Whether a defendant charged with theft is entitled to acquittal when he honestly but unreasonably believes that property was abandoned or that he had the owner's permission to take it.
Holding
Yes. An honest, good-faith belief that the property was abandoned or that the defendant had a right or permission to take it negates the specific intent required for theft, even if that belief was objectively unreasonable.
Reasoning
Theft is a specific-intent crime: it requires an intent permanently to deprive the owner of property. A person who genuinely believes the property is abandoned or that he is authorized to take it does not possess that felonious intent. The relevant question is therefore what the defendant actually believed, not what a hypothetical reasonable person would have believed.
California decisions had long recognized that a good-faith claim of right defeats larceny because it defeats felonious intent. In People v. Devine, the Supreme Court explained that a person cannot intend to steal property he believes is his own, even if he was careless in reaching that belief. People v. Photo and In re Bayles likewise treated an honest belief in ownership or a legal right to possession as incompatible with theft.
The court drew support from cases involving knowledge-based crimes. Those decisions rejected instructions allowing conviction based merely on facts that would have caused a reasonable person to know property was stolen. An objective test risks punishing a defendant for being careless, imprudent, or insufficiently suspicious rather than for actually having the criminal knowledge or intent the statute requires.
An unreasonable belief may be powerful evidence from which jurors infer that the defendant did not honestly hold the belief. But reasonableness is evidentiary, not an independent legal requirement. If the jury finds that Navarro genuinely believed he could take the beams, the prosecution has failed to prove the required specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt.