Caseflicks

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit • 1989

Joseph Jackson, II v. State of Arizona (Unknown) Terry, Deputy Acting Warden (Unknown) Avenenti, Deputy Warden

885 F.2d 639 | 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 13889

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Takeaway

In short, this case enforces Neitzke's distinction between a merely deficient complaint and a frivolous one: an indigent prisoner with an arguable claim must receive service of process, even if the claim may later fail under Rule 12(b)(6).

Background

Joseph Jackson, an Arizona prisoner proceeding without counsel, sued the State of Arizona and two prison officials for damages. His largely unintelligible complaint asserted a broad assortment of constitutional grievances, including unsafe or unsanitary prison conditions, slippery floors, meals containing dried beans, and a rule barring prisoners from taking personal typewriters to the state law library.

The district court granted Jackson leave to proceed in forma pauperis but did not order service on the defendants. Instead, it dismissed the complaint sua sponte, with leave to amend, because it failed to state a claim. Jackson did not file a timely amended complaint. Although he later submitted amendments with a motion for reconsideration, those amendments did not cure the defects identified by the district court, and the court entered judgment dismissing the action.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the governing question was not whether Jackson's complaint failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), but whether any claim was frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). It affirmed dismissal of some claims, including all claims against Arizona, but reversed as to several prison-conditions claims and remanded for issuance and service of process.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a district court may dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service merely because it fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Holding

No. Before service, dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is proper only if the action is frivolous or malicious, or if the allegation of poverty is untrue; failure to state a claim does not itself establish frivolousness.

Reasoning

Section 1915 is meant to give indigent litigants meaningful access to federal court while permitting courts to screen out abusive litigation. Because an in forma pauperis plaintiff does not face ordinary filing costs, § 1915(d) allows a court to dismiss an action if poverty is falsely alleged or if the action is frivolous or malicious, often before process issues.

Relying on Neitzke v. Williams, the court explained that a claim is frivolous only when it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. This includes claims resting on indisputably meritless legal theories and allegations whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. The standard is narrower than Rule 12(b)(6): a claim may be inadequately pleaded or ultimately fail under Rule 12(b)(6), yet still be nonfrivolous.

There was no record basis to find that Jackson was not indigent or that he had acted maliciously. Thus, because the district court dismissed the case before service, the Ninth Circuit had to determine de novo whether each of Jackson's claims had an arguable legal and factual basis. Any arguable claim entitled Jackson to issuance and service of process and the procedural protections generally available to paying litigants.

Issue #2

Whether Jackson could maintain a damages claim against the State of Arizona.

Holding

No. The claim against Arizona was frivolous because the Eleventh Amendment bars the suit and a State is not a person subject to damages liability under § 1983.

Reasoning

The Eleventh Amendment bars a private damages action against a State in federal court absent a valid waiver or congressional abrogation, neither of which was present here. The court also noted that, under Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, a State is not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Because Arizona possessed clear immunity from Jackson's damages claim, that claim had no arguable legal basis. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the State of Arizona before service.

Issue #3

Whether Jackson's allegations of unsanitary food handling and polluted water stated nonfrivolous Eighth Amendment claims against the prison officials.

Holding

Yes. Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8 were not frivolous because, if their allegations were true and resulted from deliberate indifference, they could establish cruel and unusual punishment.

Reasoning

Construed liberally, Jackson's complaint alleged that prison food handling and water conditions endangered inmates' health and could cause death or disease. Although the court recognized that many allegations appeared improbable or exaggerated, § 1915(d) did not permit dismissal simply because the allegations might ultimately prove unpersuasive.

Prison conditions that seriously threaten an inmate's health or safety can violate the Eighth Amendment when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to those conditions. If Jackson could prove both the alleged danger and deliberate indifference by the named officials, he could establish an arguable cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim.

These claims therefore could not be eliminated as frivolous before service. The court reversed their dismissal and remanded for issuance and service of process, leaving ordinary post-service procedures available to test the sufficiency of the pleadings.

Issue #4

Whether Jackson's purported double-jeopardy and threat-related allegation in claim 2 had an arguable basis in law.

Holding

No. Claim 2 was properly dismissed as frivolous because it was wholly incomprehensible and did not articulate an arguable legal claim.

Reasoning

Jackson described claim 2 in fragmentary terms referring to “Double Jeopardy,” threats, slavery, and violent reactions by prisoners. The court could not discern a coherent factual allegation or legal theory from this language.

Even giving a pro se pleading liberal construction, a court need not invent a claim where the complaint supplies no intelligible basis for one. Because claim 2 did not present an arguable legal theory, its dismissal was affirmed.

Issue #5

Whether allegations concerning slippery prison floors and dried beans served at meals stated arguable Eighth Amendment claims.

Holding

No. Claims 4 and 9 were frivolous because these allegations described discomforts or ordinary prison conditions, not constitutionally cruel and unusual punishment.

Reasoning

The Eighth Amendment does not require prisons to be comfortable. A complaint about slippery floors, without allegations showing a sufficiently serious deprivation or deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm, did not state even an arguable constitutional violation.

Likewise, serving dried beans did not plausibly amount to cruel and unusual punishment. These allegations did not describe conditions so grave as to deprive Jackson of basic human needs or otherwise offend the Eighth Amendment, so the court affirmed dismissal of claims 4 and 9.

Issue #6

Whether prison officials violated Jackson's right of access to the courts by preventing prisoners from carrying personal typewriters to the state law library.

Holding

No. Claim 7 was frivolous because prisoners have no constitutional right to use a typewriter.

Reasoning

Jackson framed the typewriter restriction as a due-process violation. The court treated the allegation as implicating the constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts.

Although inmates possess a right of meaningful access to the courts, that right does not include a constitutional entitlement to a personal typewriter or to use one at a law library. Since the legal theory was foreclosed by Ninth Circuit precedent, claim 7 lacked an arguable basis in law and was properly dismissed.

Concurrences

Judge Farris

Reasoning

Judge Farris agreed that Neitzke required reversal of the pre-service dismissal of Jackson's nonfrivolous claims, but he wrote separately to emphasize his view that the ultimate outcome was likely unchanged. In his view, the complaint could still be dismissed on remand for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

His point was that Neitzke draws a necessary procedural distinction: a complaint that fails to state a claim is not automatically frivolous under § 1915(d). Thus, even if Jackson's pleading was legally deficient, the district court could not use the broader Rule 12(b)(6) standard to dismiss it as frivolous before service.