Caseflicks

Supreme Court of Minnesota • 1942

State v. Peterson

4 N.W.2d 826 | 213 Minn. 56 | 1942 Minn. LEXIS 481

Full access

Unlock the video and quiz

The written brief is free to read below. Subscribe to watch the video explainer and take the quiz.

Create an account Log in

Takeaway

In short, this case holds that an alleged instigator of a crime escapes liability for the completed offense by timely, affirmative, and clearly communicated withdrawal before the crime is carried out.

Background

Peterson was convicted of second-degree arson for the burning of her Lake Minnetonka home. The State did not contend that she personally lit the fire. Instead, it alleged that she caused August Anderson, with whom she had a longstanding and close relationship, to burn the house as part of an insurance scheme.

Anderson admitted setting seven fires in the house on October 30, 1940. Peterson denied directing or assisting him. While hospitalized after an automobile accident, she learned that Anderson had gone to the house. Before the fire, she sent Victor Carlson to retrieve Anderson and bring him to the hospital. Carlson twice tried to persuade Anderson to leave; Anderson refused. After setting the fires, Anderson told Peterson what he had done. She immediately told him to return and put them out.

On appeal, Peterson challenged the adequacy and reliability of Anderson's accomplice testimony, several evidentiary and instructional rulings, and her criminal liability in light of her asserted withdrawal. The Supreme Court found the withdrawal issue dispositive and reversed the conviction.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a person who allegedly procured, counseled, or commanded another to commit arson remains criminally liable when she withdraws before the fire is set and communicates that withdrawal to the person who will commit the crime.

Holding

No. A person may avoid liability for the completed substantive offense by timely and effectively withdrawing and making that withdrawal known to the principal actor before the crime is committed.

Reasoning

The Court distinguished an agreement to commit arson from the completed crime of arson. Peterson was charged with arson, not conspiracy. Although a conspiracy may be a separate offense, liability for the substantive crime can be avoided when a person who set a criminal agent in motion terminates that agency before the criminal act occurs.

A procurer or instigator must take affirmative action to disavow or defeat the criminal plan. Mere private change of mind is not enough. But when the withdrawal is communicated to the person expected to commit the offense in time for that person to stop, the original procurer is no longer responsible for the principal's later independent act.

The undisputed evidence showed that Peterson did more than merely express regret. Before Anderson started the fire, she sent Carlson twice to the house to tell Anderson that she wanted him to leave immediately and come to her at the hospital. These efforts were the most effective measures available to her to prevent the fire.

Anderson necessarily understood Peterson's message to leave the house before carrying out the plan as an unmistakable direction not to burn it. Because Peterson timely withdrew and clearly communicated that withdrawal before Anderson set the fires, Anderson alone bore criminal responsibility for the arson. The verdict therefore could not stand.