State of Washington v. Donald J. Trump

Temporary restraining orders ordinarily are not appealable. But an order labeled a TRO may be reviewed when it functions like a preliminary injunction, particularly where it follows adversarial litigation and remains effective beyond the short duration ordinarily allowed for a TRO.

Here, the parties fully contested the TRO through briefing and oral argument in district court. The order had no expiration date, no prompt hearing had been scheduled, and the district court's schedule made clear that the order would remain in force longer than fourteen days. Given the government's assertion of an urgent national-security need for appellate relief, the court treated the order as reviewable at this stage.

The States alleged that the Order impaired the teaching, research, hiring, and global-engagement missions of their public universities. Students, faculty, visiting scholars, prospective employees, and interns from affected countries could not travel, return to campus, accept positions, or participate in research; the universities also faced lost investments and diminished ability to recruit.

Those injuries were concrete, traceable to the Order, and redressable by declaratory and injunctive relief. The connection was direct: restricting entry of nationals from the designated countries prevented people from attending, working at, or returning to the States' universities.

The States also could invoke third-party standing on behalf of affected students and faculty. Their interests were closely aligned with those individuals' interests: students' educational progress depended on the universities' ability to teach them, and faculty research supported the institutions' academic missions.

The government argued not merely for deference, but for a rule that the President's immigration decisions were unreviewable even when constitutional rights were allegedly violated. The court rejected that position as inconsistent with the basic constitutional role of the judiciary to decide cases challenging the legality of actions by the political branches.

Supreme Court precedent recognizes broad federal power over immigration, yet repeatedly states that this power is subject to constitutional limits. The court relied on cases such as Zadvydas and Chadha to show that neither Congress nor the Executive may make immigration policy immune from constitutional review.

The government's reliance on Kleindienst v. Mandel was misplaced. Mandel concerned an official's individualized visa decision under a congressionally prescribed standard, whereas this case challenged a sweeping presidential policy. The court concluded that Mandel did not eliminate judicial review of constitutional challenges to broad immigration measures.

National-security concerns warrant institutional respect and deference, but they do not displace the judiciary's duty to protect constitutional liberties. Courts have reviewed and, at times, invalidated government actions taken in the name of national defense, including during wartime.

A stay pending appeal is discretionary. The applicant bears the burden to show both a strong likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable injury absent a stay; these are the two most important stay factors. The court concluded that the government had not met either burden.

The Fifth Amendment protects all persons within the United States, including noncitizens regardless of whether their presence is lawful, temporary, or permanent. Certain noncitizens seeking to return after travel abroad, particularly lawful permanent residents, also possess due-process protections.

The Order imposed serious restrictions without providing notice or a meaningful opportunity to respond. The government did not establish that lawful permanent residents, nonimmigrant visa holders with prior connections to the United States, refugees, or other affected persons lacked protected interests, nor did it show that the Order supplied sufficient process before depriving them of those interests.

A post-Order statement from White House Counsel asserting that the Order did not apply to lawful permanent residents did not moot the issue. The government did not establish that White House Counsel could amend the President's Order, that the interpretation bound all enforcement officials, or that it would persist in light of the government's shifting interpretations.

The government's proposed limitation to lawful permanent residents and certain previously admitted noncitizens would omit other persons who may have due-process rights, including noncitizens unlawfully present in the United States and U.S. citizens with legally cognizable interests in particular noncitizens' admission. The court therefore declined to adopt a restriction that could leave protected persons outside the injunction.

The court also declined to limit the TRO to the plaintiff States. Immigration policy operates through a nationwide network of ports of entry and interconnected travel systems, and the government offered no workable alternative that would protect the States' university-related interests while enforcing the Order elsewhere.

Even if some tailoring might ultimately be appropriate, the court would not effectively rewrite the Executive Order in emergency stay proceedings. The political branches, rather than the court, were better positioned to make the necessary policy distinctions.

The States alleged that the Order was intended to disfavor Muslims, notwithstanding its facial reference to nationality rather than religion. They offered evidence of the President's campaign statements favoring a "Muslim ban" and pointed to the refugee provisions that preferred religious minorities in particular circumstances.

Facial neutrality does not end Establishment Clause or equal-protection analysis. Courts may consider historical context, decisionmakers' statements, and other evidence bearing on discriminatory purpose. Because the court had already found that the government failed to show likely success against the due-process claim, it did not need to resolve the religious-discrimination claim on the accelerated record.

The government's interest in preventing terrorism was unquestionably compelling. But the government offered little evidence showing an urgent need to restore the Order immediately, especially because the TRO temporarily returned the country to the immigration framework that had existed before the Order.

The government identified no evidence that a national of one of the seven designated countries had committed a terrorist attack in the United States. It also did not provide classified or other evidence explaining why the earlier country designations, which had triggered additional visa requirements, justified the immediate and broad entry suspensions imposed by the Order.

By contrast, the States submitted evidence that enforcement harmed students, faculty, universities, families, and residents stranded abroad. Deprivation of constitutional rights is itself an irreparable injury, and the government's vague waiver process did not adequately explain how those harms would be avoided.

The public interest pointed in both directions: the public has a strong interest in national security and in an elected President's ability to implement policy, but also in family unity, travel, and freedom from discrimination. On this record, those competing interests did not support a stay.