Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 2018

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv.

586 U.S. 9 | 139 S. Ct. 361 | 202 L. Ed. 2d 269 | 2018 U.S. LEXIS 6932

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that land must first be habitat before it can be designated critical habitat, and that the Service's economically consequential refusal to exclude land from a designation remains subject to APA review.

Background

The dusky gopher frog is an endangered species once found across parts of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. By 2001, habitat loss had reduced the known wild population to roughly 100 frogs at one pond in Mississippi. The Fish and Wildlife Service listed the frog as endangered but did not immediately designate its critical habitat.

In 2012, the Service designated several occupied sites and also designated a 1,544-acre tract in Louisiana, called Unit 1, as unoccupied critical habitat. The frog had not been seen there since 1965. Although Unit 1 contained five unusually high-quality ephemeral breeding ponds, much of its surrounding upland was a closed-canopy timber plantation. The Service concluded that the upland forest could be restored with reasonable effort and that Unit 1 was essential because it could support a geographically separate frog population.

Weyerhaeuser owned part of Unit 1 and leased the remainder from family landowners. The owners argued that Unit 1 could not be critical habitat because, in its existing condition, it was not habitat in which the frog could survive. They also challenged the Service's refusal to exclude the tract after considering its potential economic effects, including substantial lost development value.

The District Court upheld the designation. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Endangered Species Act imposed no independent requirement that critical habitat first be habitat. It also held that the Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1 was committed to agency discretion and therefore unreviewable. The Supreme Court granted review on both questions.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether an area may be designated as “critical habitat” under the Endangered Species Act if it is not habitat for the endangered species.

Holding

No. An area is eligible for designation as critical habitat only if it is habitat for the species, although the Court did not define the precise boundaries of “habitat” or decide whether Unit 1 qualifies.

Reasoning

The ordinary meaning of the phrase “critical habitat” establishes that critical habitat must be a subset of habitat. An adjective ordinarily narrows the category named by the noun; thus, “critical” identifies the habitat that is especially important to conserving a species rather than eliminating any habitat requirement altogether.

The Act's operative designation provision confirms this conclusion. Section 4(a)(3)(A)(i) directs the Secretary to designate “any habitat” of a listed species that is considered critical habitat. That language makes habitat a threshold condition for a critical-habitat designation.

The statutory definition of “critical habitat” does not displace that threshold. It explains what makes an area of habitat “critical”: occupied areas must contain certain essential features, while unoccupied areas must be essential to conservation. But it does not define the broader and antecedent term “habitat.”

The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the Act contains no habitability limitation. Because the Fifth Circuit had not interpreted “habitat” or assessed whether Unit 1, despite requiring restoration, could count as habitat for the frog, the Court vacated and remanded for that determination in the first instance.

Issue #2

Whether the Service's decision not to exclude an area from critical habitat based on economic impacts is judicially reviewable.

Holding

Yes. A decision not to exclude an area under ESA § 4(b)(2) is reviewable for arbitrariness, capriciousness, or abuse of discretion.

Reasoning

The Administrative Procedure Act begins with a strong presumption favoring judicial review of agency action. The exception for action “committed to agency discretion by law” is narrow and applies only when a statute provides no meaningful standard by which a court can assess the agency's exercise of discretion.

Section 4(b)(2) supplies meaningful standards. It requires the Secretary to consider economic, national-security, and other relevant impacts before designating critical habitat, and it authorizes exclusion when the benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits of designation, unless exclusion would cause extinction.

Although the word “may” gives the Secretary discretion whether to exclude a particular area, that discretion must be exercised through the statutory process. The Secretary cannot avoid review when a landowner alleges that the Service ignored relevant costs or failed to make the required area-specific comparison of the benefits of designation and exclusion.

The Court's earlier decision in Bennett v. Spear described the Secretary's ultimate designation-or-exclusion decision as reviewable for abuse of discretion. Weyerhaeuser's claim—that the Service inadequately considered Unit 1's costs and benefits—is the familiar kind of claim courts evaluate under the APA. The Court therefore remanded for the Fifth Circuit to consider the merits of that challenge if necessary.