Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 2018

Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky

585 U.S. 1 | 138 S. Ct. 1876 | 201 L. Ed. 2d 201 | 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3685

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Takeaway

In short, this case permits States to keep some political advocacy out of polling places, but requires them to define prohibited apparel with objective, workable standards rather than an open-ended ban on anything “political.”

Background

Minnesota law prohibited voters from wearing a “political badge, political button, or other political insignia” in or about a polling place. The challenged provision applied inside the polling place and was enforced by election judges, who could ask voters to remove or conceal prohibited items. A voter who refused still had to be allowed to vote, but could be referred for civil or criminal enforcement.

Before the 2010 election, the Minnesota Voters Alliance, Andrew Cilek, Susan Jeffers, and others challenged the law under the First Amendment. Their supporters intended to wear “Please I.D. Me” buttons advocating voter-identification laws and Tea Party apparel. State guidance instructed election judges to prohibit apparel naming parties or candidates, taking a position on ballot questions, promoting issue-oriented material intended to affect voting, or promoting groups with recognizable political views. Some plaintiffs were asked to cover their apparel; Cilek was initially turned away twice before being allowed to vote after officials recorded his information.

The District Court rejected the challenge. The Eighth Circuit initially upheld the statute against a facial challenge but revived the plaintiffs’ as-applied claims. On remand, the District Court granted summary judgment to the State on the as-applied claims, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review only of the facial First Amendment challenge.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the interior of a polling place is a nonpublic forum for First Amendment purposes.

Holding

Yes. A polling place on Election Day is a nonpublic forum.

Reasoning

The Court applied its forum-based First Amendment doctrine. Traditional and designated public forums generally receive strong protection against content-based restrictions, but the government may impose reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restrictions in a nonpublic forum when they are consistent with the forum’s intended purpose.

A polling place is government-controlled property dedicated on Election Day to a single, highly specific purpose: voting. Rules limit who may enter, why they may enter, and how long they may remain. Its character as a controlled setting for the administration of elections makes it a nonpublic forum.

Because the statute did not distinguish among speakers based on their political viewpoint on its face, the governing question was not strict scrutiny. The question was whether the apparel restriction was reasonable in light of the polling place’s purpose.

Issue #2

Whether Minnesota may, consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit some political apparel inside a polling place.

Holding

Yes. Minnesota may reasonably exclude at least some forms of political advocacy from the polling place.

Reasoning

The Court relied on Burson v. Freeman, which upheld a campaign-free zone around polling places in light of historical problems of voter intimidation, fraud, disorder, and pressure at the polls. Although Burson concerned restrictions outside the polling place and often involved more active electioneering, its reasoning supported the State’s interest in protecting voters from partisan campaigning at the moment they cast their ballots.

The State may treat the polling place as an “island of calm” in which voters can make their choices without being drawn into the conflict of an election campaign. Voting is a weighty civic act, and the State may reasonably conclude that partisan discord and advocacy should not accompany voters into the voting area.

Silent apparel is ordinarily less disruptive than active speech, but its effect must be assessed in context. The special function of a polling place on Election Day permits reasonable content-based limits on apparel that conveys political messages, so long as the State draws and administers those limits through a sensible standard.

Issue #3

Whether Minnesota’s prohibition on all “political” badges, buttons, and insignia was a reasonable restriction in a nonpublic forum.

Holding

No. The law was facially unconstitutional because Minnesota supplied no objective, workable standard for determining what apparel was “political.”

Reasoning

The statute did not define “political,” a term broad enough in ordinary usage to encompass nearly any message related to government or public affairs. Minnesota argued that the prohibition instead covered messages that a reasonable observer would understand as relating to electoral choices before voters on that Election Day, but that limiting interpretation did not solve the statute’s line-drawing problem.

The State’s own enforcement policy included plainly identifiable categories, such as apparel naming a candidate or party or supporting or opposing a ballot measure. But it also prohibited “issue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting” and material promoting groups with “recognizable political views.” Those categories depended on whether candidates or parties had taken positions on particular issues, rather than on an administrable feature of the apparel itself.

Under the State’s approach, election judges would need to know the positions taken by every candidate and political party on a wide array of local and national issues. That would produce uncertain and inconsistent results for messages such as “Support Our Troops,” “#MeToo,” “All Lives Matter,” an NRA shirt, a rainbow flag, or constitutional text.

The Constitution does not demand perfect clarity in every speech regulation. But a rule aimed directly at political expression must provide objective, workable standards that constrain official discretion. Minnesota instead left election judges with open-ended authority to decide what counted as political, creating a substantial risk that individual officials’ own political views or knowledge would influence enforcement.

The Court emphasized that Minnesota’s goal was not impossible to achieve. Other States use more definite rules tied to candidates, political parties, ballot measures, or election-related advocacy. Minnesota could preserve a polling place free from partisan campaigning, but it had to use a more discernible standard than an undefined ban on “political” insignia.

Dissents

Justice Sotomayor

Reasoning

Justice Sotomayor agreed that a polling place is a nonpublic forum and that States may reasonably restrict political apparel there to preserve order, protect voters from intimidation or confusion, and safeguard election integrity. She disagreed only with the Court’s decision to invalidate Minnesota’s statute before Minnesota’s highest court had authoritatively interpreted it.

In her view, the Court should have certified the meaning of “political” to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Federal courts should ordinarily seek a state court’s construction when a state statute may be susceptible to a narrowing interpretation that would avoid constitutional infirmity. Certification would respect state-federal comity and could eliminate the hypothetical line-drawing problems on which the majority relied.

Justice Sotomayor rejected the majority’s reasons for declining certification. The State’s late request did not prevent the Court from certifying a question on its own initiative, and the Court should not speculate that the Minnesota Supreme Court would simply adopt the State’s litigation position or be unable to provide a workable construction of its own.

She also stressed that the word “political” is not inherently incapable of definition. The Court itself recognized clear applications involving candidates, parties, and ballot measures, and prior decisions had upheld restrictions on “political” activities in other settings. The possibility of some unconstitutional applications did not justify facial invalidation where a state-court narrowing construction remained available.

Finally, the statute’s history of implementation gave her assurance that it had not been enforced in an unreasonably indeterminate way. No voter who refused to remove an item had been denied the vote, the State reported no prosecutions under the provision, and this was the first challenge of its kind in more than a century. Given the statute’s many valid applications and the State’s substantial interests, she would have certified the interpretive question rather than strike down the law on its face.