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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court • 1825

Mills v. Wyman

20 Mass. 207

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that moral obligation and gratitude, without bargained-for consideration or a prior legal duty, do not make a promise enforceable.

Background

After returning from a foreign country, the defendant’s twenty-five-year-old son became ill among strangers. The plaintiff sheltered and cared for him until he died, incurring expenses in doing so. The services were not provided at the father’s request, and the adult son had long since left the father’s household.

When informed of the son’s illness and death, the father wrote a promise to reimburse the plaintiff for the expenses. He later refused to pay. The Court of Common Pleas directed a nonsuit for the defendant, and the plaintiff sought review.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the father’s express written promise to pay the plaintiff’s expenses was enforceable solely because it rested on a moral obligation.

Holding

No. A moral obligation alone does not supply legal consideration for an express promise unless it rests on a prior valuable consideration or legal duty that the law has made unenforceable.

Reasoning

The general rule is that a promise unsupported by consideration is unenforceable, even when refusing to perform it appears morally blameworthy. The Court regarded the father’s promise as a gratuitous promise: he received no bargained-for benefit, and the plaintiff incurred no detriment in exchange for the father’s later undertaking.

Some promises associated with moral obligation are enforceable, but only because an earlier transaction supplied valuable consideration. A renewed promise to pay a debt barred by limitations, incurred during infancy, or discharged in bankruptcy may be enforced because the debtor originally received something of value and the later promise removes a legal barrier to collecting an honestly incurred debt.

The plaintiff’s care for the son did not create that kind of antecedent obligation. The father did not request the services, and his later promise was not a revival of a debt that had once been legally or equitably due. It was therefore a naked promise to pay for a benefit voluntarily conferred on another person.

The Court acknowledged that a deliberate written promise may create a serious duty of conscience, particularly where the promisee may rely on it. But the law leaves such duties of imperfect obligation to conscience unless the promisor gained something or the promisee suffered a detriment as the agreed price of the promise.

Issue #2

Whether the father was already legally obligated to pay for medical care and support furnished to his adult son, so that his later promise had consideration.

Holding

No. A father has no general legal duty to pay debts or expenses incurred for an adult child who has become independent.

Reasoning

The son was twenty-five years old, had long left his father’s family, and was acting independently in the world. Under those circumstances, the son’s expenses did not become the father’s legal debts merely because the expenses arose from the son’s final illness.

The Court distinguished obligations concerning minor children and necessaries. A father’s legal obligation to support and educate minor children may support a promise to pay for their needs, but that duty does not ordinarily continue after a child reaches adulthood and becomes his own agent.

Issue #3

Whether Massachusetts’s statute concerning support of poor lineal relatives created a legal obligation that could support the father’s promise.

Holding

No. The record did not establish the statutory conditions necessary to impose that obligation.

Reasoning

The statute imposed responsibility on lineal relatives only in specified circumstances, including findings concerning the poor relative’s settlement, the likelihood that the person would become chargeable to a town, and the relative’s ability to provide support. Liability arose only after those facts had been adjudicated in the proper proceeding.

Nothing in the record showed that those statutory prerequisites had been established. The statute therefore could not supply a preexisting legal duty or consideration for the father’s promise.