Caseflicks

Missouri Court of Appeals • 1996

Hillside Development Co. v. Fields

928 S.W.2d 886 | 1996 Mo. App. LEXIS 1462

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that a longstanding, obvious driveway created by a common owner may support an implied easement when it is reasonably necessary to use an existing garage, even though the owner has another way to enter the property.

Background

The house now owned by Roscoe Fields was built in 1967 on land then owned as a single tract by Carl Nelson. Although the only public road lay south of the house, Nelson built the basement garage on the north side. An asphalt driveway therefore ran openly from the road around the east and north sides of the house to the garage.

After Nelson died, Shriners Hospital acquired the tract and subdivided it in 1984. It retained the house lot but sold surrounding land, including the disputed curved portion of the driveway, to Hillside Development Company. The deed documents reserved an express ingress-egress easement, but that easement failed to include a curved 20-yard-by-12-yard section of the existing driveway in front of the house.

Fields bought the house lot from the hospital in 1987. He knew from the title report that Hillside held record title to the disputed driveway segment and that the express easement did not cover it. Hillside later sued Fields for trespass and ejectment. Fields counterclaimed for a declaration that he held an implied easement over the disputed driveway segment. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court rejected the implied-easement claim and entered judgment for Hillside. Fields appealed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Fields' knowledge that Hillside owned the disputed driveway segment, and that the express easement did not cover it, barred his claim to an implied easement from preexisting use.

Holding

No. Neither Fields' record notice nor the limited express easement foreclosed an implied, or visible, easement.

Reasoning

An easement implied from preexisting use arises when commonly owned land is severed, even though the easement is not written into the title documents. Indeed, if the claimed right appeared in the deed, it would be an express easement rather than an implied one. Thus, Fields' knowledge that Hillside held title to the driveway segment was consistent with, not fatal to, his claim that the segment was burdened by an implied easement.

The driveway's open and obvious condition also defeated any suggestion that Hillside could claim surprise. Hillside took the servient land subject to the circumstances created by the common owner, who had constructed a permanent driveway leading directly to the house's garage. In that sense, Hillside stood in the shoes of the common grantor.

Issue #2

Whether the undisputed facts established a visible easement over the disputed portion of Fields' driveway.

Holding

Yes. The driveway satisfied all four requirements for an easement implied from visible preexisting use.

Reasoning

Missouri requires unity of ownership followed by severance; an artificial arrangement created by the common owner that visibly benefits the claimed dominant estate and burdens the servient estate; pre-severance use long enough to show permanence; and reasonable necessity to the full beneficial use and enjoyment of the dominant estate.

The first three elements were undisputed. Nelson, and later Shriners Hospital, held the relevant property in common ownership before the subdivision separated the house lot from the surrounding land. Nelson had built the driveway as an obvious artificial improvement that provided vehicular access to the garage. The driveway had served that function for approximately 17 years before the hospital severed title, and its asphalt construction and defined route showed that it was intended as a permanent arrangement.

The fourth element requires reasonable necessity, not strict or absolute necessity. Hillside improperly relied on the stricter standard governing easements by necessity, under which a claimant generally must show that the property would otherwise be landlocked. A visible easement instead asks whether the claimed use is reasonably necessary to the property's full beneficial enjoyment.

Without the disputed driveway segment, Fields could enter his property through the express easement but could not reasonably use the existing garage or much of the driveway on his own land. Hillside's proposed alternatives—constructing a new driveway or garage—would be expensive and difficult, and a rear driveway could interfere with septic equipment. Under Missouri decisions recognizing implied access rights to garages built before severance, these alternatives did not defeat reasonable necessity.

Because denying the easement would deprive Fields of practical use of a significant, valuable part of the residential property as it had long been arranged, the court reversed the judgment for trespass and ejectment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its ruling.