Whether a party seeking to add a defendant after the deadline in a Rule 16 scheduling order is governed by Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment standard or Rule 16(b)'s standard for modifying the schedule.
Holding
Rule 16(b), not Rule 15(a), governs once a district court has entered a scheduling order setting a deadline to join parties or amend pleadings.
Reasoning
Rule 15(a) generally favors leave to amend, subject to considerations such as prejudice, bad faith, futility, and undue delay. But that liberal standard does not displace a court-ordered litigation schedule. Rule 16(b) specifically authorizes scheduling orders that limit the time for joinder and amendment and permits modification only upon a showing of good cause.
Treating Rule 15 as controlling after a scheduling deadline would defeat Rule 16's case-management function. A scheduling order controls the course of the action unless the court modifies it; parties cannot bypass that order simply by styling a late request as a motion to amend the complaint.
Johnson did not expressly move to modify the scheduling order. The Ninth Circuit saw no reason to depart from its approach that a party ordinarily must seek modification of a binding order. In any event, treating his amendment motion as an implicit request to modify the schedule would not alter the outcome because he failed to meet Rule 16(b)'s good-cause standard.