Caseflicks

New York Court of Appeals • 1971

People v. Licata

28 N.Y.2d 113 | 268 N.E.2d 787 | 320 N.Y.S.2d 53 | 1971 N.Y. LEXIS 1467

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that a race track may enforce a valid exclusion order against a bookmaker despite an inadvertent ticket sale, and a barred patron who enters or refuses to leave may commit criminal trespass.

Background

Aqueduct Race Track's plainclothes-detective supervisor served Licata with a written order directing him to leave immediately and never again enter or remain on track property. The track barred him because of his prior bookmaking conviction. Licata discarded the notice and said, “I’ll be back.”

Four months later, Licata bought an admission ticket and entered Aqueduct. A Thoroughbred Racing Bureau detective who knew of the exclusion order confronted him just after he passed through the turnstile, reminded him that he was barred, and told him he would be jailed if he came in. Licata responded with an obscenity and ran inside the track. The detective pursued, apprehended, and arrested him.

After trial, Licata was convicted of third-degree criminal trespass under former Penal Law § 140.05 and sentenced to five days in jail. He appealed, arguing that the ticket sale authorized his entry and revoked the prior exclusion order.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Aqueduct could lawfully exclude Licata from the race track through a written no-entry order.

Holding

Yes. A race-track operator may exclude an individual, so long as the exclusion is not based on race, creed, color, or national origin, and the racing regulations required exclusion of persons such as known or reputed bookmakers.

Reasoning

Under Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, a race track generally may choose whom to exclude, subject to the prohibition against discrimination on the identified protected grounds. Licata's exclusion was based on his bookmaking conviction, not on an impermissible ground.

The Racing Commission's regulation, 19 NYCRR 4.46, specifically barred known or reputed bookmakers and other undesirable persons from licensed race-track premises. It also placed responsibility on the licensed association to screen patrons and eject such persons. Aqueduct therefore acted within both its common-law authority and its regulatory responsibility when it issued Licata the written exclusion order.

Issue #2

Whether an employee's sale of an admission ticket revoked or countermanded Licata's existing written exclusion order and gave him permission to enter.

Holding

No. The ticket sale did not nullify the prior no-entry order or give Licata a license or privilege to enter.

Reasoning

Although a ticket ordinarily gives its purchaser a right to enter a place of amusement, that right is limited and may be revoked. Here, Licata had already received explicit written notice that he was not permitted to enter Aqueduct at any time.

The sale of a ticket did not create a contract authorizing Licata's entry because there was no meeting of the minds. A ticket cashier's function was simply to sell tickets to paying customers; the cashier was neither required nor authorized to determine who had been barred as an undesirable person. That screening and exclusion authority belonged to the track's protective bureau, which had issued the no-entry order.

Treating a routine ticket sale as revoking a valid exclusion order would frustrate the Racing Commission's directive that bookmakers and other specified undesirable persons not enter race-track premises. It would reduce enforcement to post-entry expulsion and make criminal trespass unavailable, imposing an unreasonable burden on track officials.

Issue #3

Whether Licata's conduct also established criminal trespass by remaining after a detective revoked any purported permission to be on the premises.

Holding

Yes. Even if the ticket initially gave Licata some permission to enter, the detective revoked that permission, and Licata unlawfully remained by refusing to leave and running farther into the track.

Reasoning

Former Penal Law § 140.05 criminalized knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully on premises, and § 140.00(5) defined unlawful entry or remaining as being without license or privilege. The statutory term “remain” covers a person who entered with permission but stays after that permission ends.

The detective, who had witnessed service of the original written notice, confronted Licata immediately after entry and reminded him that he was barred and would be arrested. This was effectively a renewed direction to leave and a revocation of any license that the ticket might arguably have conveyed.

Instead of leaving, Licata cursed at the detective and ran within the track. Those actions showed a refusal to comply with the revocation of permission and independently supported liability for unlawfully remaining on the premises.