Caseflicks

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit • 2006

Robbins v. Social Security Administration

466 F.3d 880

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Takeaway

In short, this case requires an ALJ to give specific, legally adequate reasons for rejecting symptom and lay-witness evidence; otherwise, an RFC and vocational-expert analysis built on that rejection cannot sustain a denial of benefits.

Background

Leroy Robbins sought Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging that he had been disabled since August 1993 by depression and serious problems with his neck, shoulder, back, and knees. His applications were initially denied. After an ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council declined review, the district court remanded by stipulation, directing the agency to obtain and evaluate a mental-health examination, hold a new hearing, reassess the credibility of Robbins and lay witnesses, and reevaluate his residual functional capacity (RFC) and work ability.

On remand, a second ALJ found Robbins disabled beginning September 7, 1998, but not for the earlier period from August 1993 through September 6, 1998. For that earlier period, the ALJ found that Robbins could perform less than the full range of medium work and, based on vocational-expert testimony, could work as a general clerk or security or gate guard. The district court affirmed the partial denial. Robbins appealed, arguing that the ALJ improperly evaluated his testimony and his son's lay testimony, which in turn undermined the RFC finding and the vocational-expert hypothetical.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the ALJ gave legally sufficient reasons for finding Robbins's testimony about his pain and functional limitations not entirely credible.

Holding

No. Because there was no finding of malingering, the ALJ had to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons, and the reasons given did not meet that standard.

Reasoning

Once the record shows a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably produce the claimant's alleged symptoms, the ALJ must assess the claimant's credibility. In the absence of affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject symptom testimony only through specific findings supported by clear and convincing reasons. Subjective complaints cannot be discounted merely because objective medical evidence does not affirmatively substantiate their severity.

The ALJ stated that Robbins's testimony was inconsistent with or unsupported by the overall medical evidence. That rationale was legally inadequate because it effectively rejected his pain testimony for lack of objective corroboration. Regulations and Ninth Circuit precedent permit objective evidence to inform the inquiry, but do not permit an ALJ to discredit subjective symptom testimony solely because medical evidence does not verify its asserted severity.

The ALJ also referred to supposedly equivocal or conflicting statements about Robbins's alcohol use. Inconsistent statements about drinking may sometimes bear on credibility, but the ALJ did not identify the particular statements, explain the supposed inconsistency, or show why it undermined Robbins's account of his disabling limitations. A cursory reference to equivocal testimony was not substantial evidence supporting an adverse credibility finding.

The decision also lacked the required narrative explanation connecting evidence to the credibility determination. Without specific reasons and an account of the weight assigned to Robbins's statements, the court could not meaningfully review the ALJ's reasoning. The defective credibility finding therefore left the pre-September 1998 RFC unsupported by substantial evidence.

Issue #2

Whether the ALJ's failure to address the testimony of Robbins's son, Rodney, was harmless error.

Holding

No. The omission was not harmless because Rodney's testimony supported Robbins's claimed limitations and could have affected the disability determination if credited.

Reasoning

Lay testimony about a claimant's symptoms and limitations is competent evidence. An ALJ must consider it or expressly reject it by giving reasons germane to that particular witness. The Commissioner conceded that the ALJ did not account for Rodney Robbins's August 1998 testimony, which described his father's pain, difficulty walking and using his arms and hands, fatigue, depression, and worsening condition.

Under the Ninth Circuit's harmless-error rule for omitted favorable lay testimony, the error is harmless only when the reviewing court can confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, fully crediting the testimony, could reach a different disability determination. The court could not draw that conclusion here.

Although the ALJ discussed similar testimony from Robbins's daughter, Rodney's testimony added corroborative weight to Robbins's account and to the accounts of his wife and daughter. Because the ALJ had not lawfully discredited Robbins's own testimony, the court could not treat Rodney's corroboration as inconsequential.

Issue #3

Whether the vocational-expert hypothetical and the resulting step-five finding that Robbins could perform other work before September 7, 1998 were supported by substantial evidence.

Holding

No. The hypothetical was legally inadequate because it rested on an RFC that improperly excluded limitations supported by wrongly discounted claimant and lay testimony.

Reasoning

At step five, an ALJ may rely on vocational-expert testimony only when the hypothetical reflects all limitations supported by substantial evidence. An ALJ need not include unsupported limitations, but may not disregard limitations that are properly supported in the record.

The ALJ's RFC omitted limitations that could follow from Robbins's testimony and Rodney's corroborating testimony. Because the ALJ's treatment of that evidence was legally flawed, the RFC finding for the period before September 7, 1998 was not supported by substantial evidence.

That error was consequential. If the omitted testimony were credited, the vocational expert would have been asked to consider additional restrictions that the record suggested could change the available-work analysis. The court therefore reversed and remanded rather than affirming the step-five denial.

Dissents

Judge O’Scannlain

Reasoning

Judge O’Scannlain would have affirmed. In his view, the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for discounting Robbins's account of disabling limitations. The ALJ did not reject the testimony simply because Robbins lacked affirmative objective proof of pain; rather, the ALJ found that his claimed inability to function conflicted with medical opinions and clinical findings showing relatively limited functional restrictions.

The dissent stressed that the regulations permit an ALJ to compare a claimant's statements with the full medical record, including treating and examining physicians' opinions. Here, several doctors and agency reviewers concluded that Robbins could perform medium or light work with specified accommodations, noted good strength and no significant difficulty ambulating, and encouraged him to return to work. Those conclusions reasonably conflicted with Robbins's claim that pain confined him largely to sitting and watching television.

The dissent also regarded Robbins's statements concerning alcohol use as a legitimate additional credibility factor. It read the ALJ's discussion as identifying conflicting reports: Robbins had denied an alcohol problem at one point, while other evidence described heavy drinking, and he later reported occasional drinking while acknowledging a prior problem. Judge O’Scannlain believed the ALJ's preceding detailed discussion of the record adequately explained the later credibility conclusion even without expressly linking every item of evidence to that conclusion.

Judge O’Scannlain further concluded that omitting Rodney Robbins's testimony was harmless, even under the majority's demanding harmless-error standard. The ALJ had considered substantially similar accounts by Robbins's wife and daughter, including observations of pain, difficulty walking, depression, irritability, and inability to perform apartment-management work. The daughter’s testimony was found generally credible, so Rodney's similar account added no materially new limitation.

Finally, the dissent emphasized that the ALJ accepted that Robbins had severe impairments, imposed postural and manipulative restrictions, and found he could not return to his past work. Given the medical evidence supporting a limited medium-work RFC and the vocational expert's testimony that he could work as a general clerk or security or gate guard, Judge O’Scannlain saw no basis to disturb the RFC or the hypothetical.