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Supreme Court of Colorado • 2019

v. People

2019 CO 96

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Takeaway

In short, PSCC follows the case that actually caused the defendant’s confinement, but every qualifying confinement period is counted inclusively from its first day through its last.

Background

Michael Alan Fransua was arrested in October 2013 after entering his former girlfriend’s home and assaulting her. He was charged with burglary, assault, and harassment, but posted bond in December 2013. While released in March 2014, he again entered the former girlfriend’s home and refused to leave. In this second case, he was charged with trespass, violating bail-bond conditions, and violating a protection order. He could not post bond in the second case, and he remained jailed from March 1 through June 16, 2014. His bond in the first case was never revoked or altered.

On June 16, Fransua resolved both cases by pleading guilty in the first case to attempted second-degree burglary. The prosecution dismissed the second case and the original first-case charges. He initially received five years in community corrections, escaped three months later, and was resentenced to five years in Department of Corrections custody.

At resentencing, Fransua sought 245 days of presentence confinement credit (“PSCC”). The district court awarded 162 days, denying credit for the 108 days he was jailed after his arrest in the second case. The court reasoned that this confinement resulted from the second case, not the case in which Fransua was sentenced. The court of appeals affirmed that ruling but held that the PSCC calculation must include both the first and last days of each confinement period. Fransua sought review of the denied 108 days, and the People cross-petitioned on the calculation of first-day credit and the procedural vehicle for challenging PSCC.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a defendant released on bond in a first case is entitled to PSCC in that case for time spent in custody after being unable to post bond in a separate second case.

Holding

No. Fransua was not entitled to credit in the first case for the 108 days he was confined on the second case.

Reasoning

Colorado’s PSCC statute, section 18-1.3-405, grants credit for the entire period a person is confined for an offense before sentencing for that offense. Under Schubert v. People, the confinement and the charge or conduct producing the sentence must have a substantial nexus. Entitlement to PSCC is reviewed de novo.

Fransua had posted bond in the first case, and that bond remained in effect throughout the disputed 108-day period. When he was later arrested and could not post bond, his custody was attributable to the second case alone; the first case did not independently keep him in jail.

Although the second case included charges for violating conditions connected to the first case, it also included a separate trespass charge. The trespass rested on distinct conduct and could have been brought even if the first case had never existed. Because that independent charge supported Fransua’s detention, there was no substantial nexus between the confinement and his sentence in the first case.

The disputed time could have been credited against a sentence in the second case had that case resulted in a sentence rather than dismissal. Instead, Fransua received the benefit of the plea agreement that dismissed the second case, so the Court declined to transfer that confinement credit to the first case.

Issue #2

Whether PSCC includes both the first and last days of a defendant’s presentence confinement.

Holding

Yes. A defendant receives PSCC for both the first and last days of each period of qualifying confinement.

Reasoning

The PSCC statute entitles an eligible defendant to credit for the “entire period” of presentence confinement. Giving the term “entire” its ordinary meaning, the Court concluded that the period includes the day confinement begins and the day it ends.

The People relied on Colorado’s general time-computation statute, section 2-4-108(1), which ordinarily excludes the first day and includes the last. But the related subsection extending deadlines when the final day falls on a weekend or holiday concededly does not apply to PSCC. The Court reasoned that the general statute could not sensibly apply only in part to PSCC calculations.

The specific language of the PSCC statute therefore controls. The case was remanded for correction of Fransua’s credit calculation to include every first and last day of qualifying confinement.

Issue #3

Whether an unpreserved challenge to the amount of PSCC may be reviewed on direct appeal and whether PSCC is properly characterized as part of a sentence unauthorized by law.

Holding

A PSCC calculation may be challenged on direct appeal without preservation when no further factual development is required, but PSCC is not a component of a sentence and thus is not a Rule 35(a) claim that the sentence was unauthorized by law.

Reasoning

The court of appeals had treated Fransua’s PSCC challenge as a claim that his sentence was not authorized by law under Criminal Procedure Rule 35(a). The Supreme Court rejected that characterization based on its companion decision in People v. Baker: PSCC is not a component of the sentence itself, so an erroneous credit award does not make the sentence “not authorized by law.”

Nonetheless, Fransua raised his credit arguments on direct appeal, an appropriate avenue where the record requires no additional factual development. The Court also explained that preservation is not required because the same PSCC issue may be raised postconviction through a Rule 35(a) claim that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. Requiring preservation on direct appeal would make little sense when the identical claim could later be raised without it.