed a conviction based on the incorrect premise that every reputational threat used to obtain money is unlawful.

The jury instead needed to decide factual questions bearing on wrongfulness: whether Jackson had a plausible claim of right to the money and whether her threat to disclose her story was connected to that claim. A proper instruction would have permitted conviction only if the jury found that the demand sought money to which Jackson was not entitled, or that the threat lacked a nexus to a plausible claim of right.

The evidence was sufficient to support convictions under a correct instruction, so the remedy was retrial rather than dismissal. Even if Jackson were Cosby’s daughter, a rational jury could find that a $40 million demand by a 22-year-old did not reflect a plausible support claim and that the threat of disclosure, rather than any legitimate entitlement, supplied the leverage for payment.

The conspiracy charge required the jury to find that each defendant understood the unlawful character of the agreement, but it identified as an unlawful object the violation of § 875(d) under the court’s incorrect definition. The jury could therefore have found an agreement to engage in conduct that was not necessarily unlawful under the proper interpretation of the statute.

The Travel Act charge likewise expressly incorporated the court’s § 875(d) instruction. Because the jury could find the interstate travel unlawful based on the same overbroad conception of extortion, the Travel Act convictions could not stand.

The government introduced a short portion of the conversation in which Jackson’s mother warned Medina that the scheme was extortion. Medina sought to introduce the balance of the 42-minute recording to suggest that the mother sounded emotional or unreliable, giving him reason to discount her warning.

Federal Rule of Evidence 106 requires additional portions only when necessary to explain an admitted passage, place it in context, avoid a misleading impression, or ensure a fair understanding. The trial court found that the remainder did not undermine or explain the admitted warning, that the mother’s tone remained calm and reasoned, and that much of the proposed material consisted of Medina’s own inadmissible self-serving hearsay. Those conclusions were within the court’s discretion.

The government presented evidence that Sabas attended key discussions in which Jackson and Medina planned to pressure Cosby and his sponsors, was present when Jackson demanded $40 million, and heard Medina say that Cosby would have to pay substantial money to prevent the story from becoming public. That evidence supported an inference that Sabas understood the scheme rather than merely associated with its participants.

The evidence also showed affirmative assistance. Sabas drove Jackson and Medina to the airport for their New York trip, permitted use of his credit card for return tickets, retained documents and recordings central to the scheme, and later attempted to conceal some of those materials from FBI agents. A rational juror could view those acts as knowing participation in the conspiracy and aiding and abetting the Travel Act offense.

Federal courts generally favor joint trials of defendants charged with participating in the same conspiracy. Sabas’s defense—that he lacked knowledge of the conspiracy—was not irreconcilable with Jackson’s and Medina’s defense that they believed they had legal rights to money from Cosby.

Most of the evidence against Jackson and Medina would have been admissible against Sabas in a separate trial because it showed the nature of the alleged conspiracy he was charged with joining. The jury also demonstrated its ability to assess the defendants individually by acquitting Sabas on the substantive § 875(d) charge while convicting Jackson and Medina. Sabas therefore did not establish the severe prejudice required for severance.