Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 2016

Ross v. Blake

578 U.S. 632 | 195 L. Ed. 2d 117 | 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3614 | 136 S. Ct. 1850 | 84 U.S.L.W. 4352 | 26 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 205

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Takeaway

In short, Ross v. Blake makes PLRA exhaustion mandatory but only for grievance procedures that are genuinely available in practice.

Background

Maryland prisoner Shaidon Blake alleged that, while guards moved him to segregation, Officer Michael Ross held him as another officer, James Madigan, repeatedly shoved and punched him. Blake reported the incident, and Maryland's Internal Investigative Unit (IIU) conducted a year-long investigation that condemned Madigan's conduct. Madigan resigned, and a jury later awarded Blake $50,000 on his excessive-force claim against Madigan. Blake also sued Ross under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to protect him.

Ross asserted the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement as an affirmative defense. Although Maryland's ordinary Administrative Remedy Procedure (ARP) required a grievance to the warden and possible appeals, Blake had not filed an ARP grievance. He believed the IIU investigation replaced that process. The District Court dismissed Blake's claim against Ross, holding that an internal investigation did not excuse exhaustion.

The Fourth Circuit reversed. It recognized a judge-made "special circumstances" exception to the PLRA, under which an inmate's reasonable but mistaken belief that he had exhausted available remedies could justify noncompliance. It concluded that Blake reasonably believed the IIU investigation removed his complaint from the ordinary ARP process. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the PLRA permits a court to excuse a prisoner's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies because of "special circumstances," including a reasonable mistake about prison grievance procedures.

Holding

No. The PLRA forecloses a judicially created "special circumstances" exception; a prisoner must exhaust all administrative remedies that are available.

Reasoning

Section 1997e(a) states that no prisoner action concerning prison conditions may be brought until "such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Its use of "shall" and "no action" makes exhaustion mandatory, not a matter left to judicial discretion. The statute contains no exception for a prisoner's reasonable misunderstanding, good faith, or other special circumstances.

The Court distinguished statutory exhaustion requirements from judge-made exhaustion doctrines. Courts may create exceptions to a prudential doctrine that they created, but they may not add exceptions to a mandatory rule Congress enacted. The Court's prior PLRA decisions likewise refused to create exceptions based on the relief sought, the nature of the claim, or its constitutional character.

The PLRA's history confirms that result. Its predecessor, CRIPA, allowed courts to require exhaustion only when remedies were plain, speedy, effective, and when exhaustion was appropriate and in the interests of justice. Congress replaced that discretionary regime with the PLRA's stricter and mandatory text, so a special-circumstances rule would improperly restore discretion Congress deliberately removed.

Issue #2

Whether Blake nevertheless may proceed if Maryland's ordinary grievance process was not an administrative remedy "available" to him within the meaning of the PLRA.

Holding

Possibly. The case was remanded for the lower courts to determine whether Maryland's ARP process was actually available to Blake.

Reasoning

The word "available" limits the PLRA's exhaustion command. A prisoner need exhaust only a remedy that is capable of use to obtain some relief for the complained-of wrong. Thus, the rejection of a broad special-circumstances exception does not require exhaustion of a process that, in practice, cannot be used.

A remedy is unavailable when it operates as a dead end: prison officials lack authority to provide relief or are consistently unwilling to do so. A formally existing grievance procedure does not have to be exhausted if the facts show that it offers no real possibility of redress.

A remedy is also unavailable when the grievance system is so opaque that no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it. The standard is demanding: a procedure is not unavailable merely because it permits reasonable disagreement or creates some confusion. But a process that is essentially unknowable and cannot realistically be used by an ordinary inmate need not be exhausted.

Finally, officials can render an otherwise valid grievance procedure unavailable by thwarting its use through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation. Misleading an inmate, threatening him, or creating procedural traps that prevent pursuit of relief eliminates the obligation to exhaust under the statute.

The materials presented to the Court suggested that Maryland wardens routinely dismissed ARP grievances when the IIU was investigating the same matter, stating that no further action would occur in the ARP process. Yet other materials indicated that the Inmate Grievance Office sometimes reached the merits after such dismissals. On remand, the lower court had to determine whether the IIU investigation foreclosed ARP relief, whether the relationship between the two systems was knowable to an ordinary prisoner, and whether officials had effectively thwarted use of the process.

Concurrences

Justice Thomas

Reasoning

Justice Thomas joined the Court's legal analysis and its judgment, but would not have discussed the new documents Blake submitted in the Supreme Court concerning Maryland's grievance procedures. Those materials were outside the certified appellate record, and the Court generally should not allow parties to influence its decision with evidence not considered below.

In his view, the Court should leave it to the Court of Appeals on remand to decide whether the record may be supplemented or whether the documents are proper subjects of judicial notice. Addressing them in the Supreme Court risked encouraging gamesmanship and complicated appellate review.

Justice Breyer

Reasoning

Justice Breyer joined the Court except insofar as its opinion could be understood to exclude all traditional administrative-law exceptions to proper exhaustion. In his earlier concurrence in Woodford v. Ngo, he had concluded that the term "exhausted" incorporates the established exceptions to exhaustion found in administrative law.

He agreed that the PLRA does not permit freewheeling special-circumstances exceptions. But he maintained that traditional administrative-law exceptions may still apply when appropriate, even though none was necessary to resolve this case.