Takeaway
In short, this case holds that Delaware may scrutinize the domicile underlying an ex parte foreign divorce, but a bigamy defendant is entitled to a new trial when the jury is misinstructed on domicile and prevented from considering evidence of a diligent, good-faith reliance on legal advice.
Long had lived in Wilmington with his first wife for about thirty years before they separated in 1945. In September 1946, he went to Arkansas, claiming both health reasons and an intention to establish a permanent home there. He remained long enough to satisfy Arkansas's divorce-residence period, obtained an ex parte Arkansas divorce decree on January 7, 1947, and returned to Wilmington that same day. He began a Wilmington job shortly afterward and married a second wife on January 25.
Delaware prosecuted Long for bigamy, taking the position that the Arkansas divorce was ineffective in Delaware because Long had not established an Arkansas domicile. The trial court instructed the jury that the divorce could be recognized only if Long was domiciled in Arkansas when the decree was entered. It also excluded evidence concerning his first wife's alleged adultery and his consultations with a Delaware attorney before remarrying. Long was convicted and sought a new trial.
Issue #1
Whether Delaware's foreign-divorce statute required Delaware courts to recognize the Arkansas divorce without independently examining Long's Arkansas domicile.
Holding
No. The statute did not eliminate the basic jurisdictional requirement that at least one spouse be domiciled in the divorcing state.
Reasoning
The statute required full faith and credit for divorce decrees entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. In context, that phrase did not mean merely that the Arkansas court was formally authorized to hear divorce cases. A judgment is entitled to recognition elsewhere only if the rendering court possessed the jurisdiction required to enter it.
The legislature's deletion of language tying recognition of foreign divorces to Delaware's own procedural jurisdictional rules meant only that a foreign decree need not conform to Delaware-specific methods of acquiring jurisdiction. It did not mean that Delaware must recognize a decree entered without the elementary jurisdictional foundation of domicile.
In a divorce action, a state ordinarily lacks authority to dissolve a marriage when neither spouse is domiciled there. Delaware could therefore examine whether Long had acquired an Arkansas domicile, just as it could examine personal jurisdiction over an absent spouse.
Issue #2
Whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause required Delaware to recognize Long's ex parte Arkansas divorce decree.
Holding
No. The clause did not prevent Delaware from inquiring into Arkansas's jurisdiction, including whether Long was domiciled there when he commenced the divorce action.
Reasoning
Long relied on decisions requiring recognition of divorce decrees where jurisdiction had been fully litigated by parties who appeared in the divorce proceeding. But his first wife did not appear in the Arkansas action, and the Arkansas decree therefore did not foreclose Delaware from examining the jurisdictional facts.
The first wife's alleged adultery did not place her in the same legal position as a party who had made a general appearance. Marital fault may permit a wronged spouse who has genuinely acquired a new domicile to seek divorce there after constitutionally adequate notice, but it cannot supply jurisdiction in a state where neither spouse is domiciled.
Issue #3
Whether principles of comity independently required Delaware to recognize the Arkansas decree.
Holding
No. Comity did not bar Delaware from examining the Arkansas court's jurisdiction.
Reasoning
Comity is a discretionary basis for respecting foreign judgments; it does not require a state to accept a divorce decree while disregarding whether the rendering court had jurisdiction. Because domicile was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid divorce, Delaware could decline recognition if Arkansas lacked that foundation.
Issue #4
Whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury that Long had to be domiciled in Arkansas on the date the Arkansas divorce decree was entered.
Holding
No. For purposes of Delaware's recognition of the decree, the relevant time for Arkansas domicile was when the divorce action began, not when the decree was entered.
Reasoning
Jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding depends on domicile at the commencement of the action. A later change in domicile does not retroactively deprive the court of jurisdiction that validly existed when the suit was filed.
Long's return to Delaware on the very day of the decree strongly supported an inference that he never intended Arkansas to be his home. Yet the evidence did not conclusively establish that point. The jury could have found that he initially intended to remain in Arkansas indefinitely and only later changed his mind after deciding to return to Wilmington.
By requiring the jury to assess Long's domiciliary intent on the decree date rather than when he filed in Arkansas, the instruction made his immediate return dispositively damaging and was therefore prejudicial.
Issue #5
Whether the trial court properly excluded evidence that Long's first wife had committed adultery.
Holding
No. The evidence was admissible as circumstantial evidence of Long's state of mind concerning his move to Arkansas and possible intent to establish a domicile there.
Reasoning
The alleged adultery was not offered simply to relitigate the merits of Long's marriage. It could help explain why Long wanted to leave Wilmington and live elsewhere, which bore on whether he genuinely intended to make Arkansas his home.
The evidence would not compel the conclusion that Long intended a permanent Arkansas residence, but it was not too remote to assist the jury in evaluating his claimed intent. The jury should have been permitted to consider it for that limited purpose.
Issue #6
Whether a good-faith, diligent mistake of law based on competent legal advice can be a defense to a Delaware bigamy charge.
Holding
Yes. If Long made a bona fide and diligent effort to determine whether he could lawfully remarry, fully disclosed the relevant facts, and reasonably relied on legal advice that the Arkansas divorce permitted remarriage, that mistake could negate the general criminal intent required for bigamy.
Reasoning
The statutory defenses to bigamy, including dissolution of the prior marriage, did not exclude all other defenses. The Court concluded that bigamy under Delaware law requires a general criminal intent and that defenses negating that intent, such as insanity, coercion, or a reasonable mistake of fact, remain available.
Ordinarily, ignorance of the law does not excuse criminal conduct because a broad mistake-of-law defense would encourage ignorance and create difficult, easily fabricated questions of subjective belief. Those concerns are substantially weaker where a defendant has made a genuine, diligent, and objectively adequate effort to learn and obey the law before acting.
A defendant who seeks advice from a reputable attorney, makes full disclosure, receives advice that the proposed remarriage is lawful, and relies on that advice in good faith has done what the legal system can reasonably expect of a citizen attempting to comply with a difficult area of law. Marriage and divorce law is especially complex, while remarriage itself is neither inherently immoral nor antisocial.
The defense is narrow. Long bore the burden to show efforts that were nearly exemplary: a bona fide purpose to obey the law, full disclosure of material facts, reliance on competent and candid advice, and no substantial reason to doubt the advice. The excluded evidence could support those findings, so it should have gone to the jury under proper instructions.