Caseflicks

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit • 2014

Cheyenne Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles

754 F.3d 1147 | 88 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1444 | 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11543

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that a criminal ban on using vehicles as “living quarters” cannot rest on undefined language and unconstrained police judgment, especially where its practical operation targets homeless people.

Background

Los Angeles Municipal Code § 85.02 made it unlawful to use a vehicle parked or standing on a City street or certain public lots “as living quarters either overnight, day-by-day, or otherwise.” After complaints concerning trash and human waste associated with vehicle dwelling in Venice, the LAPD formed the Venice Homelessness Task Force to enforce the ordinance against homeless people living in vehicles. Officers were informally instructed to look for home-like possessions—such as food, bedding, clothing, medicine, and necessities—and were told that sleeping in the vehicle was not necessary. The enforcement sequence was generally a warning, then a citation, then arrest.

The plaintiffs were homeless people cited, warned, or arrested under the ordinance even when they said they were not sleeping in their vehicles. One was cited while waiting for a church to open and later arrested after leaving his car; another was arrested while sitting in his car to escape rain despite proof that he slept at a winter shelter. A plaintiff driving an RV through Venice received a warning, and another was cited and arrested although he explained that he did not sleep in his van. Their vehicles contained ordinary personal items such as clothing, food, bedding, medicine, and radios.

Plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action alleging several federal and state claims. During late discovery, the City produced internal enforcement memoranda. One memorandum suggested arrests should rest on observed overnight occupancy for more than one night or daytime occupancy for at least three days, but the Task Force commander rejected that limitation in favor of a general “Four C’s” approach. Depositions also revealed conflicting officer views about what conduct violated the ordinance. Plaintiffs then expressly raised a facial vagueness challenge in their summary-judgment papers. The district court declined to consider that claim because it was not specifically pleaded in the amended complaint and granted summary judgment to the City on all claims. Plaintiffs appealed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the district court could refuse to reach the vagueness claim because plaintiffs had not expressly pleaded it in their First Amended Complaint.

Holding

No. The district court abused its discretion by failing to construe plaintiffs’ summary-judgment arguments as a request to amend the pleadings and by refusing to decide the vagueness claim on the merits.

Reasoning

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 embodies an extremely liberal amendment policy. When a claim outside the pleadings is raised in connection with summary judgment, the district court ordinarily should treat the matter as a request to amend, particularly where the opposing party can fully litigate the issue.

The record did not support bad faith or undue delay. Plaintiffs learned the critical details of the LAPD’s enforcement policies only when the City produced internal memoranda eight days before discovery closed. Those materials mattered because a vagueness analysis considers whether an enforcement agency has adopted a limiting interpretation that gives the law definite meaning.

The City was not unfairly surprised or prejudiced. Plaintiffs’ deposition questions focused on the absence of concrete enforcement criteria, plaintiffs told defense counsel before summary judgment that they would assert vagueness, and both sides fully briefed the issue. No additional discovery was needed, the amendment was not futile, and plaintiffs had amended only once before receiving the late-produced materials.

Issue #2

Whether Los Angeles Municipal Code § 85.02 was facially void for vagueness under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

Holding

Yes. Section 85.02 was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to give ordinary people fair notice of prohibited conduct and invited arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement against homeless people.

Reasoning

Due process requires a criminal law to provide ordinary people adequate notice of what it prohibits and to establish standards that constrain police discretion. A law may fail either requirement independently; § 85.02 failed both.

The ordinance prohibited using a vehicle as “living quarters either overnight, day-by-day, or otherwise,” but it did not define “living quarters” or explain what duration or conduct “otherwise” covered. Under the City’s own enforcement practices, neither sleeping nor possessing a large quantity of belongings was necessary. Thus, people could not tell whether lawful acts such as eating food, keeping a sleeping bag or books, talking on a phone, or sitting in a car during rain would lead to citation or arrest.

The ordinance’s breadth resembled the anti-loitering law invalidated in City of Chicago v. Morales. It could potentially reach ordinary drivers carrying personal belongings or travelers passing through Los Angeles in RVs, yet it gave no workable line separating innocent conduct from criminal conduct. A person seeking to comply could not reliably do so without abandoning possessions, a vehicle, or the City itself.

The lack of standards also enabled selective enforcement. Although the language could cover many ordinary vehicle users, the Task Force applied it to homeless people. Vagueness doctrine guards against laws that let police cast a broad net and select for punishment persons viewed as undesirable rather than persons clearly shown to have committed a defined offense.

The City’s health and safety concerns were legitimate but could not cure the ordinance’s constitutional defect. Some plaintiffs had garbage, pets, or other conditions in their vehicles, but others were engaged in commonplace activities. Nor did the City supply a valid limiting construction: the Task Force commander disfavored the more specific 2008 memorandum, substituted the vague “Four C’s” philosophy, and officers did not follow the memorandum’s overnight or multi-day observation requirements in plaintiffs’ cases.

Issue #3

Whether the disabled plaintiffs’ challenge to mistakenly issued parking tickets remained a live controversy.

Holding

No. That challenge was moot.

Reasoning

The disabled plaintiffs sought only declaratory and injunctive relief and disclaimed any contention that the mistakenly issued parking citations were reasonably likely to recur. Both sides acknowledged that Task Force officers had stopped issuing those tickets, so voluntary cessation mooted the claim because recurrence was not reasonably expected.