Whether the public-duty doctrine bars a negligence claim when an officer’s affirmative act allegedly injures the plaintiff directly.
Holding
No. The doctrine does not bar an independent duty of care arising from an officer’s affirmative acts; Lamantia owed Bassett the care a reasonable officer with similar skill, training, and experience would exercise under similar circumstances.
Reasoning
The public-duty doctrine concerns an officer’s general duty to protect the public and preserve the peace. When a plaintiff claims an officer failed to protect them from a third party or another independent danger, that public duty ordinarily supports no individual negligence claim absent a special relationship.
Bassett alleged a different wrong: Lamantia himself injured Bassett by tackling him. Because the claim rests on the officer’s affirmative conduct rather than a failure to protect Bassett, the public-duty doctrine does not displace duties arising under ordinary negligence principles.
Montana’s ordinary-care principles support a duty not to injure others through a lack of reasonable care. Bassett was also a foreseeable plaintiff: an officer could reasonably foresee that tackling someone might injure that person.
An officer pursuing a suspect is not judged as though he were an ordinary bystander. His duty is measured by the care a reasonable officer with similar skill, training, and experience would use in similar circumstances. Whether Lamantia breached that duty and caused Bassett’s injury remains for the fact finder.