Whether the defendant's declarations, elopement with his niece, and request for a magistrate constituted an attempt to contract an incestuous marriage.
Holding
No. The evidence showed preparation and intent, but not an indictable attempt.
Reasoning
The Court drew a line between preparation and attempt. Preparation consists of arranging the means or measures needed to commit an offense; an attempt is a direct movement toward committing the offense after those preparations have been made. Although the defendant's conduct plainly showed his purpose to marry his niece, criminal attempt liability requires more than a demonstrated intention.
The Court illustrated the distinction with a person who buys and loads a gun while declaring an intent to shoot a neighbor. Those acts are serious preparations, but they do not become an attempted killing until the person makes a movement to use the gun against the intended victim.
Applied here, the declarations, elopement, and request for a magistrate were steps taken in preparation for a marriage ceremony. In the Court's view, an attempt would not arise until an officer had been engaged and the parties stood before that officer ready to take the vows necessary to form the marriage contract.
The statute required acts that would have culminated in the particular offense but for circumstances independent of the defendant's will. Because the defendant had not yet reached that point, the evidence could not sustain the charge.