Caseflicks

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit • 1986

H. Jack Frandsen v. Brotherhood Of Railway, Airline And Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express And Station Employees

782 F.2d 674 | 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 21527

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Takeaway

In short, this case prevents a Catch-22: an employee who pursues internal union appeals does not forfeit a fair-representation suit merely because those appeals later prove futile, and tolling extends to a railroad alleged to have colluded with the union.

Background

After Missouri Pacific Railroad purchased a Conrail rail line, BRAC represented both the nine transferred Conrail employees and the much larger group of existing Missouri Pacific employees. Frandsen, a Conrail signal-block operator with nearly thirty-eight years of seniority, chose to keep his job and move to Missouri Pacific after he was allegedly told that the transfer agreement would dovetail his seniority with the Missouri Pacific roster. Instead, the April 15, 1982 agreement gave the transferred employees only “prior rights” to their former jobs and assigned them Missouri Pacific seniority beginning April 16, 1982. Frandsen therefore lost the practical value of his accumulated Conrail seniority.

Frandsen and other transferred employees appealed internally within BRAC. The union president rejected the appeal in August 1982, and Frandsen appealed to BRAC’s International Executive Council. Although Frandsen repeatedly pressed for a prompt decision and warned that outside action might be necessary, the Council did not affirm the president’s decision until September 1983. Frandsen sued BRAC and Missouri Pacific in March 1984, within six months of that final internal decision. He alleged that BRAC breached its duty of fair representation by negotiating the seniority arrangement and that Missouri Pacific colluded in the breach.

The district court granted summary judgment for both defendants. Applying DelCostello’s six-month limitations period, it held that Frandsen’s claim accrued on April 16, 1982 and was untimely. Although the court recognized that Clayton generally favors exhaustion of internal union remedies, it concluded that exhaustion was futile because an internal union appeal could not provide complete relief from a negotiated agreement. It therefore refused to toll the limitations period while Frandsen pursued the internal appeal.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether DelCostello’s six-month statute of limitations is tolled while an employee pursues internal union remedies that are ultimately determined to be futile under Clayton.

Holding

Yes. The six-month limitations period is tolled during the pursuit of internal union remedies, even if a court later concludes that those remedies were futile.

Reasoning

Clayton and DelCostello serve complementary labor-law policies. Clayton generally encourages private resolution through internal union procedures, while DelCostello promotes reasonably prompt resolution of labor disputes. Reading the cases together, an employee ordinarily has six months to sue but the clock does not run while the employee is pursuing available internal union relief.

Clayton’s futility exception exists to protect an employee from being forced through remedies that cannot fairly or effectively resolve the dispute; it is not a penalty that strips an employee of the time otherwise available to sue. Nothing in Clayton suggests that an employee who in good faith tries internal procedures must lose the benefit of tolling if those procedures later prove futile.

A no-tolling rule would be unworkable because employees cannot reliably predict whether a court will later excuse exhaustion. Clayton made exhaustion a discretionary, fact-sensitive inquiry involving such matters as hostility, adequacy of relief, and delay. A worker facing that uncertainty should not have to risk either dismissal for failing to exhaust or dismissal as untimely for attempting to exhaust.

Internal procedures can still serve useful purposes even if they cannot furnish every remedy sought in federal court. They may provide partial relief, encourage compromise, clarify the weakness of a claim, or give the union’s own political processes a chance to correct the problem without judicial intervention.

Refusing tolling would encourage protective lawsuits. Employees would file immediately to avoid the possibility that a court might later label internal remedies futile, undermining Clayton’s preference for nonjudicial dispute resolution and producing piecemeal, cautionary litigation.

Because Frandsen pursued BRAC’s appeal process and filed suit less than six months after the International Executive Council’s final ruling, his action was timely. The district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment on limitations grounds.

Issue #2

Whether Frandsen had to pursue Railway Labor Act grievance procedures against Missouri Pacific before the limitations period could be tolled as to the railroad.

Holding

No. Frandsen was not required to pursue Railway Labor Act grievance procedures, and the limitations period was tolled against both BRAC and Missouri Pacific while he pursued internal union remedies.

Reasoning

Railway Labor Act adjustment procedures govern “minor disputes”: disputes between an employee and a railroad over the interpretation or application of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. Frandsen’s core allegation was instead that the union breached its statutory duty of fair representation and that the railroad colluded in that breach.

A duty-of-fair-representation claim is not a minor dispute merely because it arises in a railroad workplace. It concerns the union’s statutory obligation to represent employees fairly, rather than an ordinary disagreement over contractual rights that the National Railroad Adjustment Board can resolve.

Tolling against both defendants also advances the policies identified in Clayton and DelCostello. Requiring Frandsen to bring a separate, immediate action against Missouri Pacific while pursuing internal union relief would fragment litigation and force an employee to protect against different timing rules for closely connected claims.

Missouri Pacific was sued as an alleged participant in BRAC’s breach and as a party from which complete relief could be obtained. Any practical burden on the railroad is limited because, if the union’s conduct created added costs, the railroad may seek to place responsibility for those costs on the union under Bowen v. Postal Service.

At the summary-judgment stage, Frandsen had alleged sufficient facts to permit his collusion claim to proceed. He had not yet had a full opportunity to obtain discovery from union and railroad officials, and the record supported an inference that BRAC may have favored the much larger group of existing Missouri Pacific employees over the nine transferred Conrail employees.