Takeaway
In short, this case confirms that retrial after a properly supported mistrial is permissible, while alternative-perpetrator evidence and lesser-offense instructions must rest on evidence that satisfies established evidentiary and substantive legal standards.
Matthew Troila was convicted of first-degree murder on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The victim was found stabbed to death in a Roxbury lot on May 2, 1987. Witnesses placed Troila with the victim the preceding night, and three witnesses testified that Troila had admitted killing the victim after the victim allegedly made a sexual advance toward him. Margaret Wilson testified that Troila, his brother Joseph, the victim, and she went to the lot where the body was found; after the men left her car, Troila returned and said he had killed the victim.
Troila had previously been tried twice on the same indictment. The first trial ended in a hung jury. At the second, a juror made an unauthorized view of the crime scene. After a hearing and arguments from both sides, the judge concluded that the jury had been tainted and, with the parties' agreement, declared a mistrial. At the third trial, the judge excluded a tape-recorded police interview of Joseph Troila, declined to give requested manslaughter and mere-presence instructions, and the jury convicted Troila. Troila appealed directly to the Supreme Judicial Court.
Issue #1
Whether the third trial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause or Massachusetts common-law double-jeopardy principles after two prior mistrials.
Holding
No. The prior mistrials did not bar a third trial because each was supported by manifest necessity.
Reasoning
Double-jeopardy principles do not categorically prohibit retrial after a mistrial. A trial judge may declare a mistrial when there is a manifest necessity for doing so, and the appellate court will respect that determination when the judge used appropriate procedures and exercised sound discretion.
The first mistrial followed a deadlocked jury, the traditional example of manifest necessity that permits retrial on the same indictment.
The second mistrial followed a juror's unauthorized view of the crime scene. The judge held a hearing, questioned the jury foreman, heard counsel's arguments, and considered alternatives before finding that exposure to extrinsic information had tainted the jury. Because that inquiry adequately supported the finding of manifest necessity, the second mistrial did not preclude the third trial.
Issue #2
Whether the judge improperly excluded Joseph Troila's recorded police statement as evidence that another person committed the murder or as impeachment of Margaret Wilson.
Holding
No. Joseph's recorded statement was inadmissible hearsay and did not qualify as impeachment evidence or a statement against penal interest.
Reasoning
The recording could contradict Wilson's account only if Joseph's out-of-court assertions were accepted as true. The defense therefore offered the statement for its truth, making it hearsay rather than permissible nonhearsay impeachment evidence.
Joseph did not admit criminal conduct in the interview. Instead, he denied involvement in the killing and denied being near the crime scene. Those denials did not expose him to criminal liability and thus could not satisfy the exception for statements against penal interest.
Nor did the interview contain an implied admission of wrongdoing. Because no asserted hearsay exception applied, the judge properly excluded the recording.
Issue #3
Whether the evidence required an instruction permitting the jury to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter based on reasonable provocation.
Holding
No. The evidence did not support a finding of reasonable provocation.
Reasoning
Voluntary manslaughter requires a killing in the heat of passion on reasonable provocation, without malice, or during sudden combat. A manslaughter instruction is warranted only when the evidence would allow a jury to find those elements.
The only asserted provocation was Troila's alleged statement that the victim had "made a pass" at him. That evidence, without more, could not permit a reasonable jury to find legally adequate provocation. The judge therefore had no duty to instruct on manslaughter.
Issue #4
Whether the judge was required to instruct that the defendant's mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient for conviction.
Holding
No. A mere-presence instruction was unnecessary because the Commonwealth did not proceed on a joint-venture theory.
Reasoning
A mere-presence instruction is appropriate when the Commonwealth seeks to impose liability on the theory that the defendant joined another person's criminal venture. It helps distinguish knowing participation from simple presence at the scene.
Here, the Commonwealth expressly disavowed joint venture, and the judge instructed that the jury could convict only if they found that Troila himself committed the murder. Because presence alone was not a basis of liability under the charge given, no separate mere-presence instruction was required.
Issue #5
Whether the Supreme Judicial Court should grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or should be reduced to a lesser degree of guilt.
Holding
No. The court found no basis for a new trial or for reducing the degree of guilt.
Reasoning
After reviewing the entire record under its heightened statutory authority in first-degree murder cases, the court concluded that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The witnesses' accounts of Troila's admissions and the corroborating evidence supported the jury's verdict.
The court also found no other reason to order a new trial or reduce the conviction to a lesser degree of homicide.