Whether the Copyright Act of 1909 excluded obscene works from copyright protection.
Holding
No. The 1909 Act protected all otherwise copyrightable writings and contained no express or implied obscenity exception.
Reasoning
Section 4 of the 1909 Act extended copyright protection to “all the writings of an author.” Motion pictures plainly qualified as writings, and nothing in that broad language suggested that a work ceased to be copyrightable because its content was obscene.
The statutory history supported this reading. Congress had rarely imposed content-based limits on copyright, and when earlier statutes arguably contained such restrictions, Congress later removed them. By contrast, Congress expressly imposed content-related restrictions in patent and trademark law, showing that it knew how to enact such limits when it chose to do so.
Congress reasonably could conclude that copyright should not turn on official judgments about artistic, social, or moral worth. Courts are poorly positioned to sort valuable expression from worthless expression, especially because public attitudes and assessments of artistic value change substantially over time.
An obscenity exception would also create serious practical and constitutional difficulties. Obscenity may depend on local community standards, while copyright is a nationally uniform system. Congress's decision not to build that unstable, locality-dependent inquiry into copyright law was therefore sensible.
Accordingly, all creative works that otherwise satisfy the Act's requirements may receive copyright protection regardless of whether they are alleged to be obscene. The court did not need to decide whether Behind the Green Door was obscene.