Whether the ALJ had good cause, supported by substantial evidence, to give little weight to Dr. Schatten’s treating-physician opinion.
Holding
Yes. The ALJ adequately articulated good cause for discounting Dr. Schatten’s restrictive assessment, and the resulting sedentary-work RFC was supported by substantial evidence.
Reasoning
A treating physician’s opinion ordinarily receives substantial or considerable weight. But an ALJ may discount it for good cause when the opinion is unsupported by the evidence, contradicted by other evidence, or conclusory or inconsistent with the physician’s own records. The ALJ must clearly state the reasons for doing so.
The ALJ identified a concrete inconsistency between Dr. Schatten’s January 2000 functional assessment and his May 1999 treatment notes. The treatment notes reported that Phillips generally felt good before the visit, had intermittent symptoms, and had less severe neck and trapezius pain. Those observations were difficult to reconcile with an assessment that she could work only three hours a day, required several daily periods of lying down, and had extensive postural and lifting restrictions.
The ALJ also reasonably relied on Phillips’s reported daily activities. Her household tasks, errands, shopping, dining out, visits with friends, travel by automobile and airplane, exercise regimen, and occasional yard work were evidence inconsistent with the extreme limitations described by Dr. Schatten. Other evidence also showed that Phillips usually slept through the night and that medication had resolved her urinary symptoms.
Because the ALJ clearly gave legitimate, record-based reasons for assigning little weight to the treating physician’s opinion, the court would not reweigh the evidence. The ALJ’s decision to limit Phillips to sedentary work, rather than accept Dr. Schatten’s more restrictive limitations or the consultants’ light-work findings, was supported by substantial evidence.