Takeaway
In short, this case holds that intentional conduct directed at frightening one group of people can support a battery claim by an unintended person physically injured, and that a general negligence verdict does not preclude that claim unless it necessarily decided the relevant intent issue.
David Manning, Jr. was seated in the right-field bleachers at Fenway Park during a 1975 Orioles–Red Sox game. Orioles pitcher Ross Grimsley was warming up in the nearby bullpen while spectators, including Manning, continuously heckled him. Evidence showed that Grimsley repeatedly looked directly at the hecklers immediately after their remarks.
At the end of the third inning, after his catcher had left the bullpen plate, Grimsley made a pitching motion and threw a ball more than 80 miles per hour at a right angle to his normal pitcher-to-plate line. The ball traveled toward the hecklers, passed through the wire-mesh fence, and struck Manning.
Manning sued Grimsley and the Baltimore Baseball Club, Grimsley’s employer, in diversity under Massachusetts law. He alleged both battery and negligence. The district court directed a verdict for the defendants on battery, and the jury later returned a defense verdict on negligence. Manning appealed only the judgment disposing of the battery claim.
Issue #1
Whether the evidence, viewed favorably to Manning, was sufficient to permit a jury to find that Grimsley committed a battery.
Holding
Yes. The directed verdict on the battery count was improper because a reasonable jury could infer that Grimsley intentionally threw toward the hecklers to cause their imminent apprehension of harmful contact.
Reasoning
On review of a directed verdict, the court was required to take the evidence in the light most favorable to Manning. Grimsley was an expert pitcher; he had looked directly at hecklers immediately after their remarks; and the critical throw traveled at a 90-degree angle from the path on which he had been warming up, directly toward those spectators. Those facts supported a reasonable inference that the throw was deliberate rather than accidental.
The jury could also infer that Grimsley meant to cause the hecklers an immediate fear of being hit. His throw occurred while the heckling was ongoing and while he was trying to prepare to pitch, permitting the conclusion that he acted in response to conduct then interfering with his performance rather than merely reacting to a past insult.
The court applied Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13: a person commits battery when, intending to cause harmful or offensive contact with another or a third person, or to cause imminent apprehension of such contact, the person causes harmful contact. Thus, Manning could recover even if Grimsley had intended to frighten or strike other hecklers rather than Manning himself. Although Massachusetts had no decision directly on point, the court concluded that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would adopt this established common-law rule of transferred intent.
Issue #2
Whether the unappealed defense verdict on Manning's negligence claim precluded him from pursuing the battery claim.
Holding
No. Neither issue preclusion nor claim preclusion barred a new trial on the battery count.
Reasoning
Issue preclusion applies only when a factual issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined by a valid final judgment. Even assuming the negligence trial litigated whether Grimsley intentionally threw toward the bleachers, the general defense verdict did not reveal that the jury resolved that question in Grimsley's favor.
To find negligence, the jury would have needed to find both that Grimsley intentionally threw toward the bleachers and that the throw unreasonably risked injuring Manning. The jury could have concluded that Grimsley intentionally threw the ball but that the wire-mesh fence meant the throw posed no unreasonable risk. Because Grimsley did not show that the verdict necessarily rested on a finding of no intent, the negligence judgment could not conclusively establish that fact against Manning.
The rule barring a later suit based on a different theory arising from the same injury also did not apply. Manning pleaded battery and negligence together in the original action. The jury failed to consider battery only because the trial judge erroneously removed that count from the case, not because Manning withheld the theory and attempted to relitigate in a separate action.
Issue #3
Whether the evidence was sufficient to submit the battery claim against the Baltimore Baseball Club, Grimsley's employer, to the jury.
Holding
Yes. A jury could find that Grimsley's alleged assault responded to spectators' continuing conduct that was presently interfering with his job performance.
Reasoning
Under Massachusetts law, an employer may be liable for an employee's assault when the assault responds to conduct presently interfering with the employee's ability to perform assigned duties. The employer argued that heckling was merely insulting speech, analogous to the customer's isolated critical remark in Miller v. Federated Department Stores.
The court distinguished Miller. Constant heckling by fans at a baseball game could itself constitute conduct aimed at rattling a pitcher, or could have that effect, and a jury could find that it interfered with Grimsley's ability to warm up and to pitch if called into the game.
The timing also mattered. The evidence allowed a finding that Grimsley's throw was a response to ongoing interference, not simply retaliation for a completed annoyance. Therefore, the battery count against the Baltimore Club, as well as the count against Grimsley, should have gone to the jury.