Caseflicks

Supreme Court of New Jersey • 1975

Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel

67 N.J. 151 | 336 A.2d 713 | 1975 N.J. LEXIS 181

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Takeaway

In short, this case established the first Mount Laurel doctrine: developing New Jersey municipalities may not use zoning to exclude lower-income households and must create a realistic opportunity for their fair share of regional affordable housing need.

Background

Mount Laurel was a rapidly developing South Jersey township near Camden and Philadelphia. Its zoning scheme permitted primarily expensive, detached single-family homes on substantial lots. It prohibited apartments, townhouses, and mobile homes under its general ordinance, imposed significant minimum lot, frontage, and floor-area requirements, and reserved roughly 29 percent of its land for industrial use—far more than had actually been developed. Although planned-unit developments allowed some multifamily housing, they were designed for affluent residents and included restrictions aimed at limiting families with school-age children.

The record showed that the township had deliberately used land-use controls to attract industry and higher-income households while excluding low- and moderate-income residents. Its officials were motivated principally by the desire to protect the local property-tax base and avoid the municipal and school costs associated with lower-cost housing and families with children. The policy also left people working in the township, including lower-paid workers, unable to afford to live there.

Low-income residents living in substandard housing, former residents, regional residents seeking affordable housing, and organizations representing minority interests challenged the ordinance. The Law Division found economic discrimination, declared the entire ordinance invalid, and ordered Mount Laurel to study local housing needs and submit an affirmative plan to meet them under continued judicial supervision. Mount Laurel appealed, and some plaintiffs cross-appealed, arguing that the remedy had to address the township's fair share of regional—not merely township-connected—housing need. The Supreme Court certified the appeals before Appellate Division argument.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a developing municipality may use its land-use regulations to make low- and moderate-income housing realistically unavailable and thereby exclude people of limited means.

Holding

No. A developing municipality must make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing, including low- and moderate-income housing, and may not use zoning to exclude people because of their limited income or resources.

Reasoning

Zoning is an exercise of the State's police power, delegated to municipalities. It must promote the general welfare and comply with the substantive due-process and equal-protection guarantees embodied in Article I, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. Because adequate shelter is a basic human need, housing opportunities are a matter of fundamental public welfare rather than a merely local concern.

The relevant general welfare is not confined by municipal boundaries. When a zoning decision has substantial effects outside the municipality, local officials must consider the welfare of the region and the State. Municipal borders are artificial lines that cannot control the practical pattern of residential growth, employment, transportation, and housing need.

Mount Laurel's ordinance supplied a facial case of invalid exclusionary zoning. It generally allowed only detached single-family homes, barred other less costly housing forms, required large lots and substantial homes, and set aside an excessive amount of land for industry. These choices made affordable housing economically infeasible and shifted to the township a heavy burden to justify its restrictions.

The township could not justify exclusion by invoking the local tax consequences of lower-cost housing. A municipality may reasonably seek commercial and industrial ratables as part of a comprehensive plan, but it may not manipulate residential zoning to exclude households thought likely to require more public services or generate more school costs. Relief from the State's property-tax structure must come from other governmental institutions, not through fiscal zoning.

Environmental and infrastructure concerns can justify land-use restrictions only when the danger is real and substantial and the regulation is reasonably necessary to protect a vital interest. Mount Laurel could not rely simply on the absence of sewer and water facilities to preserve half-acre, single-family development where the land was suitable for utilities and the township could require or finance their installation.

Issue #2

Whether the housing obligation includes the municipality's fair share of regional low- and moderate-income housing need.

Holding

Yes. A developing municipality must provide a realistic opportunity for its fair share of present and prospective regional need for low- and moderate-income housing, unless it proves peculiar circumstances warrant an exception.

Reasoning

The severe shortage of affordable housing and the regional movement of people and jobs mean that a municipality cannot satisfy its public-welfare obligation by considering only present residents or persons already connected to the township. A community that benefits from regional growth must account for housing needs created across the relevant housing market.

Each municipality need not absorb all regional need. Different locations may be better suited to particular housing types because of available land, employment, transportation, or other significant factors. But because New Jersey zoning remained principally municipal rather than regional, every developing municipality had to bear its fair share unless binding regional arrangements or special circumstances justified another allocation.

The relevant region depends on the facts. For Mount Laurel, the Court identified the pertinent area as portions of Camden, Burlington, and Gloucester Counties within roughly a twenty-mile semicircle from central Camden. Planning experts and state and county agencies could help determine the township's fair-share number and translate it into sufficient appropriately zoned land.

