Takeaway
In short, this case recognizes that an express promise to compensate a rescuer may be enforceable when the promisor received the material benefit of having his life or body saved, even though the rescue was not requested in advance.
While clearing an upper floor at his employer's mill, Webb was about to drop a seventy-five-pound pine block to the ground below. He saw McGowin directly beneath the drop point. To keep the block from striking McGowin, Webb held onto it and fell with it, diverting its path. McGowin was unharmed, but Webb suffered severe, permanent injuries, including broken bones, a torn heel, and lifelong disability.
About a month later, McGowin promised to support Webb for life by paying him $15 every two weeks, in consideration of Webb's rescue and resulting injuries. McGowin made those payments for more than eight years, until his death; the payments stopped shortly afterward. Webb sued McGowin's estate for unpaid installments. The trial court sustained demurrers to the amended complaint, concluding that it stated no enforceable claim, and Webb took a nonsuit and appealed.
Issue #1
Whether McGowin's later promise to pay Webb was enforceable even though Webb rescued him without a prior request or preexisting contractual duty.
Holding
Yes. McGowin's receipt of the material benefit of being saved from death or grievous bodily harm, followed by his express promise to compensate Webb, supplied enforceable consideration.
Reasoning
The court treated preservation of McGowin's life and body as a material, rather than merely sentimental, benefit. A person's life and physical integrity have economic value recognized in medical practice, personal-injury damages, and life and health insurance. Saving McGowin from likely death or serious injury therefore conferred a benefit sufficient to support his subsequent promise to pay.
A moral obligation alone ordinarily does not make a promise enforceable. But where the promisor has received an actual material or pecuniary benefit from the promisee, the promisor's moral obligation to compensate may support an express later promise. McGowin received precisely that kind of benefit when Webb prevented the falling block from striking him.
The court analogized to cases in which a person later promised to pay for unrequested services that preserved or improved the person's property. If a later promise can validate payment for caring for an escaped animal or preserving property, the court reasoned, it can validate payment for the much more substantial service of preserving a person's life or bodily safety.
Issue #2
Whether the absence of a request by McGowin before Webb acted defeated the alleged contract.
Holding
No. McGowin's later express promise could operate as an affirmance or ratification of Webb's rescue and support a presumption that the service was requested.
Reasoning
Some authorities require a prior legal or equitable obligation before a moral obligation will support a later promise. The court held that this requirement is qualified when the promisor has received a material benefit and then expressly promises to pay for it.
By expressly agreeing to support Webb after learning that Webb had been injured while saving him, McGowin affirmed the service already rendered. The court regarded that ratification as carrying a presumption of a prior request, removing the objection that Webb had acted without McGowin's advance authorization.
Issue #3
Whether Webb's injuries and the supposedly gratuitous nature of his rescue left McGowin's promise unsupported by consideration.
Holding
No. Webb's severe injury was a legal detriment, and the parties' payment arrangement showed that the rescue was not treated as gratuitous.
Reasoning
Consideration may consist either of a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. Webb's permanent injuries were part of the consideration for McGowin's promise: McGowin gained protection from grave harm while Webb sustained life-altering physical losses in accomplishing that protection.
The sustained course of performance also undermined any claim that Webb's act was intended as a gift. McGowin agreed to make biweekly payments, and Webb accepted them for more than eight years, demonstrating that both parties understood the rescue and Webb's injuries to be the basis for compensation.
Issue #4
Whether the lifetime-support agreement was void under the statute of frauds.
Holding
No. The complaint did not show that the agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
Reasoning
The court rejected the statute-of-frauds ground of demurrer. On the facts pleaded, McGowin's agreement to make biweekly support payments for Webb's life was not void under the cited Alabama statute.
The court also distinguished Alabama decisions involving promises to pay for improvements made to federal land before the promisor acquired it. Those later purchasers had not owned the land when the improvements were made and therefore had not received the benefit of those services; McGowin, by contrast, personally received the immediate benefit of Webb's rescue.