In the Interest of J.F.C.

Family Code section 161.001 requires clear and convincing proof of both a statutory predicate act or omission by the parent and that termination is in the child’s best interest. The charge did not properly communicate that second requirement for the mother and for one of the father’s alternative predicate grounds, so it was erroneous.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 279 governs an omitted element when other elements of a ground of recovery were submitted and found, but no party requested the omitted element or objected to its omission. In that setting, the trial court may expressly find the omitted element, or it is deemed found in a manner supporting the judgment if supported by evidence.

The judgment expressly recited that termination was in the children’s best interest. Even if that recital did not satisfy Rule 279’s procedure for an express finding, the Court would deem the finding because the evidence supported it.

The evidence supported a firm belief or conviction that termination served the children’s best interest. It included the parents’ drug use while caring for the children, recurrent violent domestic conflict, physical abuse of a child, the parents’ continued instability and noncompliance after removal, expert testimony about the parents’ limited parenting capacity and risk of violence, and evidence that the children improved in foster care and did not show distress at separation. Some evidence of improved housing and conduct after the parents moved to Austin did not prevent a reasonable factfinder from reaching the required firm conviction.

The ordinary legal-sufficiency standard, under which more than a scintilla of evidence may sustain a finding, does not adequately protect the constitutionally required clear-and-convincing burden in termination proceedings. A mere modicum of evidence cannot rationally establish a matter that must produce a firm conviction.

In legal-sufficiency review, courts must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding when a reasonable factfinder could do so, and must disregard evidence a reasonable factfinder could disbelieve. But courts cannot disregard undisputed evidence contrary to the finding, because doing so would distort whether the proof was clear and convincing.

The Court distinguished factual-sufficiency review. Factual review considers the entire record and asks whether contrary evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited is so significant that the factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction.

Parents have a commanding liberty interest in the care and custody of their children. But under Santosky’s due-process framework, that interest must be balanced against the risk of error under the challenged procedure and the government’s interests.

Rule 279 creates a limited risk of error. It applies only after a trial on the merits; a parent can prevent a deemed finding by objecting to the omission or requesting a proper submission; and an express or deemed finding must be supported by evidence meeting the clear-and-convincing standard. Parents may also challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding.

The State, parents, and children have substantial interests in avoiding unnecessary retrials and resolving termination proceedings promptly. Requiring a timely charge objection allows the trial court to correct a readily curable defect before submission to the jury, while avoiding prolonged uncertainty in children’s lives.

The Court treated the relevant question narrowly: whether fundamental error can displace Rule 279 when a party failed to object to the omission of an element and the missing finding can be supplied in support of the judgment. It concluded that the procedural rule controls.

Supplying the best-interest finding did not violate any constitutional or statutory policy because neither Texas law nor the Constitution forbids the court from deciding an issue in a termination case when the parent did not preserve the right to jury submission of that issue. The finding was also supported by clear and convincing evidence.

The Court rejected the view that the charge’s omission was cured simply because best interest was discussed extensively in the evidence and arguments. The jury was not clearly instructed that it had to make a separate best-interest determination, but Rule 279—not a harmless-error theory based on the trial’s general focus—supplied the omitted finding.

The Court assumed, without deciding, that the parents could raise the constitutional complaint for the first time on appeal and that the broad-form submission may have been erroneous. It nevertheless found no basis for reversal because one statutory predicate was established as a matter of law.

Family Code section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order that specifically identifies the actions necessary to obtain the child’s return after a Chapter 262 removal. The children had been in Department custody for more than nine months, and the parents undisputedly failed numerous material court-ordered obligations.

Neither parent paid ordered child support, attended parenting or anger-control classes, obtained the ordered psychiatric evaluations before trial, or consistently submitted to required drug testing. Their partial or last-minute efforts did not negate their admitted and undisputed noncompliance. Thus, the predicate conduct under subsection (O) was conclusively established, making any defect concerning juror agreement harmless.

The Court left unresolved whether a parent may obtain a new trial for ineffective assistance of counsel in a termination proceeding. It assumed for argument’s sake that Strickland’s deficient-performance and prejudice framework applied, then held that the parents could meet neither component.

Counsel’s failure to object to the best-interest omission did not overcome the strong presumption of sound trial strategy. Counsel demonstrated that he understood the best-interest requirement, made other careful charge objections, and may have strategically chosen to preserve an appellate charge complaint if the verdict were adverse.

The failure to challenge broad-form submission was not professionally deficient because Texas Department of Human Services v. E.B. had approved broad-form submission in termination cases. Counsel’s decisions to address religious-belief evidence through cross-examination and argument, to make selective evidentiary objections, and not to mount a wholesale reliability challenge to psychological testimony also fell within the range of reasonable professional judgment.

In all events, the extensive evidence supporting termination prevented the parents from showing a reasonable probability that the result would have been different absent counsel’s asserted errors.

Because failure to comply with the court orders was conclusively established as a predicate ground and the judgment was supported by an express or deemed best-interest finding, the factual sufficiency of the alternative endangerment ground could not affect the judgment.

The Court rejected the argument that termination under section 161.001(1)(O) was criminal contempt requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt or subject to statutory contempt penalties. The Legislature expressly made noncompliance with qualifying court orders an independent ground for termination, while Santosky requires clear and convincing—not beyond-a-reasonable-doubt—proof.

The challenged evidence concerning sexual conduct was not an abuse of discretion in light of other unchallenged expert testimony raising concerns about parenting potential. Any possible error in allowing a witness’s opinion testimony was cumulative of other evidence.