Issue #3

What zoning measures must Mount Laurel undertake to satisfy its obligation, and may it regulate the pace of growth?

Holding

Mount Laurel must revise its regulations to permit a realistic range of affordable housing options, including multifamily and higher-density housing, small homes on small lots, and other low-cost forms; any permissible growth-management program may not operate as an exclusionary device.

Reasoning

The Court did not prescribe one uniform housing form or a fixed zoning formula. But Mount Laurel had to permit multifamily housing without bedroom restrictions, small dwellings on very small lots, and other lower-cost and higher-density housing types sufficient to serve its fair share. If the township authorized planned-unit developments, their residential mix ordinarily should include a reasonable amount of low- and moderate-income housing unless adequate opportunity already existed elsewhere in town.

Bedroom limitations directed at discouraging families with children are contrary to the general welfare. Likewise, a municipality that zones for industry and commerce for tax benefits must permit housing within the means of employees of those uses. Land reserved for nonresidential development must be reasonably related to the actual present and future potential for such development.

The Court did not decide the full scope of a municipality's authority to time growth. It stated only that even if timed growth can be valid in some circumstances, it cannot be used to halt development, exclude lower-income households, or postpone affordable-housing opportunities indefinitely.

Issue #4

What remedy should follow from Mount Laurel's invalid zoning scheme?

Holding

The ordinance was invalid only to the extent of the exclusionary deficiencies identified by the Court. Mount Laurel was given ninety days, subject to a reasonable extension by the trial court, to adopt corrective amendments; the trial court's order requiring a housing study and affirmative plan under immediate supervision was vacated as premature.

Reasoning

The Court rejected total invalidation of the zoning ordinance because only particular features and omissions made the scheme unlawful. It left the details of corrective zoning to the township in the first instance, subject to the Court's substantive guidelines and to a supplemental challenge by plaintiffs after the amendments were adopted.

Courts and municipalities do not themselves build housing; private developers, nonprofit organizations, and specialized public agencies generally do that work. The municipality's immediate legal duty was to create a genuine opportunity for housing through proper land-use regulation, not necessarily to construct housing directly.

The Court declined at this stage to define the outer boundaries of judicial authority to compel affirmative housing measures. It expected Mount Laurel to act in good faith, including by taking additional steps that might encourage fulfillment of its fair share, and preserved the ability of plaintiffs to seek further judicial relief if the township failed to comply.

Concurrences

Justice Pashman

Reasoning

Justice Pashman joined the result and the Court's central analysis but would have gone farther and acted more quickly. In his view, exclusionary zoning was not an isolated Mount Laurel problem; it was a widespread and deeply entrenched practice through which suburbs captured the benefits of regional growth while avoiding its social and fiscal burdens and preserving enclaves of affluence or social homogeneity.

He emphasized that exclusion may result from both improper purpose and practical effect. Minimum house-size, lot-size, and frontage requirements; bans on multifamily housing and mobile homes; bedroom restrictions; and excessive nonresidential zoning all can operate together or separately to price out low- and moderate-income households. The State's housing shortage, suburbanization of employment, continuing development, and rising construction costs made judicial intervention urgent.

Pashman would recognize that any municipality choosing to regulate land use assumes a constitutional affirmative duty to plan and provide its fair share of regional low- and moderate-income housing. The scope of the duty should vary with regional need, the municipality's earlier exclusionary behavior, and its benefit from regional economic growth; it should include serious consideration of regional needs in planning, variances, subdivisions, and cooperation with subsidy programs.

He would authorize active judicial enforcement. Trial courts should identify the relevant region, determine its present and future housing needs, allocate those needs among municipalities, and fashion a suitable equitable remedy, with expert assistance and participation by affected municipalities where needed. A court should respect local planning choices but should use full equitable authority when a municipality has not created a realistic opportunity for its fair share.

Pashman would extend the doctrine beyond developing suburbs. Developed municipalities should accommodate their fair share when land becomes available for development or redevelopment, without grossly disrupting settled neighborhoods. Rural municipalities should not adopt inherently exclusionary controls without a substantial connection to a legitimate zoning purpose, even if regional fair-share analysis is not yet practical there.

Justice Mountain

Reasoning

Justice Mountain agreed with the Court's conclusions and substantially with its reasoning, but he would rest the decision on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. He interpreted the zoning enabling act's requirement that zoning promote the “general welfare,” N.J.S.A. 40:55-32, as broad enough to compel the same regional and affordable-housing obligations the Court imposed.

Because that statutory interpretation resolved the case, Justice Mountain thought it unnecessary to decide whether Mount Laurel's zoning also violated the State Constitution's due-process and equal-protection protections.