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Supreme Court of the United States • 2020

Kahler v. Kansas

589 U.S. 271 | 140 S. Ct. 1021 | 206 L. Ed. 2d 312

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that due process does not require States to recognize moral incapacity—the inability to distinguish right from wrong—as an insanity defense, leaving the design of insanity rules largely to state law.

Background

In 2009, James Kahler went to the home where his estranged wife, Karen, their children, and Karen's grandmother were staying. He shot and killed Karen, her grandmother, and the couple's two daughters; he allowed his son to flee. Kahler later surrendered and was charged with capital murder.

Kansas allows a defendant to introduce mental-illness evidence at the guilt phase only to show that the defendant lacked the culpable mental state required for the charged offense. It does not permit an acquittal based on evidence that mental illness prevented the defendant from understanding that an intentional act was morally wrong. At sentencing, however, Kansas permits broad mental-health evidence to mitigate punishment or support commitment to a mental-health facility.

Before trial, Kahler argued that Kansas had unconstitutionally abolished the insanity defense by permitting conviction of a person unable to distinguish right from wrong. The trial court rejected the challenge. Kahler presented evidence that severe depression prevented him from forming the intent to kill, but the jury convicted him of capital murder and later imposed a death sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that due process does not require a State to adopt any particular insanity test.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires Kansas to provide an insanity defense that acquits a defendant who, because of mental illness, could not understand that his intentional criminal act was morally wrong.

Holding

No. Due process does not require a State to adopt a moral-incapacity, right-from-wrong insanity defense.

Reasoning

A state rule defining criminal liability violates due process only when it offends a principle of justice so deeply rooted in the Nation's traditions and conscience as to be fundamental. Historical practice is the primary guide, and this demanding standard ordinarily leaves States broad authority to define criminal offenses and defenses.

The Court's precedents had already rejected the idea that due process constitutionalizes a particular insanity test. In Leland v. Oregon, the Court held that a State could use a moral-incapacity test rather than an irresistible-impulse test. In Clark v. Arizona, the Court upheld Arizona's choice to retain moral incapacity while excluding cognitive incapacity as an independent insanity defense. Those cases establish that no single formulation of legal insanity is the constitutional baseline.

Kansas has not eliminated every insanity defense. Its statute allows a defendant to use mental-disease evidence to show an inability to form the mens rea required for the crime. Thus, a defendant who did not understand the nature and quality of his actions—for example, one who did not comprehend that firing a gun would kill a person—may be acquitted because he lacked the required intent.

Kansas also permits defendants to introduce a wide range of mental-health evidence at sentencing. A defendant may argue that mental illness prevented him from appreciating moral or legal wrongfulness, or from controlling his conduct, in support of reduced punishment or commitment instead of imprisonment. Kansas therefore channels some mental-illness evidence to sentencing rather than excluding it altogether.

The historical record did recognize a broad principle that insanity can excuse criminal conduct, but it did not establish moral incapacity as the exclusive or indispensable definition of insanity. Early common-law sources and decisions used varying formulations, including tests focused on the defendant's capacity to understand his actions, possess reason, or form felonious intent.

M'Naghten's Case later articulated a two-pronged rule: a defendant could be excused either for not understanding the nature and quality of the act or for not knowing that the act was wrong. Although that formulation became influential, the States continued to adopt divergent approaches, including irresistible-impulse, product-of-mental-illness, cognitive-capacity, and legal-wrongfulness tests.

The distinction between moral wrongfulness and legal wrongfulness is consequential. A defendant may know that killing is illegal while, because of a delusion, believing the killing morally required by God. A State using legal wrongfulness may convict that defendant, while a State using moral wrongfulness may acquit. This persistent variation further undermines the claim that the moral-incapacity rule is a settled constitutional minimum.

Rules about insanity reflect contested medical judgments and competing views about free will, blameworthiness, public safety, and the purposes of punishment. Because those judgments remain subject to uncertainty and revision, the Constitution leaves States substantial room to experiment. Kansas could reasonably decide that a person who intentionally kills is not wholly blameless even if mental illness led the person to believe the killing was morally justified.

Dissents

Justice Breyer

Reasoning

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, agreed that States have broad discretion to formulate insanity rules but concluded that Kansas crossed a constitutional line. In his view, Kansas did more than revise the insanity defense: it eliminated the defense's historic core by allowing conviction of a person who intentionally acted but, because of mental illness, lacked the capacity for moral responsibility.

He illustrated the difference with two defendants. One kills a person because mental illness makes him believe the victim is a dog; the other kills a person because mental illness makes him believe a dog commanded the killing. Kansas permits the first defendant to contest mens rea but requires conviction of the second if the second intentionally killed a human being. Breyer saw no morally meaningful difference between the two defendants sufficient to make one criminally responsible and the other not.

Breyer did not contend that M'Naghten's precise wording was constitutionally fixed. Rather, he argued that centuries of English and American legal history consistently embody a deeper principle: a person whose mental illness leaves him without sufficient capacity for moral judgment cannot properly be found guilty of a crime. Common-law references to reason, discretion, good and evil, free will, and felonious intent, in his view, linked criminal liability to moral agency rather than to the modern, narrower concept of mens rea.

The historical variations in insanity doctrine did not defeat this conclusion, according to the dissent. Tests based on irresistible impulse or the product of mental illness generally expanded the traditional defense; they did not authorize conviction of defendants who lacked moral responsibility. And the overwhelming majority of modern jurisdictions retain an insanity defense that can excuse a defendant despite proof of the offense's technical mens rea.

Moving mental-illness evidence to sentencing did not cure the constitutional defect. The historical principle, Breyer reasoned, is that an insane defendant should not be adjudged guilty at all. Sentencing mitigation is discretionary, leaves the defendant exposed to severe punishment including death, and does not remove the stigma and collateral consequences of a criminal conviction.

Because mental illness commonly affects a person's motivations and moral perceptions rather than the ability to form an intent in the narrow sense, Kansas's rule potentially permits conviction of many defendants who would be regarded as legally insane under traditional approaches. Breyer concluded that this result conflicts with the longstanding premise that moral culpability is a prerequisite to criminal punishment.