Caseflicks

Ohio Supreme Court • 1996

Dresher v. Burt

75 Ohio St. 3d 280 | 662 N.E.2d 264

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Takeaway

In short, Dresher requires an Ohio summary-judgment movant to make a record-based showing under Civ.R. 56(C) before the nonmovant must produce evidence; a bare claim that the opponent has no proof will not do.

Background

Judy Dresher alleged that Dr. Burt seriously injured her during surgery and sought to hold the hospital, SEMC, liable for negligent credentialing. Her theory was that SEMC knew or should have known, before her surgery, of information showing that Dr. Burt was unfit or dangerous but nevertheless permitted him to practice there.

SEMC served requests for admissions and document production seeking to establish that Dresher had no evidence supporting her negligent-credentialing claim. Dresher denied that she lacked such evidence but objected to the related document requests. SEMC did not move to compel production. Instead, it sought summary judgment, asserting that Dresher had no evidence on essential elements of the claim.

The trial court granted SEMC summary judgment on other grounds. On appeal, the Montgomery County Court of Appeals rejected SEMC's argument that the negligent-credentialing claim could be dismissed merely because Dresher had not produced supporting evidence. The appellate court certified whether summary judgment may be granted when neither side supplies Civ.R. 56 evidentiary materials showing both the absence of a material factual dispute and the movant's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a party seeking summary judgment on the ground that its opponent lacks evidence must first identify record evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue on an essential element.

Holding

Yes. The movant bears an initial burden to state the basis for its motion and specifically identify Civ.R. 56(C) materials in the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact; a conclusory assertion that the opponent has no evidence is insufficient.

Reasoning

Civ.R. 56 permits a party to move for summary judgment with or without affidavits. Thus, a movant need not submit affirmative affidavits disproving, or "negating," the opposing party's claim. But the rule still requires a judgment to rest on the designated record materials—such as pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, admissions, affidavits, transcripts, or stipulations—that show no genuine factual dispute and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

The court read Celotex as rejecting a requirement that the movant produce affirmative evidence negating the opponent's case, not as allowing a movant to shift the burden through a bare assertion that the opponent lacks proof. Consistent with Celotex and Mitseff, the movant must identify record material that affirmatively demonstrates the absence of evidence supporting an essential element.

Only after the movant satisfies that initial burden does Civ.R. 56(E) impose a reciprocal burden on the nonmovant. At that point, the nonmovant may not rest on the pleadings and must set out specific facts, through authorized summary-judgment materials, showing a genuine issue for trial. If the movant does not meet its threshold burden, the motion must be denied and the nonmovant has no duty to respond with evidence.

Issue #2

Whether paragraph three of the syllabus in Wing v. Anchor Media permits a summary-judgment motion, by itself, to force the nonmoving party to produce evidence on every issue on which that party would bear the trial burden.

Holding

No. The court limited Wing because its unqualified formulation failed to recognize the moving party's threshold burden under Civ.R. 56.

Reasoning

Wing broadly stated that a summary-judgment motion forces the nonmoving party to produce evidence on issues for which that party bears the burden of production at trial. The court concluded that this statement was too broad because it omitted the preliminary requirement that the movant first make and support the motion as Civ.R. 56 requires.

A motion does not automatically trigger the nonmovant's duty to produce evidence merely because the nonmovant would bear the burden at trial. That duty arises only after the movant has identified appropriate record materials demonstrating the claimed absence of a genuine factual issue.

Issue #3

Whether SEMC's discovery requests and Dresher's responses established that Dresher lacked evidence for her negligent-credentialing claim, and whether summary judgment could be granted when neither party supplied the required evidentiary showing.

Holding

No. SEMC did not meet its initial Civ.R. 56 burden, so Dresher had no reciprocal duty to produce evidence; accordingly, the certified question was answered in the negative.

Reasoning

SEMC relied principally on its own assertion that Dresher had no evidence, coupled with her responses to SEMC's requests for admissions and document production. But Dresher denied that she lacked evidence and objected to producing documents under the requests as framed. Those responses did not establish that she possessed no proof; if anything, they indicated that she claimed to possess evidence but declined to disclose it absent a proper discovery request.

SEMC never pursued a motion to compel discovery and pointed to no Civ.R. 56(C) material clearly showing that Dresher could not establish an essential element of negligent credentialing. Its summary-judgment motion therefore rested on a conclusory assertion rather than the required record-based showing.

The court distinguished cases in which the pleadings themselves, when combined with governing law, establish that the claimant has no legally cognizable cause of action. In that circumstance, pleadings may supply the necessary Civ.R. 56(C) support. Here, however, neither the pleadings nor other authorized record materials established that Dresher's claim failed as a matter of law.

Concurrences

Justice Pfeifer

Reasoning

Justice Pfeifer agreed with the judgment and with limiting Wing, but declined to join an opinion that might broadly reshape Ohio summary-judgment practice. In his view, this case was an unsuitable vehicle for a far-reaching doctrinal rule because the litigation was still undeveloped on the factual merits of the negligent-credentialing claim.

He emphasized that the principal issue when summary judgment was first sought was the statute of limitations, an issue well suited to summary judgment. By contrast, extensive discovery on the underlying factual claim had not yet occurred, making summary judgment on the merits premature. Dresher's discovery responses and objections could themselves be understood to leave a genuine factual issue unresolved.

Dissents

Justice Cook

Reasoning

Justice Cook would have reinstated summary judgment for SEMC. She viewed the lead opinion as improperly requiring a defendant to prove the negative—that the plaintiff has no evidence—when the defendant seeks judgment because the plaintiff cannot prove an essential element.

In her view, Celotex permits a defendant that does not bear the trial burden of proof to point out the absence of evidence on a dispositive element, without producing affirmative evidence or affidavits. A specific, targeted assertion of the missing proof gives the plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to respond and shifts the burden to the plaintiff to identify evidence creating a triable factual dispute.

SEMC specifically identified the alleged evidentiary failure: Dresher had no evidence that SEMC knew, before her surgery, of Dr. Burt's misconduct or dangerous practices. Because that knowledge was essential to negligent credentialing, Justice Cook concluded that SEMC's motion properly required Dresher to come forward with evidence.

Dresher had repeated opportunities to produce evidence, answer the motion, seek further discovery under Civ.R. 56(F), or otherwise explain how she could support her claim. Her objections to SEMC's discovery requests should not excuse her from responding to a focused summary-judgment motion. Justice Cook warned that the lead opinion would encourage evasive discovery objections and curtail summary judgment's role in disposing of factually unsupported claims. Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Wright joined her dissent.