Blechman was tried before a jury on an indictment alleging that, on October 11, 1944, he counseled George Polos to burn a Hackensack dwelling with the intent to prejudice or defraud the property’s fire insurers. The governing statute made it a high misdemeanor to willfully or maliciously burn insured property, or to aid, counsel, procure, or consent to its burning, with that fraudulent intent.
The jury found Blechman guilty. On review, the printed record did not include either the full indictment or a formal entry of judgment of conviction. The State, however, did not rely on that omission and appeared to accept that the return on the writ established a judgment. Blechman argued that solicitation was not punishable unless the property was actually burned, that the proof varied from the indictment, that the insurance proof was inadequate, and that the evidence and jury instructions did not adequately establish specific intent to defraud an insurer.
Issue #1
Whether the writ of error had to be dismissed because the record did not formally show the entry of a judgment of conviction.
Holding
No. Although the omission ordinarily would justify dismissal, the Court reached the merits because the State did not raise the defect and effectively conceded that the return showed a judgment on the verdict.
Reasoning
A writ of error ordinarily requires a record showing the judgment being reviewed. Here, the state of the case omitted a formal judgment entry, a deficiency the Court said would normally be fatal to review.
The Court nevertheless declined to dismiss because the State did not invoke the omission and appeared to concede that the return on the writ established the entry of judgment. The Court therefore proceeded to consider the asserted trial errors.
Issue #2
Whether counseling or soliciting another to burn insured property with intent to defraud an insurer is an offense under the statute when no burning actually occurs.
Holding
Yes. The statute makes the solicitation itself a high misdemeanor; actual burning or completion of the solicited offense is not required.
Reasoning
The statute separately condemns both the willful or malicious burning of insured property and the acts of aiding, counseling, procuring, or consenting to its burning. The Court read the language as creating a distinct offense for counseling or solicitation, rather than making counseling punishable only after a completed burning.
That reading also accords with the common law. Soliciting another to commit a felony, or an aggravated misdemeanor, was itself indictable even if the person solicited did nothing and the intended crime never occurred. The punishable act is the solicitation, which moves the defendant’s criminal purpose beyond mere unexpressed intent.
Solicitation is not simply an incomplete attempt to commit the target offense. A criminal attempt requires a direct but ineffectual overt act toward completion of the crime, whereas solicitation is complete when the defendant incites another to commit it.
The Maryland decision on which Blechman relied did not control because its arson statute expressly made an actual burning an indispensable element. By contrast, the New Jersey statute recognized the already-existing common-law solicitation offense and elevated its classification to a high misdemeanor.
Issue #3
Whether the proof fatally varied from the indictment because Blechman also solicited a third person who was posing as a participant in the planned arson.
Holding
No. The evidence supported the offense as charged: that Blechman counseled Polos to commit the burning.
Reasoning
The indictment alleged that Blechman counseled Polos to set the fire, and there was evidence supporting that allegation. The additional proof that Blechman also spoke with a third person did not negate or alter the charged solicitation of Polos.
Because the evidence established the allegation actually made in the indictment, the required correspondence between the charge and the proof was satisfied.
Issue #4
Whether the State failed to prove that the dwelling was covered by valid fire insurance at the relevant time.
Holding
No. The State introduced competent prima facie evidence of a valid outstanding fire-insurance policy covering the property.
Reasoning
The record contained evidence of an insurance policy in force when the indictment alleged the solicitation occurred. The person signing as attorney-in-fact was supported by competent prima facie evidence of authority and signature, and the defense did not challenge the evidence’s integrity on cross-examination.
There was also evidence that Blechman paid the policy premium, or a proportional share of it, to the insurer. The Court therefore found the proof of insurance adequate.
Issue #5
Whether the evidence was insufficient to prove that Blechman specifically intended to prejudice or defraud the insurer.
Holding
No. There was ample evidence that Blechman himself acted with the required fraudulent intent, and the solicited persons' lack of criminal intent was immaterial.
Reasoning
The requisite specific intent concerned Blechman’s own purpose in making the solicitation. The Court concluded that the evidence amply supported an inference that he sought to defraud or prejudice the insurer.
It did not matter that Polos and Pabst may not have shared Blechman’s intent or may have been unwilling to carry out the plan. Since solicitation is complete even when it is ineffectual, the failure of the people solicited to participate does not eliminate the solicitor’s criminal intent or liability.
Issue #6
Whether the jury instructions required reversal because they did not adequately explain the need to find specific intent to defraud and allegedly gave a misleading general definition of malice.
Holding
No. The instructions were not reversible error, and the separate challenge to the malice instruction was not preserved for review.
Reasoning
An instruction that accurately states the law as far as it goes is not reversible merely because the defendant believes it should have been more complete. If Blechman wanted a fuller instruction on specific intent, he needed to submit a specific request to charge.
Blechman also did not preserve his claim that the general definition of malice created a misleading ambiguity. He neither assigned error to that passage nor specified it as a cause for reversal, as the applicable review rules required.
A challenge to a jury instruction must identify the asserted defect with sufficient precision to notify both the court and the opposing party; when the challenge concerns particular language, that language should be reproduced. Blechman’s generalized objection did not meet that standard.