Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 2015

Kingsley v. Hendrickson

576 U.S. 389 | 135 S. Ct. 2466 | 192 L. Ed. 2d 416 | 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4073 | 25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 401 | 83 U.S.L.W. 4515

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Takeaway

In short, Kingsley holds that a pretrial detainee need prove only that deliberately used force was objectively unreasonable, not that officers subjectively intended wrongdoing or recklessly disregarded the detainee’s rights.

Background

Michael Kingsley was a pretrial detainee in a Wisconsin county jail. After he repeatedly refused orders to remove paper covering the light fixture in his cell, officers handcuffed him, removed him from the cell, and placed him face down on a bunk in a receiving cell. The parties disputed whether Kingsley resisted and whether officers slammed his head into the bunk, but agreed that Sergeant Hendrickson placed a knee in Kingsley’s back and directed Deputy Degner to apply a Taser to Kingsley’s back for about five seconds.

Kingsley sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The District Court instructed the jury that Kingsley had to prove not only that the force was unreasonable, but also that the officers recklessly disregarded his safety and rights. The jury found for the officers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a pretrial detainee had to establish the officers’ subjective intent to violate, or reckless disregard of, the detainee’s rights. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve a circuit conflict over the proper standard.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a pretrial detainee alleging excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment must prove that officers subjectively knew their force was excessive or instead need show only objective unreasonableness.

Holding

A pretrial detainee need show only that force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable; he need not prove that officers subjectively intended to violate his rights or knew their force was excessive.

Reasoning

The Court separated two state-of-mind questions. Due process does require more than accidental or merely negligent conduct: the officer must have deliberately used the force at issue, such as by purposefully or knowingly deploying a Taser. But once deliberate force is established, the constitutional question whether that force was excessive is objective, not dependent on the officer’s personal view of its legality or excessiveness.

Objective reasonableness must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene and based on the information available at the time, rather than hindsight. Courts must also give appropriate weight to jail officials’ legitimate need to preserve order, discipline, and institutional security. Relevant circumstances can include the need for force, the amount used compared with that need, the injury suffered, efforts to limit force, the seriousness of the security problem, the threat reasonably perceived, and whether the detainee was actively resisting.

The Court read Bell v. Wolfish as establishing an objective framework for pretrial-detainee due-process claims. Even without express punitive intent, a detainee may prevail by showing objectively that governmental action lacks a rational connection to a legitimate nonpunitive purpose or is excessive in relation to that purpose. Bell examined the objective relationship between jail conditions and legitimate detention interests; it did not require proof of officials’ subjective beliefs.

An objective standard also fits Graham v. Connor’s treatment of force used against persons accused but not convicted of crimes, and it is administrable in practice. Several circuits’ pattern instructions and correctional training practices already use an objective-reasonableness approach. The Court further concluded that the standard sufficiently protects good-faith officers because it incorporates the officer’s on-scene knowledge, defers appropriately to institutional-security judgments, excludes accidental conduct, and operates alongside qualified immunity.

The officers’ reliance on Eighth Amendment cases was misplaced. Whitley v. Albers and Hudson v. McMillian involved convicted prisoners, who may be punished but are protected against cruel and unusual punishment; pretrial detainees may not be punished at all. County of Sacramento v. Lewis required a purpose to cause harm in the very different setting of a high-speed pursuit and concerned intent to commit the challenged acts, not a subjective belief that intentionally used force was excessive. Johnson v. Glick likewise treated malicious purpose as one potentially relevant factor, not as an indispensable element of a pretrial detainee’s claim.

Issue #2

Whether the District Court’s jury instruction improperly required Kingsley to establish a subjective reckless state of mind.

Holding

Yes. The instruction was erroneous because it added subjective recklessness requirements to the objective-unreasonableness inquiry; the Seventh Circuit was to decide on remand whether the error was harmless.

Reasoning

Although the instruction included an objective-reasonableness component, it separately required Kingsley to prove that the officers recklessly disregarded his safety and rights. It also invited the jury to consider whether the officers themselves reasonably believed that staff or prisoner safety was threatened. Taken together, those directions could lead jurors to focus on the officers’ subjective reasons and views rather than solely on whether the deliberately used force was objectively unreasonable.

The Court did not decide whether the instructional error required a new trial. Because harmlessness could depend on the detailed record and trial circumstances, the Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded for that court to address harmless error in the first instance.

Dissents

Justice Scalia

Reasoning

Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, argued that the Due Process Clause prohibits punishment of pretrial detainees, not every deliberately inflicted force that a later factfinder considers objectively unreasonable. In his view, Bell v. Wolfish makes actual intent to punish the central constitutional inquiry, although that intent sometimes may be inferred from circumstances.

He maintained that Bell’s inference of punitive intent from a lack of reasonable relation to a legitimate objective works for considered detention conditions and jail policies. It does not work automatically for an officer’s split-second decision about the amount of force needed to restore order. Using too much force may be evidence of punitive intent, but it can also reflect a mistaken judgment rather than an intent to punish.

Justice Scalia rejected the idea that substantive due process independently creates a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from objectively excessive force. He warned that the majority improperly transformed the Fourteenth Amendment into a source of general tort law, despite the availability of state-law remedies such as assault and battery.

Justice Alito

Reasoning

Justice Alito would have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. He reasoned that the Court first should determine whether a pretrial detainee may bring an excessive-force claim under the Fourth Amendment against a detention-facility employee.

Because Fourth Amendment excessive-force analysis is already objective, Justice Alito believed that recognizing such a claim could make the due-process claim addressed by the majority unnecessary or indistinguishable. In his view, the Court should not decide a substantive-due-process question before resolving the availability of the more specific Fourth Amendment framework.