Caseflicks

California Supreme Court • 1894

People v. Brown

105 Cal. 66 | 38 P. 518 | 1894 Cal. LEXIS 1111

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Takeaway

In short, this case establishes that larceny requires an intent permanently, not merely temporarily, to deprive the owner of property; an instruction to the contrary requires reversal when it may support a burglary conviction.

Background

A seventeen-year-old boy, Brown, had been staying and working for his board at the house from which a bicycle was taken. The entry and the taking of a bicycle worth enough to constitute grand larceny were conceded. Brown testified that he took the bicycle to retaliate against another boy who had been throwing oranges at him. He mistakenly took Frank's bicycle rather than the other boy's, hid it under brush, and said he intended to return it that evening.

Brown was convicted of burglary based on entering the house with intent to commit grand larceny. The trial court instructed the jury that a taking could be larceny even if the defendant intended only a temporary deprivation—for example, taking a horse or bicycle to travel a certain distance and then leaving it. Brown appealed from the judgment and the order denying relief.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether larceny may be committed when the defendant intends only temporarily to deprive the owner of property.

Holding

No. Larceny requires an intent wholly and permanently to deprive the owner of the property.

Reasoning

The Court held that the required felonious intent in larceny is an intent permanently to deprive the owner of the property. A person need not intend to convert the property to his own personal use, but he must intend that the owner be wholly and permanently dispossessed of it.

If Brown's testimony was true, he took the bicycle only to retaliate against another boy and intended to return it that evening. That account would negate the permanent-deprivation intent required for larceny. His conduct might constitute a trespass, but it would not constitute larceny.

The Court acknowledged that a person who takes a horse or other property for a limited purpose may sometimes be guilty of larceny. But that conclusion cannot follow merely from temporary use. The jury must examine all the surrounding circumstances and apply the controlling question: whether the taker intended permanently to deprive the owner of the property.

Issue #2

Whether the trial court's instruction defining larceny as including an intended temporary deprivation was reversible error.

Holding

Yes. The instruction misstated the law and could have caused the jury to convict Brown based on his own testimony despite the absence of felonious intent.

Reasoning

The instruction told jurors that taking property merely to use it temporarily—for example, riding a bicycle or horse for a certain distance and then leaving it—was larceny to the same extent as a permanent taking. That statement improperly eliminated permanent deprivation as an essential element of the offense.

Because the burglary charge depended on an entry with intent to commit grand larceny, an erroneous definition of larceny affected the central issue in the case. Under the instruction, Brown's admission that he took and hid the bicycle could establish larceny even if the jury believed his asserted intention to return it. The error therefore required reversal and a new trial.